

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE:

Reflections on "Educating Executives," by Raymond Katzell

Southern Governor—Challenge to the Strong Executive Theme, by Robert Highsaw

The Managerialization of the Campus, by Earl Latham

WINTER 1959

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in this number

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Reflections on "Educating Executives"

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THE symposium, "Educating Executives," in the Autumn, 1958 *Review* provides a panorama of educational programs to develop executives in industry and public agencies. All were instituted within the past few years and therefore present a contemporary overview.

What can we learn from these reports? We can observe what the programs tried to accomplish, how they were conducted, and something of their outcomes. Some of us may spot characteristics that we may wish to adapt to our own purposes, practices that we may decide to avoid, or needs that we may regard as still unfulfilled.

It may therefore be helpful to approach this array of programs by analyzing first their apparent similarities and differences. Aggregate trends may then be compared with what is known of other programs and some comparative judgments made.

Major dimensions in terms of which these similarities and differences may be analyzed are: Objectives, Content, Method, Educational Agency, and Job Level of Trainees. Let us examine more closely these facets of the programs reported.

A Combined Analysis of the Programs

A. Basic Objectives. All executive development programs, including those cited here, have the comprehensive goal of modifying executive thinking and behavior through learning. However, there may be important differences among programs in the particular levels and patterns of behavior which they attempt to change. Four such target areas may be iden-

» Three possible weaknesses in the educational programs for public executives described in the last *Review* are suggested here (along with praise of many aspects): (1) They apparently are not sufficiently integrated into a total executive development program by the employing agency for each individual, (2) there is too little attention to the emotional barriers to effective action as opposed to the barrier of inadequate knowledge, and (3) there may be danger of over-emphasizing administrative technique as against program knowledge. In addition, we are warned that executive training programs in general can do more harm than good, with four characteristics of potentially harmful programs explained.

tified, some more explicitly than others, in the reports under review:

1. Improving the executive "as a man" by enhancing the scope of his cultural background;
2. Broadening his outlook on executive responsibilities, presumably leading to some redirection of executive attention and action;
3. Increasing his specific administrative knowledge and skills;
4. Modifying his patterns of adjustment and relationships to his world, involving some change in personality processes.

The first objective is most clearly represented in the liberal arts programs described by Nelson. The second, or "broadening" objective, is paramount in most of the other programs described. The main difference between these two objectives, irrespective of content or method, is the greater emphasis in the second objective on change in *job* behavior. As Nelson puts it, ". . . the liberal arts do not stand or fall according to whether they make better business managers or better public administrators." However, one may infer that programs to educate the whole man would have few employer sponsors without the as-

sumption that attaining this objective also helps create better executives. This inference is supported by the attention Nelson devotes to the ways in which it may be "possible for the liberal arts to transform the practices of an administrator" and by the objectives cited for the liberal arts program undertaken by Bell Telephone. Thus, in the last analysis, objectives one and two may not differ markedly.

The third objective, that relating to skills training, is the major target of none of the programs reviewed here, although several devote considerable attention to it in the course of pursuing the second (Mailick, Grundstein, Reynolds, Mowitz). This circumstance should not blind us to the possibility that programs which focus primarily on improving specific administrative skills may play an important and legitimate role in executive development. Such programs are widely represented in the seminars and workshops conducted by various universities, by professional and management associations, and intramurally by many companies and agencies, on such topics as work simplification, public speaking, cost control, budget management, etc.

The fourth target area for development exists on the level of changing the individual's perceptions and feelings of himself, his colleagues, and his environment. The improvements sought in this connection are dependent not so much on factual knowledge as on the removal of the psychological barriers to effective understanding and action and on the development of personal insights that cannot be readily communicated by the spoken and written word.

Of the programs described here, the only one that explicitly embraces this fourth objective is that reported by Grundstein. Here, there was a dual focus on the organization and the executive's self. Referring to the changes stimulated by the executive's experiences, Grundstein points out: "Some of the changes are in the conceptual (thinking) area, with no challenge to one's image of self, but some changes are directed to altering one's image of self. I attempted to get into this area of perception of self and others through a sensitivity sequence that was directed to raising the level of consciousness regarding one's behavior."

Thus, these several programs range from

considerable concern with improving job performance of the executive to relatively little attention to such short-range payoffs; from attention to specific administrative skills through intellectual broadening to personality change. Yet, there is a recurrent theme: the aim of raising the executive's sights, of sensitizing him to a wider diversity of factors affecting his responsibilities, of stimulating his growth toward statesmanlike leadership.

B. Content. The subject-matter of a development program may be regarded as an operating definition of its objective. We may therefore analyze content under the same rubrics as we did objectives.

The programs dedicated to the intellectual development of the whole man have stressed the liberal arts, particularly philosophy, economics, aesthetics, natural sciences, social sciences, literature, and contemporary civilization.

Programs addressed to the broadening of the executive as an executive have differed widely in specifics, but there are common general themes. Chief among them are: the setting of public administration in its political, economic, and social context; organizational and administrative theory; planning and policy-making, including their ethical and moral facets; administrative behavior and human relations. The process of decision-making appears to have served as a convenient core on which more than one program undertook to integrate various topics.

Several programs included training in specific administrative techniques. Prominent among these were budgeting and accounting, personnel administration, oral and written communication, decision-making skills, techniques of motivating people, and principles and techniques of scientific management. As previously mentioned, practically none of the programs was devoted mainly to such skill-subjects; usually they were articulated with broader, more theoretical treatments of the type listed in the preceding paragraph.

It is more difficult to classify the subject-matter related to the psychological development of the individual. We have already seen that Grundstein devoted attention to this subject, but the article furnishes only a few details on content. Also, most of the other

programs devoted some attention to interpersonal relations and the implications of behavioral sciences; presumably, at least part of the intention may have been to modify the executive's self-understanding and adaptive behavior. The liberal arts, too, have traditionally been held to improve one's self-knowledge and approach to life. But as to these latter efforts, we must not fail to make a distinction between cognitive learning *about* human nature, and the more intimate, self-directed, and emotional process of learning new behavior patterns and modes of adjustment. Grundstein's program aside, we must therefore question whether any of the programs contained subject matter effectively directed to personality change.

C. *Method.* The basic educational method most widely employed in these programs appears to have been the seminar or discussion-group led by an expert in the subject at hand. The lecture and lecture-discussion also were widely used, either as the major method of instruction or interspersed among seminars.

Readings were employed universally as an ancillary educational method but never as the exclusive one. Other ancillary methods, each used by one or two programs, included workshops, consultations with high-level administrators, the case method, and the syndicate method.

It is apparent that these programs were, for the most part, cast in the mold of traditional academic practices. The program which in its essence deviated most from that tradition was that of the Brookings Institution, which emphasized the conference method and encouraged continued development through the formation of alumni groups. Continued innovation along these lines is essential if we are to implement our view that development is a continuing rather than a one-shot affair.

The auxiliary use of discussions with outside administrators (Reynolds) and of workshops (Mailick) represent interesting efforts to move from the plane of abstraction and generality to that of specificity and particularization—another field in which more innovation is needed if development is to bring behavioral change.

D. *Development Agency.* Another aspect of method is the locus of the training activity,

i.e., which agency or institution plays the major role in carrying out the development program. All of the programs were executed by an agent outside the government—usually a university. However, in most instances, the government unit or group whose personnel were enrolled in the program played an active part in its planning and design.

In this respect, then, our sample of programs is restricted for it does not include representatives of intramurally conducted programs, a type which is common in private industry and not unknown in government. One might guess that intramural programs would have stronger representation of skill-subjects and relatively little of the liberal arts as such. Intramural programs may also be expected, more typically, to examine problems and implications germane to the company or agency itself, which may be a mixed blessing.

E. *Levels of Executives.* The programs reported here collectively attempted to cover the needs of a wide range of job levels, ranging upward from approximately the equivalent of GS-5. However, each program typically defined a limited executive stratum to which it was addressed. For example, the Brookings program was aimed at career executives at the level of GS-16 and above, while that at the University of Chicago was directed at GS-12 and above. Apparently the feeling was widespread that great heterogeneity of job levels would not make for effective programs. Another evidence of this was the establishment of separate programs for different job levels where the range was wide (e.g. Reynolds, Motwitz).

Not unexpectedly there seems to be some interaction between the job levels comprehended by a program and its objectives, content, and educational methods. Our limited data indicate that the programs addressed to higher-level executives tended toward greater emphasis on broadening and liberalizing objectives and subject-matter, whereas those designed for the lower levels were more concerned with skills and techniques. In educational method, the former programs were more likely to be characterized by more active roles for participants (conferences, seminars), whereas the programs addressed to lower levels exhibited greater structure and spoon-feeding.

One might hazard a guess that such differences in method depend more on expediency than on educational philosophy. Or at least one hopes so.

Evaluating the Composite Program

One way of summarizing the nature of executive development programs furnished in the six reports is to draw a composite picture made up of their modal characteristics: (1) a program offered by a university (2) mainly for intermediate-level executives (3) with the aim of assisting in the intellectual development (4) of a broad-gauge executive—a man who is aware of the scope of his responsibilities, cognizant of the social, economic, and moral boundaries within which policies must be formulated, and at least somewhat understanding of the nature of complex organizations and the people who compose them. The content of the program accordingly comprises organizational theory, the economic, social, and political environment of public agencies, the process of planning and policy-setting, principles and theories of management, human relations, and some attention to advanced administrative skills such as decision-making, budgeting, or motivating people. This subject-matter is considered in lectures and discussion groups, supported by readings from selected bibliographies.

Of course individual programs deviate from the mode, but the composite portrait may give us a general feel for what has been going on and serve as a point of departure for general comment.

On the positive side, it is apparent that our composite program is up-to-date in the sense that it reflects contemporary thinking regarding executive functions and the administrative process. Moreover, it tries commendably to challenge the executive by involving him in the consideration and discussion of new ideas and syntheses. The composite also properly recognizes that the effective executive is neither merely a repository of advanced information in his technical specialty nor an administrative specialist furnished with a battery of techniques for organizing and supervising subordinates; clearly, the note struck here is one of responsible leadership of com-

plex organizations in a multi-faceted environment.

From some standpoints, however, our composite program is rather old-fashioned. For one thing, it is centered around the hallowed tradition of developing people by getting them together in a course, in which they listen, read, and discuss. Should not more attention be given (as some of the programs did) to "newer" educational practices that attempt to simulate something of life, such as the case method, the laboratory method, or the syndicate method?

And why is there no attention to individualized programs of development, such as job rotation, counseling, coaching, subsidized adult and graduate education, correspondence courses, or participation in development programs of various professional and managerial associations? In this connection, it should be noted that executives usually report that the most profound influence on their own development has been confrontation with new and challenging responsibilities, pointing to the importance of planned on-the-job experience in the development of the individual. Is it that individualized programs of development are harder to conceive or to administer—have they been tried and failed?—or is it just that we comfortably fall back on our familiar educational heritage? Some of these agencies may have individual development programs in addition to outside educational courses, though they were mentioned only by Mailick. If so, there is need to integrate them with the courses. Failure to mention them would suggest the absence of an over-all developmental plan.

The composite program is conventional in another way as well—in its emphasis on the intellectual growth of the executive, i.e., on learning or cognitive understanding. However, we now know that behavior is only in part a function of cognition. Accurate perception of relationships, skill in responding appropriately to situations, and the elimination of emotional and affective barriers to realistic perception and action also are potent factors in effectiveness. While laudable efforts have been noted among the programs to accommodate some of these considerations, such efforts form a relatively small part of the total picture. Of course it may be appropriate for the

composite program to focus on growth in knowledge if this is really the area in which most executives are especially lacking, but one rather doubts that ignorance plays a more prominent part in executive ineffectiveness than does inability to put extant knowledge to use in specific situations.

There is another emphasis in the composite program which may create an imbalance if it is true of the whole field of executive development. The past few decades have seen increasing crystallization of the concept of management as a general profession, irrespective of the particular business, agency, or executive's special field. Certainly many essential executive skills are general in nature and transcend the specific setting or job, but it does not follow that all an executive needs to function effectively is this kit of general attitudes and skills. There are substantive aspects of the work of a particular agency, or subdivision, which are special to the work of that organization. It is almost a truism that the executive needs such substantive or technical competence over and beyond his general administrative and leadership skill.¹ It therefore follows that the development of executives involves enhancement not only of their general administrative abilities, but also, up to a point, of their technical competence in the field in which their organization operates, be this manufacturing, agriculture, finance, diplomacy, or what have you. This need probably is particularly strong at the lower and middle managerial levels.

It would seem to be too much to ask that our programs reviewed here also incorporate such technical subject-matter, since they were obviously addressed to the development of the general executive abilities. However, let this discussion serve as a *caveat* to the field at large not to think of executive development solely in these terms. Otherwise we may repeat the mistake of extremists in teacher education

¹Empirical studies support this belief by indicating that technical ability is an important factor in managerial effectiveness. See, for example: Baumgartel, H. "Leadership, motivation, and attitudes in research laboratories" 12 *Journal of Social Issues* Number 2, pp. 24-31 (1956); and Comrey, A. L. et al. *Factors Influencing Organizational Effectiveness* (University of Southern California, 1954).

who concentrated on the *how* of teaching to the detriment of the *what*.

"Bad" Executive Development

There is a final *caveat*: *an organized executive development program is not necessarily "good"—it may sometimes be "bad."*

An executive development program is good when it will help the executive better to realize his potentialities through more effective and self-satisfying performance of his job. It is bad to the extent that it hampers or detracts from this process.

Under what circumstances might programs be bad? The major ones are these:

A. The problem identified for solution may be wrong, i.e., developmental objectives may not correspond to the executives' needs. The case comes to mind of the company president who, finding that his managers often failed to note things that were buried in the memoranda and reports which deluged them, decided they should improve their reading skills.

B. The program may be inadequate for the objectives. A common example is the "quickie" course in human relations, a field which is far too complex and emotionally charged for "how-to-do-its." Poorly designed programs are bad because they waste the executives' time, misdirect their attention, and sometimes even misinform them.

C. The program may be out of step with the organizational climate. The effectiveness of an executive's behavior depends in part on its articulation with the behaviors, needs, and expectations of others in his organization. A program which undertakes to develop managerial attitudes and behaviors that are out of phase with such established relationships is unlikely to do either the manager or his organization any good, no matter how desirable these behaviors may be under other circumstances.² It is in this context that one of

²Research evidence on this point may be found in: Fleishman, E. A. et al. *Leadership and Supervision in Industry: An Evaluation of a Supervisory Training Program* (Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University, 1955); and Hariton, T. "Conditions Influencing the Effects of Training Foremen in New Human Relations Principles." Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1951.

Nelson's points becomes especially significant: the importance of having in positions of policy leadership persons who are sensitive to and sympathetic with the values, approaches, and methods that may be developed through a program for career executives. The same may be said about higher-level career executives in relation to the development of their subordinate executives within an agency.

D. The program may be directed toward problems which lie outside of the control of the executives who participate in it. A common reaction of those in high echelons to symptoms of organizational ineffectiveness or malfunctioning is to feel that the answer lies in improving the caliber of their subordinate executives. While this diagnosis may be correct, it may also be that executive performance is about as good as can be expected under current policies, traditions, and conditions. If the latter is the case (as may too often be true), then the organization of executive development programs to remedy the situation will be bad. In addition to wasting time, effort, and money, they may increase the frustration of the subordinate executives, and divert effort from attacking the roots of the problems. We must be particularly wary of this origin of bad programs, since it is so much easier to inaugurate training programs than to change organizational aims, policies, and traditions.

Assuring Effective Programs

If development programs can be bad as well as good, how can we ensure the latter? One indispensable requirement is a thorough study of the development needs of the executives in an organization. Basically, such a study entails the establishment of empirical standards of effective executive behavior, and a survey of the extent to which, and respects in which, executive performance falls below these standards. Given this information, it should be possible to judge whether executive ability needs development or whether the major target should be policy and procedure revision, and, if the former, in what directions development is most needed.

Another requirement is better evaluation of the consequences of various types of programs and methods. To their everlasting credit, practically all contributors to the symposium were sensitive to this need. To the extent that they reported evaluative data, they will help us all in the design of future programs. But I am sure they would join me in entering a plea for greater future support of controlled and systematic research on the relations between the characteristics of development programs and their outcomes.

It is, after all, a basic law of psychology that we improve in direct proportion to our knowledge of the results of our efforts.

Good Managers Preserve Individuality

We shall need good managers to make sure that the large organizations of the future will help to preserve and enhance the *individuality* of the people who work for them. . . . Some people are viewing the growth of large organizations with alarm. Books and magazine articles are appearing which talk dolefully about the "organization man." . . . I think most of them are nonsense. . . . Very possibly the conditions seen by these critics exist somewhere in some organizations, both large *and* small. But they do *not* exist in *good* organizations. It is the very essence of good management and good organization to see that they do not exist.

—Howard Morgens, President, Procter and Gamble Company, "Tomorrow's Managers," Commencement Address, Washington University, St. Louis, June 11, 1958.

The Southern Governor— Challenge to the Strong Executive Theme

By ROBERT B. HIGHSAW

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OVER twenty years ago the President's Committee on Administrative Management established the orthodoxy that a strong chief executive in government should head an integrated complex of agencies co-ordinated by such devices as sufficient staff aids and the executive budget.¹ The reports of the two Hoover Commissions and twenty-six Little Hoover Commissions in the states served to support that doctrine.

A major goal of the strong-executive concept was the reduction of "private-interest" interference (such as patronage and favoritism in purchasing) in administrative action by legislators while preserving and strengthening their "public-interest" control of governmental policy as a group. Therefore, the strong-executive doctrine postulated a chief executive easily held responsible for administrative acts. This argument undoubtedly applies in many, perhaps most, jurisdictions. However, like other organizational devices, the strong-executive system must be related to the forces

► Good administration, we usually feel, is best assured by a chief executive with clear authority to plan for and lead his branch of government. Here a proviso is suggested, based on recent events in southern state governments: private interests often are served ahead of the public interest by the strong chief executive when his administrative practices are unchecked by the legislature and public. Two other checks on irresponsible executive action are growing up: professionalization within the career service, providing standards outside those set by the chief executive, and close relations between program administrators and their counterparts in other units of government, with standards and guidance from the federal government.

in each situation if it is to produce the desired results.

It is my contention that the result of executive integration in several southern states has been a chief executive often unrestrained by either the legislature or public opinion. Although this result means that the governor has the power to and often does promote integration of executive authority in line with general concepts of modern administration, it may also make for less rather than more administrative responsibility in the southern states.

Chief Executive Power in the South

The strong-executive doctrine assumes the accountability of the chief executive to the voters. A governor and his party, so the argument runs, will stand or fall on the kind of government that his administration affords. In jurisdictions where the two-party system operates effectively and where the chief ex-

¹ *Administrative Management in the Government of the United States* (Reproduced in facsimile by arrangement with U. S. Government Printing Office by Public Administration Service, 1947), pp. 1-6. Of course the state reorganization movement reintroduced into American state governments the strong-executive doctrine twenty-five years or so before the report of the President's Committee in 1937. Cf. A. E. Buck, *The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States* (Columbia University Press for the National Municipal League, 1938), p. 6, and The Council of State Governments, *Reorganizing State Government* (The Council, 1950), p. 2.

ecutive is eligible for immediate re-election, this premise probably is valid. However, by tradition and choice the southern states are the staunchest of the one-party jurisdictions in state and local elections, and only in Arkansas and Texas can the governor immediately succeed himself. The first of these facts means, for practical purposes, that the real political fights in the area are intraparty, and consequently political alignments are factional, not partisan, so that political contests are characterized by personal rather than party politics. The limitation on gubernatorial succession, combined with the intensely personal politics of the South, pushes into the background questions of administrative responsibility.

Another factor combines with the one-party system and the limitation on executive succession to condition the effectiveness of the strong-executive doctrine in the southern states. This doctrine assumes that if administrative performance is spotlighted by clear responsibility of the governor, the electorate will reward "good government" by votes and punish "poor government" by casting ballots for the opposition. If the electorate does not respond to this stimulus, there need be, of course, no relationship between clear executive responsibility and good administration. The argument does not seem to apply in the South now, for administrative competence is not so widely recognized as a major issue by the voters that they consider it of paramount importance in an election; consequently, the elected official often does not consider it beyond lip service to the catch-phrase "efficiency and economy." Most of the region's primary elections in 1958 (and these were more important, of course, than the general elections) reflected the primary stress of those pressures in the South that are embraced within the phrase "states' rights."

It is probably a fair generalization that great tensions in societies (whether caused by poverty, racial issues, or labor strife) will elicit more response than the issue of whether government is well administered. Who can say that the espousal of "clean, honest government" by John Patterson in Alabama, Ernest Vandiver in Georgia, and Buford Ellington in Tennessee was more responsible for their elec-

tion to the office of governor than their position on the segregation issue? The record in the South over a long period seems to indicate that, once a minimum level of administrative effectiveness is achieved, the electorate will be more concerned with the issues that arise from social tensions than with governmental performance. Indeed, their solutions to the former will be assimilated into any definition of "good government."

Southerners expect political interference with administration almost as a matter of course. We object only to particular manifestations of it, such as the gutting of a popular and generally well-regarded program, the abuse and arbitrary dismissal of competent public servants, or the perversion of public funds from a useful public purpose to a factional purpose of limited or no general benefit.

In a recent study, *The Office of Governor in the United States*,² Coleman B. Ransone writes:

... the legislature, through its investigating committees, the approval of the governor's appointments, its legislative budget staff, and its post-auditing agent continues to wield sporadic but powerful control over the administrative process.³

I have been impressed, however, with how often relationships between politicians in southern legislatures and politicians in the executive branch are inverted, the latter frequently exercising more influence over the legislator than the reverse.⁴ If this be true, then independent legislative control over administration, proper or improper, vanishes, and the only effective political check on arbitrary administration by the governor is the public.

Several elements now operate to remove "sporadic but powerful control over the administrative process" from southern legislatures. Two factors in particular give the governor and his principal department heads

² (University of Alabama Press, 1956).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁴ This conclusion is based upon letters and interviews with both public officials and political scientists in the region as well as upon newspaper commentaries. I thus owe thanks to a great many persons for materials summarized in this section, but the interpretation of these materials is mine.

wide control over the legislature. The first is spoils, not merely of public jobs (this is widespread enough, for Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas do not have statewide merit systems)⁵ but the equally important and far more subtle modern spoils of contracts to sell to the state and favors such as concessions in state parks (including in Alabama an attempt to submit timber in such a park to exploitative cutting), liquor licenses, and rate regulation. Today the state is Big Business, extremely big business in poor agricultural states like Mississippi, Kentucky, and South Carolina. Favors are indispensable to many business men and almost as significant to the legislators who can curry enough favor with executive politicians to help influence their decision as to where favors shall be granted.

A second major factor is control over the expenditure of road and highway funds in many states, especially where the highways are directly under the governor, as in Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky, to name a few. In Kentucky, for example, several years ago the legislature passed an additional two-cent gasoline tax to finance rural roads and vested control over the standards for dispensing this money and the decision-making as to when and where rural roads should be built in the highway commissioner, a chief political appointee of the governor.

As a result, serious legislative investigations of administration are increasingly unlikely in some southern states if opposed by the governor; similarly, legislative changes in the executive budget, either as to amounts of money to be spent or riders attached to appropriation bills, or substantive changes in legislation for the various departments proposed by the executive will not be undertaken lightly. Legislators do not easily and thoughtlessly antagonize the governor during a session, not even in a few administratively disintegrated states such as Mississippi, where J. P. Coleman

⁵ Compiled from *Directory of State Merit Systems*, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957). A merit system statute was enacted in 1955 in Florida which authorized the governor to extend coverage to any agency under his control. By 1957, more than half of the state employees were subject to it.

demonstrated in 1956 that a personally strong executive can and will "call the dance."⁶ It is fairly standard practice now for executive leaders to make a careful tabulation of legislative votes on gubernatorial programs and to tell dissenting legislators that, if attitudes and votes are not changed, they will get no more jobs for constituents, no more state-aid for rural roads for their districts, no more of the favors that are the lifeblood of state legislators. This relationship is not subtle; it is direct, brutal; and it is effective. Executive politicians now can—and do—back recalcitrant legislators against the wall and read the "riot act" to them.

One of the other potent weapons of the governor is control over the spending of money for capital improvements, either directly through a finance department, as in Kentucky since 1948, or indirectly through a building commission, as in other states. Again the legislator goes hat in hand with his constituents, and begs.

These controls over the legislature must be understood in order to realize that any real or independent control legislators may exercise over administration in several of the southern states is by sufferance of the political executives and not because of any inherent power or concept of legislative equality. A faithful legislative adherent, to be sure, may still get a deserving friend placed on the state payroll or succeed in a public contract placed with another. However, the legislator is in no better position to do this because he is a legislator than is the county campaign manager for the faction which elected the governor.⁷ The cam-

⁶ The weekly political analyses of Kenneth Toler, Chief, Jackson, Mississippi Bureau of the *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, provide striking confirmation of Governor Coleman's political strength. However, in a special session of the legislature in 1957 Governor Coleman raised the issue of constitutional revision and was soundly defeated, although one of his principal arguments was the necessity of improving administration.

⁷ The county campaign manager should not be confused with the county chairman in the party organization. Since victory in the primary elections ensures victory in most jurisdictions in the South, the would-be party nominee frequently must construct a shadow organization in the counties that parallels the party structure in them. Although the party county chairman and the county executive committee have considerable legal

paign manager in fact usually will be more influential in shaping administration than will be the legislator unless the requirements of immediate legislative tactics demand otherwise.

This situation is not always an unmitigated evil even though it does lack effective institutional nurture and protection of professional administration. As a new Educational Director for the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration a few years ago, I was puzzled why a "spoils" state like Kentucky so frequently sought and promoted to top-level administrative positions able graduates of the Program, while merit system states like Alabama had relatively few of them in their service. The answer was simple. In the Clements and Wetherby administrations there were department heads who so had the confidence as well as the respect of the governor that they were permitted to run their departments as they considered best—departments such as conservation, finance, mental health, and others. These heads frequently brushed aside requests of legislators for favors, often brusquely, but they made it clear that their decisions were not "political" in the usual partisan sense of the term; county campaign managers were treated in the same way as legislators. More important, so I am informed, in this period there were no administrative witch-hunts, no personal political persecutions, little substantial political interference with administration. These desirable results, though, must not obscure the important fact that, since the executive branch dominated the legislature and the public seemed indifferent to administration, there was administrative integrity only because of executive forbearance.

This analysis of legislative subordination to the executive and its results could go on indefinitely. Clearly the legislative investigation in some southern states has become a device to protect the executive branch, not to examine

control over the primary election processes, they are often less important than the successful candidate's own organization to which he is obligated for getting out his vote. Of course, county chairmen are not divorced from the factionalism of personal politics. Their party position is not their strength in a situation where political conflict is essentially intraparty.

it critically and bring about improvements. Clearly state purchasing in some states is used as a device to remove the legislator from areas of influence that he formerly had. Clearly the true executive budget now means that even the constitutional executive officers must conform to gubernatorial edicts or run the risk of a budget cut (though sometimes the superintendent of education may none too politely inform the governor where he may go).

Of course the generalizations that have been made in this paper about political interference with administration in the South are not always applicable in every state at all times and in every situation. There have been, and are, strong legislatures fully as capable of extreme private-interest interference as the executive politicians; there have been and are governors, and their executive units, that do not occupy the commanding position which I have described. It is not the immediate, specific occurrence of the problems that is important, but the picture in the South as a whole, looked at as a questioning of the doctrine that the strong executive promotes "public-interest" administration.

Checks on Arbitrary Administration

Even as this development has moved along, two factors have been at work to mitigate its effect upon public administration. The first is professionalization in the public service, and the second (not entirely unrelated) is an emerging functional, or vertical, integration of public activities.

A few years ago York Willbern reviewed carefully and thoughtfully professionalization in the public service,⁸ suggesting:

Unreasonable dogmatism with regard to the integrative doctrines of public administration may not be wise. It must be recognized that advocacy of a single executive, the subordination of all or most administrative agencies to a single focus of power, the executive budget, and so on, are sometimes in conflict with the development of professionalization, which . . . is still a desirable goal. There may be circumstances . . . where professionalization is more urgently needed than integration.⁹

⁸ "Professionalization in the Public Service," 14 *Public Administration Review*, 13-21 (Winter, 1954).

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

Willbern favored attempts of political governing officials to coordinate professional activities "even where attainment of real coordination or control . . . seems unlikely" because "contact between the professional and the politician may broaden and enlighten both. . . ."¹⁰ The considerable progress recorded by southern states in the development and administration of several programs such as mental health and natural resources suggests in concrete terms the broadening effect of this contact.

Since professional interest is not necessarily identical with public interest, grave problems are raised by professionalization in the public service that are outside the scope of this paper.¹¹ However, professionalization certainly heightens respect for expertise in a complex society and tends to build resistance to deep political interference. Professionals may set higher work and ethical standards of their own, unrelated or even in contradiction to standards in the employee's unit of government. These professional standards may be a barrier against private-interest action.

The integration of governmental activities by function rather than area also weakens political interference with administration in the South. States have come to share in the administration of national programs (public health, highways, welfare, and economic security, to name a few) as well as state and local programs. These problems are debated (and legislation enacted to meet them) in Washington, D. C. as well as in Montgomery, Sacramento, and Springfield. The consequence is that area has been effectively supplanted by function in the organization of many public activities, though perhaps to a greater degree in particular states and functions than in others. The net result of this functional integration is some inhibition on political interference with administration.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹¹ For the problem of democratic control of one public function dominated by a profession, see Robert T. Daland, *Government and Health: The Alabama Experience* (Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1956), Chs. 5-6, 8-9.

One result is the professional communion of the federal highway engineer with the state engineer, or of the state health worker with his local counterpart. This is not to claim that professionalization of the public service resulted from government by function, but only, as Willbern puts it, that "professional organization serves as one of the strongest vertical and horizontal connecting links—from level to level and unit to unit—within the same function."¹²

Another way in which functional integration mitigates political interference is the segregation of administrative functions into subject-matter fields with no consistent relationship, say, between welfare and resource programs or highways and professional licensing—at least no such relationship as is implicit in the integrative concept of state administrative reorganization. Finally, the most notable result of all lies in the failure of the states to develop actual state policies in many great problem fields; today the states largely assist in the administration of national policies. It is not true to say the states are mere agents of the national government; but it is nearly true in some fields and more definite in some states than others.

On the whole, the idea that a strong executive with clear lines of integrated authority will best guarantee public-interest oriented administration is importantly challenged by the experience of southern state governments today. The political power of the governors in the region, checked principally by a growing professionalization among program administrators and intergovernmental relationships along program lines, casts at least the shadow of a doubt on the universality of this concept.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 18. Subsequently in the same article, Willbern notes that "Professionalization insulates not only from the particularism and favoritism of politics, but also from political control in the public interest." Given currently accepted social attitudes toward many professions, there is no assurance that a stronger legislative body would curb professional isolation in administration any better than the strong executive has.

Hypotheses on Administrative Selection

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NATHAN PUSEY's skill in mixing old-fashioned was considered in evaluating him for the presidency of Harvard.¹ Between this criterion and more obvious traits needed by administrators lies a huge area, much discussed but little explored. Perhaps the presentation of the hypotheses below will help clarify thinking in this complex, controversial, and ubiquitous area of administration² and encourage the research that is needed in order to determine whether these and other hypotheses are correct.

Before examining these hypotheses, one should recognize that "accidental factors" (accidental from the point of view of the moralist, the logician, or the literal analyst of the job to be done) play an important role in many selections for administrative positions. Among these factors are the need to placate or gain the support of an influential person or group; the predispositions of the selector; the

► Though knowing better, administrators often subconsciously accept the personnel selection process as something mechanical, akin to inserting a program into a computer. The selection process for administrators is examined here in flesh and blood terms, as it relates to other aspects of administration as well as to filling specific jobs. We are reminded of the great deal we do not know about choosing administrators that we usually take for granted as known. If verified by observations of practitioners and studies of researchers, these hypotheses can provide firmer guides to personnel action and to the identification and proper placement of administrative talent.

accidents of availability and accessibility³ and the related uncertainty as to the value of a person unknown to the selector; the need for haste in filling a vacancy; the need for a particular skill to solve an immediate or limited problem; the choice of a third person in order to avoid the morale problem that would be created in choosing between two "natural" contenders; and the desire to "take care" of an individual who has a claim for considera-

¹ *Newsweek*, January 14, 1957, p. 68. The news item does not indicate whether the actual skill displayed or the implications of possessing this skill were considered; it should be emphasized that the report does not say Dr. Pusey would have been rejected if he did not possess this skill—see the later discussion on the need for compromises on qualifications. It also seems, based on Bernard De Voto's investigations, that if skill in mixing drinks were to be considered important, perhaps the martini, if only one drink could be included, would be more representative of the Cambridge area—see the later discussion on the need for a thorough job analysis.

² For the present purpose, an administrative job is defined as one which has at least two subordinate levels of supervision; for a fuller discussion, see Milton M. Mandell, "The Selection of Executives," in *Selection of Management Personnel* (American Management Association, 1957), pp. 207-210.

³ Mabel Newcomer, in her discussion of why executive positions are mainly filled by promotion, writes: "First . . . talent within the company is better known, and to that extent safer, than outside talent. Also, there is always a feeling that one's own company is different and that intimate knowledge of its problems is important from the start. The president or chairman is likely to select his successor in advance and to groom him personally for the job. And loyalty to the company is stressed. Moreover, there is a sense of obligation to the officers with whom the chief has worked, and a conviction—which is doubtless justified—that morale will be higher, and the chance of retaining able executives greater, if they are aware that the top offices will be filled from within. And, finally, the man who has served long and successfully in a vice-presidential capacity may be felt to deserve the recognition of top office, even though he is admittedly too old when the vacancy occurs." *The Big Business Executive* (Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 151.

tion based on previous service or other fortuitous factors.⁴

These factors are not easily kept in proportion—they become more important when the organization or the selector is weak and less so when the organization or the selector has prestige or is skillful in manipulating a situation so that rational factors can be primary. The harmful effects of "accidental factors" can be reduced by insisting to the extent possible that those persons considered for administrative jobs mainly because of such factors also have appropriate qualifications.

Hypotheses Concerning the Selection Process

1. The evaluation of administrative performance is of only partial validity if it does not include, along with the opinion of superiors, that of colleagues, subordinates, and those outside the organization with whom the administrator deals.

Research evidence justifies the belief that the value systems of each of these groups is sufficiently different, and that some persons behave so differently with each of these groups, that an evaluation based on only one of these groups will be quite different from an evaluation based on all four. For example, a study of forty-six supervisors showed that those who were relatively uninterested in the human relations aspects of administration were rated lower on over-all performance by their subordinates than those who indicated special interest in human relations.⁵ It is not likely that this would have been found if the ratings of performance had been obtained from the superiors of these supervisors.

2. The procedure devised for administrative selection, which includes such considerations as the formality of the procedure, the scope of competition, the nomination meth-

⁴ Based on a study of 226 managers in one industrial plant, Professor Dalton concluded: "the chief criteria (for management selection are) ethnicity, religion, participation in specific out-plant social activities, political affiliation, and membership in accepted secret societies." Melville Dalton, "Informal Factors In Career Achievement," 56 *The American Journal of Sociology* 414 (1951).

⁵ There was a negative correlation of $-.36$ between the subordinate's rating and the supervisor's interest in administrative duties not directly involved in human relations.

ods, and the use or non-use of panels or committees, is at least as important as the criteria for selection. The procedure is important not only for its immediate effect on a specific placement but also for its long-range effect on recruitment and human relations.

A desirable system can:

- a. promote morale.
- b. encourage self-development.
- c. extend the area of recruitment and thus uncover a greater number of potential candidates.
- d. provide for continuous identification of talent, eliminating the need for hasty evaluation, encouraging those with potential to stay, and permitting extensive training in advance of need.
- e. discourage the formation of cliques⁶ and the rise of those whose main claims to attention are that they are "safe" candidates (no errors but no hits either).
- f. encourage research.
- g. produce greater heterogeneity or homogeneity (as needed) in the backgrounds of those selected.

Because it is not possible to obtain all of these results at the same time, the situation should determine which should be considered primary.

3. Those with more ambition than ability, to the extent that they do not represent a threat to their superiors, will more likely please their superiors than their subordinates, at least over the short run; those with more ability than ambition will more likely please their subordinates than their superiors.

This hypothesis is based on research studies that locate the relative orientation of executives toward superiors or subordinates.

4. Determining whether an individual meets a set of general standards applicable to several similar positions (our usual selection procedure), does not ensure accurate placement in a particular job, which is bound to vary some from others in the same position class.

Often, however, selection and placement for administrative jobs are telescoped into one—a person is selected for a particular job rather than deemed eligible for any of a group of jobs. On the other hand, overemphasis in hir-

⁶ The injurious effects of cliques in industry are ably discussed in Norman H. Martin and Anselm L. Strauss, "Patterns of Mobility Within Industrial Organizations," 29 *Journal of Business* 106 (1956).

ing on factors in the particular job may bring together a set of executives who are unable to adapt to new job demands.

5. No effort should be made to identify at age of college graduation those with aptitude for top line-executive positions (as distinguished from budgeting, organization and methods analysis, and personnel work at the technician level) because (1) present psychological knowledge is inadequate to predict needed administrative characteristics so far in advance, (2) people may change significantly, and (3) premature identification of "crown princes" (unless those within the organization also have a chance to enter the line of succession) may be more harmful than helpful, both to the organization and the "crown princes."

One student of this question has aptly commented: ". . . I can think of no surer way to debase the quality of . . . management than to try to restrict or direct its entrants at source, while they are still almost wholly unproved to the selectors and to themselves."⁷

What is needed is diversity in original selection and a constant search for and systematic development and placement of those in the organization with management aptitude. The best college graduate will still apply, even without a "crown prince" program, if he knows that he will not be overlooked—that the organization is interested in management aptitude and constantly seeks, on a systematic basis, to identify and develop it. It is only the lack of such a systematic program (or the low prestige of an organization) that justifies, negatively, the use of the "crown prince" approach.

6. Even extensive training or supervision cannot adequately compensate for initial mistakes in selection on such fundamental factors as judgment, emotional maturity, and self-confidence.

Two British students of this question have noted:

The task of training people in management is quite difficult enough without starting with the handicap of unsuitable human material. Some people never grow up. They remain throughout their lives emotionally adolescent. Others (often owing

to early experience) lack confidence in themselves. Such people often try to convince themselves that their low opinion of their own capabilities is unwarranted by demonstrations of the kind that give other people the impression that they think too highly of themselves. All of us face some kind of a personal internal conflict. In some people this conflict is of such a character that it inhibits their relations with others. The capacity for the acceptance of new ideas in some people, even when still young, is very low indeed. The power to reason accurately and speedily is not given to everyone. Some people—often those who have been unfortunate enough to be deprived of that sense of being wanted in their childhood by their parents or by those near to them—find it more than usually difficult to feel confidence in those with whom they associate in industry.⁸

Hypotheses Concerning the Administrator's Job

1. Typical job analyses, because of their neglect of the organizational environment, past, present, and future, are of limited value for administrative positions.

Two executive jobs with identical duties in theory may yet be quite different in practice because of such environmental factors as the goals of the organization, the tempo of the organization, how up to date it is, the potential frustrations, the geographical scope of its program, the kinds of persons and groups with whom the administrator has to deal, the "style" of operation including organizational relationships, the acceptance of the program in the particular environment, the level of competence and motivations of the employees, and the adequacy of the funds available.

2. The major changes in the administrator's job during the past 25 years have been the increase in the number of variables that have to be considered in making decisions, the increase in the size of organizations and the number of their functions, the constant changes which require continuous readjustment of programs and decisions, and the increase in the complexity of technology.

3. An administrative job should be very specifically described for purposes of selection, compensation, supervision, appraisal, or de-

⁷ Hooper, F. C., *Management in the Public Services* (London: Institute of Public Administration, 1948), p. 9.

⁸ Brown, Wilfred B. D., and Raphael, Winifred, *Managers, Men and Morale* (Macdonald & Evans, 1948), pp. 119-120.

velopment. For example, saying that "communication" is a requirement of the job is not enough without describing with whom, the media to be used, and the importance of the function in the particular job; "ability to make decisions" is not enough without describing the functional areas involved, the latitude permitted, the information available, the speed with which the decisions have to be made, the effect of the decisions, the need to gain acceptance for them and from whom, and the need to control the results.

4. When executive jobs are compared at one point in time, differences stand out. Probably their likenesses and differences will shift over time, but this change in characteristics is hidden. Contrarily, a study of jobs over a long period reveals likenesses, differences, and the shifting.

5. There may not be a close relationship between the amount of time spent on an activity and its importance, at least as the administrator might report his allocation of time spent at his desk. For example, a legislative hearing or the selection of a key subordinate may not require very much time but could be fundamental to success.

6. The effectiveness of an executive in "representing" his unit is a highly important consideration in his subordinates' evaluation of him.

Representation is needed to answer criticism, obtain necessary funds and support, and gain acceptance of the ideas of his subordinates. Many of these functions are unique to the executive, and his subordinates may be helpless if he neglects them or is ineffective in them.

7. The differences in the demands of jobs at various levels of management may be as great or greater than the differences among executive jobs at the same level in the same general organization. The higher the level, the greater need for breadth, long-range and abstract thinking, and consideration of effects on other programs.

The basic difference between higher- and lower-level management is the difference between strategy and tactics. This hypothesis is stressed because of the frequent use of performance at a lower level as a selection criterion for a higher level.

For example, a comparison of the duties of 412 colonels and generals with those of 2,500 officers of lower grades indicated that the former group had twice as many duties connected with "delegating authority," three times as many duties connected with "long range planning," and more than twice as many duties connected with "decision-making."⁹ In the second study, in an industrial plant, the higher levels of management were differentiated from the lower levels in the longer time span involved in their decisions.¹⁰ And these quantitative differences become more important because of their qualitative importance.

8. Decision-making is not unique to the administrator's job—every employee makes decisions. What is relatively unique about the administrator's decisions is their broader and longer-range effect, the need to consider more intangibles in making decisions, the need to consider the effect of the decisions on the whole organization and on those outside the organization, the need for proper timing, the need to get the participation of and acceptance from appropriate individuals and groups, the need to use second-hand information, the fact that the administrator's decisions set precedents, and the need to communicate and evaluate the results.

9. The greater the ambition of colleagues, the greater the need for their superior to coordinate their activities; the less their ambition, the more likely it is that coordination can be obtained by informal relations between colleagues.

Hypotheses Concerning the Administrator's Qualifications

1. Thinking of a person in terms of sharply compartmentalized elements—his intelligence, his knowledge, his motivations, his attitudes, and his personal characteristics—is a fundamental error because it overlooks the fact that each man is a whole man in whom various characteristics interact with frequently unexpected results. In addition to studying his

⁹ Flanagan, John C., *A Research Approach to the Definition of Job Requirements for the Research Executive* (September, 1950, mimeographed).

¹⁰ Martin, Norman H., "Differential Decisions in the Management of an Industrial Plant," 29 *Journal of Business* 249 (1956).

individual qualifications, it seems highly profitable to study an individual's total behavior in a variety of situations over a period of time because behavior is a demonstration, on a sample basis, of both characteristics possessed and, much more important, how characteristics interact in the individual.

2. No person can rank high on all of the qualifications needed for higher-level management. Every selection for higher-level management is thus a compromise, and a rational basis is needed for determining which strengths need emphasis and which weaknesses, to what degree, can be safely ignored.

This hypothesis is based partly on the fact that many qualifications needed for some aspects of higher-level management are opposed to the qualifications needed for other aspects of the job. The patience, for example, needed for developing subordinates often does not seem compatible with the drive needed to get programs started or moving in a new direction. The reflection needed to plan ahead is not often found in those with high levels of activity who can accelerate a program. The detachment needed to analyze performance objectively may not be found in the same person who has the human warmth associated with gaining the liking of others.

Luther Evans, from his experience as Librarian of Congress, noted the diversity called for. He wrote: "Being head of an agency . . . requires a combination of requirements which, as far as I know, no human being has in the measure which the situation requires for the most successful and satisfying achievement. . . . The demands on the human organism of being an agency head—demands for imagination, capacity of mind, endurance, retentiveness of memory, width and depth of learning and understanding, composure and sense of justice—are more than any human being can provide, as far as I know."¹¹

The following description of military leaders is further evidence on this point:

General Sherman, who commanded the Army for almost 15 years, was considered by many of his close friends to be a fit subject for confinement as a mental case just prior to the Civil War.

¹¹ Evans, Luther H., "The Administration of a Federal Government Agency," 75 *Library Journal* 1243 (1950).

General Meade, one of the sweetest and most serene of men in his family relationships, lacked confidence in his own merits and was very abusive of his associates during battle.

Admiral Farragut, whose tenderness as an individual was marked by the 16 years in which he personally nursed an invalid wife, was so independent in his professional thought and action that both in and out of the Navy he was disqualified as a "climber." He got into wretched quarrels with his superiors mainly because he felt his assignments afforded him no distinction. The Civil War gave him his opportunity.

Admiral John Paul Jones, though an unusually modest man, was as redoubtable in the boudoir as at sea, and it would be hard to say which type of engagement most caught his fancy.

General Winfield Scott, as firm a commander as ever drew on a glove, plagued the service with his petty bickering over rank, seniority, and precedence.¹²

If every selection is a compromise, then institutional methods are needed to compensate. In some cases, closer or looser supervision is indicated, in other cases more staff assistance may be the solution, while with some persons a specific type of training program may help.

3. Because so few people have a high degree of administrative potential, the number of arbitrary requirements, such as particular types of experience or knowledge, must be kept to a minimum in order to increase the number from among whom selection can be made.

Even relatively crude selection methods can be effective if the number of candidates considered for each vacancy is sufficiently great. (Costs can be kept at a reasonable figure by using relatively inexpensive methods as the first hurdle.) The validity of any requirement which eliminates a sizable group of applicants has to be demonstrated fully because of its potential negative effect on the quality of the selection decision, i.e., those proposing a requirement must be able to demonstrate that without this knowledge the person, *no matter what his other qualifications are*, cannot do the job, and they must also demonstrate that this knowledge cannot be obtained in a reasonable time after entrance on the job.

4. Too much of any desirable personal

¹² Department of Defense, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 80-81.

characteristic may be as harmful as too little.

Too often only minimum rather than minimum and maximum standards are used in selection. There are many obvious examples of this type of personal characteristic, among them ambition, breadth of interests, and interest in interpersonal relations. Too much ambition can lead to neglect of work, disloyalty to organizational aims, ignoring of subordinates, "passing the buck," and the promotion of cliques; interests that are too broad can lead to neglect of essential details and follow-up; too much interest in interpersonal relations can lead to neglect of other, vital administrative duties.

5. The primary justification for emphasizing technical competence or program expertise in higher-level management is that it helps gain the confidence of those under or over the manager or the support of outside groups.

Subordinates in a professional field may be more comfortable when judged by those with a similar background and value system; superiors without a professional background may feel more confident if the head of a professional function under them has achieved professional status and can, presumably, protect the superior against the technical mistakes of subordinates. Outside groups in the program field also may feel their viewpoint will be better understood. But the administrator also must have administrative abilities and loyalty to the organization's objectives.

6. Those in higher-level positions of staff and line units generally need the same basic qualifications, but often they possess different qualifications—part of the cause of conflict between the two groups.

The latter half of the hypothesis is illustrated by a study the author did among 40 federal personnel people, mainly in grade GS-12, indicating distinct personality differences between line and staff: 61 per cent of the group who indicated a preference for line administration were well adjusted as judged by a personality inventory; only 23 per cent of those who preferred staff work were well adjusted. (This difference is statistically significant.) The two types of work may simply attract different kinds of people or, perhaps, long exposure to one or the other job results

in an individual's developing certain of his characteristics and repressing others, but this does not mean that different qualifications are needed.

In another study, there was no difference found in verbal intelligence between the line and staff group—the average score of 20 persons in top management on a verbal ability test was 86, the average for 63 staff employees was 85. A recent American Assembly showed concern about this question in discussing military officers' asking: "Are staff officers so Hamlet-like, 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,' that such service results in a trained incapacity for field command, or does senior command require precisely the kind of skepticism and sensitivity to the complexities of problems which successful staff officers exhibit?"¹³ And do not staff officers need the decisiveness and leadership abilities, although expressed differently, of the line executive?

7. Emotional maturity and real (as distinguished from seeming) self-assurance are the most fundamental of all personal characteristics because their possession seems significantly related to behavior of fundamental importance:

- a. willingness to accept changes suggested by others in an inferior position.
- b. willingness to develop and encourage subordinates.¹⁴
- c. willingness to delegate.
- d. ability to keep one's head in an emergency.
- e. ethical and unselfish conduct.
- f. ability to resist pressures.
- g. willingness to hire subordinates who are more able than the selector.¹⁵
- h. ability to weigh arguments objectively.
- i. effectiveness in negotiations.
- j. willingness to take disagreeable action.

8. One of the most valuable attributes of an administrator is being publicly known for

¹³ William T. R. Fox, "Military Representation Abroad," in *The Representation of the United States Abroad* (The American Assembly, Columbia University, June 1956), p. 152.

¹⁴ See George C. Houston, "Toward Better Self-Understanding" (*34 Personnel Journal* 291, 1956).

¹⁵ It is interesting to observe that some administrators without self-assurance meet their needs for able subordinates by hiring women, members of other minority groups, and those with low aspiration.

important accomplishments; such a record has highly important effects such as promoting the administrator's self-assurance, increasing the prestige of his organization and thereby the morale of its employees, and providing an additional inducement for attracting able subordinates.

9. Subjective selection methods (e.g. oral interviews) are neither valid nor nonvalid per se, i.e., they may or may not accurately predict administrative ability. Their validity varies with the appraiser.

Data available indicate that some raters achieve significant validity in selecting management trainees based on an essay test while others achieve no validity at all. Data showing sharply differing results for different raters using psychiatric interviews to select British army officers and oral interviews to choose British civil service administrators are also available.

10. Analysis of the previous behavior of an applicant for an administrative position should differentiate between behavior which reflects the demands of the previous position and behavior stemming from the personality structure of the applicant. For example, the applicant may have temporized in his previous position because the situation made this behavior appropriate, but he may be quite decisive when the situation warrants.

The best basis for arriving at this distinction is to study his behavior in a variety of situations in order to determine which actions form a consistent pattern.

11. Greater than average verbal ability (relative to members of his own occupation) is a more useful criterion for selecting administrators from nonverbal occupations such as engineering and accounting than from verbal occupations such as the social sciences because the verbal occupations require as much verbal

ability in the nonadministrative as in the administrative phases of work.

* * * *

Research is needed to test these and other hypotheses if progress is to be made. It is doubtful, considering the amount of writing on this subject, that further discussion without additional research work will be very profitable. This research work has been delayed for a number of reasons. Administrators frequently do not want to have their jobs and qualifications studied. The complexity of the field discourages all but the most foolhardy. The existing strong conflicts in opinion encourage a feeling that any research finding is bound to be rejected by those who have committed themselves to a point of view not supported by the research results.

Also, techniques for evaluating some of these hypotheses are not developed. Still, the history of science supports the opinion that the development of techniques is both independent of and the result of the need for solving problems. One can either support the opinion that research should be done now even with inadequate techniques or argue that research should be delayed until the techniques are fully adequate.

Nevertheless, it is probable that the area of administrative selection offers as fruitful a field for exploration as exists in management research today. As the authors of the Report on Personnel and Civil Service of the Second Hoover Commission noted: "Increasing the supply of managerial talent . . . is the heart of the Federal personnel problem today, and this is the area where the greatest benefits are to be gained."¹⁸

¹⁸ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1955), p. xxi.

Comparing Administrative Systems: Two Views

► Those seeking a fundamental understanding of public administration have recognized more and more that by comparing administrative systems of many countries, what is essential about government and bureaucracy can be more easily distinguished from what is incidental. This way of looking at public administration particularly points up the relationship of the administrator to the public and his role in the whole governmental process. Also, the results of different

types of organization and operation can be examined. While the how of comparative research is still the main concern of scholars in this field, even these early efforts to wrestle the gigantic mass of material into related groupings can be a guide to the administrator seeking a deeper grasp of his job. Strange as other societies may seem, the contrasts as well as the similarities to our own systems and behavior help to polish the mirror for self-study.

A Survey and Evaluation of Comparative Research

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INTERNATIONAL study programs, international technical aid, and a growing interest in international politics and political organization have intensified contemporary interest in comparative administration.

There are a number of recognizable groups of people specially concerned with the subject. Although published material is still relatively scarce if we take a narrow definition of what is meant by comparative administration, there is a great deal of closely related reading material already available for those who intend to enter this field of study. This article draws attention to some of those studies, selected by way of example. The selection is by no means exhaustive; some have had to be omitted which are no less useful than those which have been chosen.

The student may wish to draw comparisons in order to propose modifications or improvements in the administration of his own country; he may wish to enlarge his general thinking or academic experience. There are also practising administrators who wish to make comparisons to broaden their general approach to professional problems. Besides administrators with this broad interest, there are spe-

cialists who wish to see how their particular function of government operates in the administration of other countries. Finally there is a growing body of experts appointed to technical aid programs who need comparative information as a basis for the specialist advice which they will give during their assignments abroad.

Members of all of these groups are well informed as a rule and approach the subject with some familiarity with public administration gained through study or experience or both. Most of them are primarily concerned with the administration of their own country, with which they wish to draw comparisons; but some, particularly the technical assistance experts, have a more international viewpoint.

Early Attempts at Comparison

None of them can study comparative administration effectively without some preliminary study of comparative government. Every administrative system is profoundly influenced by the political system in which it operates. Administration gives effect to the policies and procedures of government; government is in

turn conditioned by the political and constitutional structure of society, so that to study any administrative system it is necessary first to understand its political and social background.

The comparative study of government has been a subject of particular interest in both North America and Europe over the past few years, and much of what has recently been written about it applies in great measure also to the comparative study of administration.

In 1952, the American Political Science Association organized an Inter-University Research Seminar on Comparative Politics under the chairmanship of Roy C. Macridis. It issued a report which was summarized in the *American Political Science Review* of December 1952 and was reviewed in the same journal in the following September.¹

In 1952, the Association set up a committee on comparative administration under the chairmanship of Walter R. Sharp. At the same time the Public Administration Clearing House sponsored a conference on Comparative Administration at Princeton from which came a report edited by Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman. With the help of Sharp's committee, this report was elaborated into a *Research Design for a Pilot Study in Comparative Administration*, issued by the Association. In April 1954, the International Political Science Association held a Round Table in Florence on teaching and research in comparative government. The rapporteur-general was Gunnar Heckscher of Stockholm University. As the outcome, Macridis has published a *Study of Comparative Government* and Heckscher a *Study of Comparative Government and Politics*. The student of comparative government or comparative administration would do well to begin by reading both.

Macridis is very critical of the conventional approach to comparative administration. He finds fault with many studies because they are descriptive rather than comparative. It is not enough, he argues, for the author to describe successively the administrative systems of a number of countries and to leave the student to make comparisons between them. It would

be more effective if he selected a number of problems or institutions and examined how each is dealt with in different administrations. From a comparative viewpoint the student will gain more from an assessment of how successfully a particular basic problem of administration has been solved in a number of different countries than from descriptive material which makes no direct comparisons. Macridis suggests that another shortcoming of many comparative studies is that they concentrate too much on western systems of government and are subjective in their emphasis on democratic forms. The modern student must accept the fact that there are nowadays public services which have been effectively developed in a different political and social framework from that of the Western countries and that they are no less interesting or significant for this reason. Macridis also urges the need for a "general theory of politics as well as a general theory of political change," an approach which seems to be of especial interest to American scholars at the present time.

In a particularly interesting and readable book Heckscher discusses the principle of comparison between administrations and the possibilities and values of the various methods of approach. He then goes on to examine the application of comparative methods in political science and makes a number of interesting and stimulating suggestions for subjects to be studied. He would like to see a comparison, for example, of the influences of different parliamentary institutions on the administrations with which they are associated, and he lays great emphasis on the need to study the variety of ways in which different countries surmount their administrative problems. He thus accepts a broad basis of comparison but unlike Macridis he still regards the country-by-country approach as important, and he also advocates comparisons on a regional basis. As he reminds us, any comparison must begin with a full understanding of the structure of the governments to be compared.

Description as Part of Comparison

The descriptive approach still has its place in the reading of any student of comparative government or comparative administration.

¹ Key books and articles are listed in a bibliography at the end.

The classical initiator of this kind of analysis is Aristotle, whose *Constitution of Athens*—understood to be one of a series of such studies—is well worth reading even after twenty-four centuries. It is a comparison of the eleven constitutions successively adopted in Athens. Comparison here is domestic, between one Athenian form of government and another, and in the main the study is a political one. However, the student of administration will find a description of the administrative system under the eleventh constitution of considerable interest because of its wide differences from the administrations of our day.

Any survey of a country's political institutions or administration must be to some extent comparative, however domestic its approach. The writer may criticize by comparison with standards which he himself may define or he may draw comparison with other countries to illustrate a particular point. The student of comparative government or comparative administration should therefore not ignore the classical studies of the subject, written primarily in terms of a single country. Many of these are no doubt already familiar to our readers.

There is, however, one type of study in this category to which we should draw special attention: the descriptive survey written from a foreign rather than from a domestic viewpoint. This has considerable value for comparative study, since even when he is writing about another country, the author cannot fully escape from his domestic environment. In the nineteenth century we have two outstanding examples in Lord Bryce's *American Commonwealth* and Alexis de Tocqueville's *De la Démocratie en Amérique*. The latter has been translated into English and although it describes the United States of a hundred years ago, it contains a great deal of interest to modern readers. Incidentally de Tocqueville has much to say about administration. Lord Bryce describes a more recent stage in the development of the United States and it should perhaps be explained to American readers that he was several times a minister in the British government in the great days of the Liberal Party, and for six years was British Ambassador in Washington. The twentieth century has other studies of this character to

offer, amongst them those on the United States by H. J. Laski, a writer whose work seems to be of special interest to American readers, and—perhaps the most outstanding—D. W. Brogan's entertaining *Politics in America*, without which no foreigner should try to understand the government of the United States.

There are also studies which adopt a comparative approach by offering successive descriptions of a variety of governments in the same volume, such as Fritz Morstein Marx' volume on *Foreign Governments*. This is a country-by-country survey of "the dynamics of politics abroad." It describes a number of governments from a contemporary viewpoint and includes very useful sketches of their recent history. However there is very little direct comparison between countries and its main value is as a work of reference.

In comparative public administration, as distinguished from comparative government and politics, much less has been written of a descriptive character. There are of course a good many domestic studies of individual administrations and individual public services, but the number of outstanding works from a comparative standpoint is relatively small. Perhaps J. Donald Kingsley's *Representative Bureaucracy*, an interesting American attempt to interpret the British Civil Service, is amongst the best. Walter R. Sharp's *French Civil Service*, dating from 1931, is still of great value to the student, notwithstanding the fact that it was written two republics ago. There is nothing newer in English on the subject, but it may be read in conjunction with *L'Organisation gouvernementale administrative et judiciaire de la France*, an authoritative and more modern study, issued by the National School of Administration in 1952. An interesting group of essays, edited by W. A. Robson under the title of *The Civil Service in Britain and France*, can be recommended to American readers, although it is descriptive and critical rather than comparative and has relatively little about France. A good recent example of a descriptive survey with comparative overtones is Howard A. Scarrow's study of *The Higher Public Service of the Commonwealth of Australia*. This examines the effect of political and administrative developments

since the establishment of federal government and the transfer of the capital from Melbourne to Canberra, but it deals with the higher levels of the service only and so is rather narrow in its approach.

A number of recent descriptive studies are of special interest to the student of comparative administration because they deal with countries about which little has so far been written. Perhaps pride of place should be given to *The Organization of the Government of India*, recently prepared by the Indian Institute of Public Administration; this gives a comprehensive and valuable summary of recent constitutional development and of the growth of departments and ministries, with a description of the organization and function of each department of state. In his study of *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt* Morroe Berger has made an analysis of a survey, in which 249 civil servants participated, of the type of entrant to the Egyptian service, his background, education, attitudes, social position and so on. This is an evaluation of the replies to a detailed questionnaire and is therefore inclined to be statistical in its approach.

Another interesting example of the statistical approach is an analysis by Robert V. Presthus of the work of *The Turkish Conseil d'Etat*. This examines a sample of over 2,000 cases dealt with by this administrative tribunal during the years 1947-1954 and gives a good insight into the work of this judicial organ of Turkish administration.

A descriptive study which loses a great deal through its narrow perspective is *The Bureaucracy in the Philippines* by Onofre D. Corpuz. It is described as "a study of the past roots and present foundations of bureaucracy in the Philippines." It compares the successive colonial governments of Spain and the United States in the Philippines, always to the advantage of the latter, without any attempt to assess the Spanish administration in relation to others of its day. The attempts of the United States to "Filipinize" the administration are presented as something unique in colonial history. There is no reference to the very much larger task of the same character successfully undertaken from an earlier period by the British in India and more recent ef-

orts of the same kind, particularly in Africa.

In local government there are two recent descriptive comparative studies which call for special notice. W. A. Robson's *Great Cities of the World* has a description of the government of twenty major cities, each presented by a competent authority. The editor has contributed a comparative introduction of municipal problems of today as well as the chapter on London. A concise but very detailed comparison of *Rural Local Government in Sweden, Italy and India* has recently been published under the sponsorship of UNESCO by Harold Zink, Arne Wählstrand, Feliciano Benvenuti, and R. Bhaskaran.

Comparative Studies and Methods

Turning from the descriptive method to the more explicitly comparative approach, and taking first the material available on comparative government, perhaps the best example of the institutional approach is K. C. Wheare's *Federal Government*. This particularly lucid study attempts to identify and make explicit the essentially federal characteristics of Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. It includes comparison with other countries in so far as their government adopts a partly federal form. Two other outstanding examples of comparative study are Alexander Brady's *Democracy in the Dominions*, a comprehensive exposition of the development of democratic government in the older Commonwealth countries, written from a Canadian viewpoint, and Carl J. Friedrich's *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, a detailed analysis of the theory and practice of government in Europe and America.

In the realm of public administration, few such comparative studies have been undertaken. Recently Indiana University issued a series of essays under the title *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*. The first in the series, and the one which gives its name to the collection, is a general and somewhat theoretical review by William J. Siffin of the problems which face the student of comparative administration. A number of case studies of a descriptive character are included, each written by an authority with first-hand knowledge of the country concerned. Lynton K. Caldwell describes the administra-

tion of Turkey; Walter R. Sharp that of Egypt; Albert Lepawsky, Bolivia; Ferrel Heady, the Philippines; and James N. Mosel, Thailand; there is also an interesting analysis of the characteristics of the administrative system of France by Alfred Diamant. Fred W. Riggs has contributed "Agraria and Industria," a comparison between two societies theoretically established by the author, one at the extreme of industrial development (with an administration remarkably like that of the United States), the other agricultural and in an extreme state of underdevelopment. The idea is stimulating, but since the author's approach always leaves him in a position to compare opposites, each of the two imaginary countries appears to have an organic symmetry which would certainly be lacking in reality.

A good example of comparison of institutions is an interesting short monograph by André Bertrand, *Les Techniques du Travail Gouvernemental dans l'Etat Moderne*. It is a particularly good description of the operation of the cabinet and of the machinery for the preparation of legislation in France, Great Britain,² and the United States and the author has had access to well-informed sources of unpublished material. An English translation may become available during 1959. A more general study of bureaucracy entitled *The Administrative State* has recently been undertaken by Fritz Morstein Marx. The writer offers a wealth of illustration from Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United States to give a sympathetic description of the development of the civil servant and his tasks and position in the modern world. It is an attempt to do for the civil service what William Whyte did for the business corporation in *The Organization Man* but in a more serious and less provocative vein. A description of the organization of a civil service with heavier domestic emphasis—although it draws frequent comparisons from elsewhere—is Roger Grégoire's book on the French civil service, *La Fonction Publique*. It

is so informative and well written that it well repays reading although unfortunately no English translation is yet available. The author was at one time Director of the French Civil Service.

Exploration of comparative administration in the professional journals is an onerous task, but the diligent student would be amply rewarded. There are such valuable studies as Hardy Wickwar's "Pattern and Problems of Local Administration in the Middle East" in the *Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1958, or H. L. Keenleyside's study of the unusual "Administrative Problems of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration" in the Autumn, 1955, issue of *Public Administration* (London). There is also enough material to reward search amongst official reports, such as the United Nations report on the *Administration of Public Enterprises in Asia and the Far East*, issued in 1954, or the Royal Institute of Public Administration's *Report of a Conference on the Development of Local Government in the Colonies*. A very useful *Selected and Annotated Bibliography on Comparative Public Administration* has been issued by the University of Michigan.

For the specialist who wishes to concentrate on studying the operation of his own function in a different context, very little has so far been written. There is C. J. Hayes' authoritative *Report on the Public Service Commissions of the Commonwealth*, but the most valuable specialized administrative studies so far are those which have been published by the International Program in Taxation at Harvard Law School, in consultation with the United Nations Secretariat, in the World Tax Series; volumes covering Australia, Brazil, Mexico, and the United Kingdom already have been issued and those dealing with Colombia, Germany, India, Sweden, and Turkey are in preparation.

Problems to Explore; Problems of Exploration

This review of available material suggests that there is a need for more. Some suggestions for further institutional and problem studies in comparative administration may not be out of place. Institutional comparison might be

*This French writer correctly uses the term *Grande Bretagne*. It is unfortunate that so many American writers wrongly use *England* in this context in view of the important contribution which Scotland has made to the development of public administration.

on a broad scale such as the degree to which the French concept of administrative law has been adopted by countries beyond the Rhine and the Pyrenees, or the degree to which British institutions have been modified in the different countries of the Commonwealth. The problem approach might be applied to comparison of problems of deconcentration of government (a research project in this field has already been undertaken by the United Nations and the International Political Science Association) or to the problem of administrative changes in the transition from colonial to independent government.

Such comparative study must avoid the danger of false equation. An agency or function of government in one administration can all too easily be assumed to be similar to one which has a similar name in another. In spite of some superficial resemblance, the counties in Great Britain and the United States have important differences; in spite of the same name being used, the structure and role of the cabinet varies very considerably from country to country. An imaginative approach may also discover similarity of function, with highly promising scope for comparison, concealed by a different organizational structure; the overall planning and coordination of policy seem in the United States administration to be a function of the political aides of the senior executive; in Great Britain they are largely dealt with by members of the administrative class of the civil service, particularly by the Permanent Secretaries; the French administration has invented a unique device for the purpose, the *Cabinet du Ministre*, the minister's cabinet, which is composed partly of political aides and partly of civil servants.

There is also a need for comparative study of functions which at first sight appear to be peculiar to one country. It would be interesting to discover, for instance, how the functions of the *Conseil d'Etat* in France, or of Parliamentary Counsel in Great Britain, or of the *Rijkswaterstaat* in the Netherlands are carried out in administrative systems which do not recognize them as such.

Finally we must avoid misconceptions about administrative characteristics which are quite alien to our own experience. The foreigner is

frequently at a loss to understand, for example, the full implications of the relationship between state and federal government in the United States; the nature and functions of the executive boards in the Swedish public service; the role of the Federal Executive Council in Yugoslavia; the recruitment and composition of the administrative class in Great Britain; or the functions of the *Cour des Comptes* in France. This suggests that a full understanding of the working of governmental operations is necessary before comparison can seriously be attempted.

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Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures

By ROBERT V. PRESTHUS
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COMPARATIVE administration is thriving. The search for generality in Western administrative systems and, more important at this historical stage, in non-Western societies has sharply expanded since World War II. In addition to the action programs and conferences of national and international agencies and the big foundations, the number of university programs and individual scholars devoted to comparative social analysis has steadily increased.

Much administrative study has been in the Middle East, where the challenge to U. S. interests and the explosion of nationalism have pushed American scholars into long-ignored areas. Because I know something of this area and because some of the new research has occurred there, I shall evaluate the existing state of comparative administration mainly in this context. Several books comparing Western administrative systems have appeared recently,

but this is well-ploughed ground and little new has been added.

My main theme is this: comparative administration needs an explicit synthesis between conceptual theory and empirical field research.

One prefatory remark concerning the research sparked by the technical assistance program of the International Cooperation Administration and the United Nations. In the main, these programs have provided exceptional research opportunities, and their action orientation has given research a problem-centered character which has helped guide the alien researcher who is often deposited in the host country with relatively short notice and a magnificent ignorance of its culture. However, I must observe that the research done under technical aid programs has not been as helpful as expected. Understandably, the aid agencies and the host country are looking for

practical results from the allocation of limited research resources—and within the common one-or-two-year tour of duty. The research man, on the other hand, wants time to get below the assumed surface manifestations of administration. Since a discipline of comparative administration clearly requires the broadest understanding of the cultural factors in administration, the technical aid-sponsored research has been less productive in developing the discipline than one might hope. Not only is its "action" research often disparate and random, but there have been few efforts to develop a theory and a method that might make such studies part of an accretive, replicable body of knowledge.

The Need for Theory

Comparative administration, it seems, dramatizes the need for a working theory because one finds so much data and such a proliferation of cultural forms that the researcher might easily spend a lifetime on any given country yet not develop any firm generalizations about its administrative system—simply because he had failed to put his findings to the test of significance in the context of some organizing theory. "Theory" here means a statement of assumed causal relations between two or more variables. Imputing causality is a vital element as is the building of interrelationships among different sets of such assumed uniformities. Without both elements the collection of evidence can go on *ad infinitum* without advancing us along the road to social "laws."¹

Such theory need not be of cosmic dimension. Social science has turned away from the vast theoretical systems of Pareto and Marx because conceptualization at such levels has not provided basis for empirical research. Most social scientists are now content to bite off smaller chunks of reality and to research these intensively, using as their guide "middle range" theory which attempts to abstract from the whole social context some limited but, hopefully, meaningful segment for analysis. Middle-range theory attempts to explain a restricted set of relationships, as opposed to theory such as Parsons' which attempts to com-

prehend and to explain an entire social system. It abstracts a significant part of the larger complex, such as the relationship discussed below between social values and organizational behavior. This process of abstraction is arbitrary and artificial, but its segments are manageable and enable us to be more precise and cumulative.

The need for middle-range theory and systematic public research—in which premises, theories, working hypotheses, definitions, and findings are explicitly stated so that the research can be judged and built upon by others—is greater in comparative administration than elsewhere because consensus about the impact of cultural forms and values upon administrative systems is otherwise almost unobtainable. In the absence of "public" research, observers fail at the outset to meet minds and so to contribute to each other's understanding.²

Overcoming the private tradition of comparative analysis would seem to require the use of middle-range theory so that bases for comparability might be precisely stated in a limited context and kept in view throughout. Probably for some time such theory would have to be applied only to small blocs of countries whose social contexts seemed relatively similar. This might be done with several Middle East states which seem comparable in point of subsistence economies, underemployment, low per capita income, low literacy rates, dependence upon government for social services and economic development, Muslim religion, stratified class systems, essentially religious as opposed to secular ideologies, and rationalistic mental sets, and so on.

Some Relationships for Study

One problem is isolating the specific vari-

¹ For example, at a recent Council on Foreign Relations seminar on human factors affecting economic development in the Middle East, social scientists, oil company executives with long experience in the area, and UN economists often were unable to agree on such elementary questions as the existence or the social effect of religious values, fatalism, and concepts of time and the universe. Even the importance of fatalism, which one might have thought a most striking Muslim characteristic, was doubted. What was occurring was the clash of essentially private views about these societies, undisciplined by any theoretical framework or system for weighting such variables.

² Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (The Free Press, 1957), pp. 95-99.

ables that are critical for bureaucratic development. It is easy to suggest what such variables might be; the challenge is to evolve theoretical conceptions and research designs that will bring out the consistent relationships between them and a given bureaucratic system. Certainly we would agree that the class system and power structure are related to bureaucratic norms and behavior and that quantitative indexes can be designed to analyze them, replacing speculation by data. Family structure and personality (including such elements as child-raising patterns and attitudes toward authority) also are amenable to research instruments. Several ordering constructs are now accepted by psychiatrists, including self, ego-ideal, superego, and the concepts of socialization, identification, social role, and values. All are available as instruments of analysis in comparative organizational behavior.³

Developmental psychologists agree that national cultures tend to produce typical personality structures. It seems equally clear that personality structures are not discarded like snakes' skins when one enters the bureaucratic arena; rather the patterns of bureaucratic authority and deference reflect the values of institutions through which the bureaucrat has grown, primarily the family. For example, cultural parochialism has obscured the fact that the nepotism and subjectivity seen in bureaucratic systems of many less-developed societies are a manifestation of their pattern of family relations in which personal loyalties outweigh the demands of technical supremacy. Without some theory which relates social values and organizational behavior, this phenomenon is explained only in irrelevant moral terms. In the West, a similar conflict—bureaucratic needs vs. family and political loyalty—exists, but the demands of objectivity usually persist; in the Middle East, the breakdown of the extended family which permits this solution has not yet occurred.

If Weber was right, the relationship between economic system and bureaucracy also is intimate. For example, he says, "the development of the money economy, insofar as a pecuniary compensation of the officials is

concerned, is a presupposition of bureaucracy."⁴ While payment in kind was characteristic of the early bureaucracies of Egypt, Rome, the Catholic Church, and China, still "a certain measure of a developed money economy is the normal precondition for the unchanged and continued existence, if not for the establishment, of pure bureaucratic administrations."⁵ Thus the economy may be useful as one criterion for analyzing bureaucracies and for explaining the differences among them.

This approach suggests that comparative administration must draw upon several theoretical levels and disciplines. The free-wheeling historical systems of Toynbee, Gibb, and Weber can be used to build middle-range theory based upon carefully-defined functions in a given society, followed by careful testing of such theory. The conclusions of traditional analyses become hypotheses; their rich, historical findings provide the basis for precise, operational questions. For example: the generalization that non-Western family structure with its demands for highly personalized decisions inhibits the development of objective, rational bureaucratic operations. Anthropological research has shown us that non-Western family values are indeed different, but the precise impact of such values upon administration remains to be demonstrated. Greater problems exist at the other end of the scale, in the sense that the raw data required for the building of middle-range theory often do not exist. Empirical, descriptive studies are needed in many areas, but I think the experience of American political science indicates that such studies can never by themselves get us very far along the road to firm generalizations about administrative behavior.

An Attempt at Broad Theory

In this context, Weber seems to provide the most useful theory. His ideal typical model was specifically designed for comparative analysis, and his main theme was that contemporary institutions remain opaque without the insights of history. That the validity of this

³ Alexander H. Leighton, John A. Clausen, and Robert N. Wilson, eds., *Explorations in Social Psychiatry* (Basic Books, 1957), pp. 17-28.

⁴ From Max Weber: *Essays in Sociology*, translated and edited by Gerth and Mills (Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 204.

⁵ *Ibid.*

general approach is becoming evident is clear from such recent writings as *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* which includes among several disparate country studies a theory for the study of comparative administration.⁶ The Parsonian dimensions of this theory, its sweeping cross-cultural generalizations, leave an empirically-oriented person gasping. If a goal of theory-building is the use of the smallest number of variables competent to explain the phenomenon under analysis, Riggs has been profligate. And certainly, like Parsons' action system, this theory will not spark much empirical research until it is broken down into manageable parts. Still, I think it is a most important contribution to the study of comparative administration which badly needs emphasis upon theory at this stage.

Comprehensive, eclectic, vastly abstract, this theory posits two broad models of analysis: *industria* and *agraria*. Riggs understands that ideal-typical models are conceptual and analytical tools that cannot and need not exist in the real world. They can be evaluated in terms of relative utility but not in terms of their identity with any existing system. Here again the usefulness and the influence of Weber are clearly seen. We have here a continuum ranging from pure agrarian to pure industrial models. Such models enable us to analyze existing systems in terms of their similarities and differences vis-a-vis the pure types. Several variables are then analyzed in terms of their modal characteristics in each ideal type, followed by an attempt to isolate some of their consequences for public administration. Only a few of these variables can be mentioned here.

Agraria's economic base, for example, is characterized by a predominantly rural population living on a subsistence basis. Government officials are the most powerful class, and they extract from the villages "large amounts of consumer goods to maintain their high social status." The limited social product going to the lower classes of *agraria* is largely a residue of activities undertaken for the ruling elite. However, there are compensations since

the village neither asks nor needs much from government: "government is an abstraction symbolized chiefly by the periodic appearance of a hated tax collector." Difficulties of tax collection and low productivity mean, furthermore, that the government's role cannot be very extensive. As a result, its powers to "control the behavior of its subjects are drastically limited."

In the Middle Eastern model of *agraria*, at least, this last generalization seems inapplicable. I cannot believe the ordinary citizen of Egypt, Turkey, or Syria, for example, believes that government's power to control his behavior is "drastically limited." The historic absence of due process and the tradition of arbitrary government have meant the capricious appropriation of private property, the denial of civil rights, the firing of professors, the banishing of journalists for criticizing government, forced labor in state-owned industries, and control of public information via radio.⁷

When the economic variable is applied to *industria*, two sub-types are posited, essentially public and private ownership. Here some cosmic generalizations occur: "Private ownership increases the sphere of political freedom and makes possible greater citizen control over the government." On the other hand, increased state ownership reduces private power, but individual liberty is lost. Such conclusions illustrate the problems of theory-building at this abstract level. Without extensive qualification, these generalizations are almost useless, particularly in view of the fact that most lesser-developed countries are moving directly from feudalism to state ownership.

Some of the consequences of *industria*'s and *agraria*'s economic systems for public administration are cited. Whereas recruitment in *agraria* is "particularized" (limited to elite groups), *industria* must recruit "universalistically." One of Riggs' related conclusions is that "great mobility of persons in spacial, occupational and hierarchical terms is promoted" by *industria*. *Industria* and *agraria* also are differentiated economically in that the former can afford to pay its bureaucrats a

⁶ Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in W. J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*, Indiana University, 1957, pp. 23-110.

⁷ For evidence that civil servants have also been disadvantaged, see Robert V. Prethys (with Sevda Erem), *Statistical Method in Comparative Administration: The Turkish Conseil d'Etat* (Cornell University Press, 1958).

living wage, establishing a financial dependence which "increases its control over their behavior," while the relative poverty of agraria forces officials to turn to other sources of incomes, with attending effects upon bureaucratic values and performance.

Here, an interesting paradox occurs: we are told that industria's economic system promotes a conception of the bureaucrat as an instrument, a "neutral means" for the achievement of goals set by his political masters. However, in summing up administrative differences in the two models, Riggs concludes that while agraria is concerned more with posts than with policies, industria is concerned more with policy than with posts. But if concerned with policy, surely the bureaucrat's role is more than "neutral instrument." In fact, policy roles vary greatly within industria, in relation to the political party systems, among other factors. In the United States, the failure of parties to reconcile the claims of divergent interests through firm policy commitments augments the bureaucrat's policy role compared, for example, to Great Britain.

Social structure is next used to differentiate the two models. Both industria and agraria have primary and secondary organizations, but one type dominates in each model. The primary type tends to dominate in agricultural, rural, relatively immobile situations, and membership is largely by birth, e.g., the extended family in agraria. Secondary organizations—less personal, less traditional, and less selective associations such as fraternal orders, unions, schools and country clubs—characterize the industrial, urban society. These two types of organization are defined by different behaviors toward outsiders, different bases of inclusion, and different indications of status: in agraria, status follows birth whereas industria is "achievement oriented."

Here, Riggs' instrument of analysis explains much about the differences in competence, recruitment, attitude, and functioning between Western and non-Western bureaucracies. The "achievement orientation" of industria means that its bureaucracy will be more rational, in line with the Weberian hypothesis. In agraria, on the contrary, secondary organizations such as government "tend to resemble large primary organizations, somehow wrenched out of

their natural rural setting." As a result, the bureaucracy resembles a "greatly extended joint family or clan."

The citizen's relations with the government and his attitude toward it are similarly affected by differences in social organization. "Government and the subject view each other through the lens of primary organization in agraria, through secondary organization in industria." The supremacy of technique, of policy decisions that reflect several diverse interests, and of objective interpersonal and official-client relations are inapposite in agraria's primary organization-dominated society; thus bureaucracy cannot develop in line with the Western model.

Differing ideological frameworks and cognitive processes also characterize agraria and industria. For example, the characteristic mode of thought in agraria is sacral, subjective, and even mystical, whereas in industria it is secular and objective. The lesser degree of control over his natural environment impels the agrarian to regard the universe with somewhat more awe than does the industrian. In addition, the universe is regarded as essentially unchanging or changeless. Time is an unscarce resource.

The typical industrian, however, lives surrounded by examples of man's control over his environment; most natural phenomena are explained, and those that are not are repressed. In most cases, the present life dominates his thoughts and energy. Secularism and materialism reign. In agraria, by contrast, truth itself is subjective and multiple, usually the result of revelation or deduction. Moreover, there is a unity of all knowledge, and this knowledge embraces all behavior. For most communities, "the foundations of knowledge are sacral," based upon logical inference and speculation. In Ayer's phrase, the epistemological differences between the two models are those of the "pontiff" and the "journeyman."

Because the ruling elite in agraria is restricted to a self-conscious "community," it shares a "common body of beliefs." Those who run the bureaucracy will tend to have a similar educational background. Conflicts and rivalries will, therefore, reflect personal interests more than ideological ones. In industria, however, the bureaucracy is divided into many occupational categories, each with its own vocabulary and vocational loyalties. As

is well known, technical specialists and generalists have different bureaucratic values.

The content and character of knowledge in agraria and industria will differ similarly. In the former, "correct conduct," "ethics," "humanism," and "urbanity" will be sought, while in industria technical skill, facts, proof, and objectivity are the honorific symbols. Also, in agraria, "the words used, gestures made, postures assumed, clothes worn, and forms followed are freighted with heavy sacral content." In contrast, industria operates in objectively rational terms.

While in the main this distinction seems accurate, it is surely overdrawn. Recent research shows that decision-making in our own industria is less rational than we have assumed.⁸ In the economic arena, our major assumptions about demand, efficiency and productivity have been shown to be "freighted with heavy sacral content."⁹ Moreover, at the interpersonal level, bureaucratic operations in industria seem to be moving in a ritualistic direction as status symbols become more treasured in an effort to supplement the increasingly slight gradations in income and influence. Such a milieu has its virtues, which I have tried to analyze elsewhere.¹⁰ However, the whole drift toward structured interpersonal relations in big organizations, which has been called the move back from contract to status, seems to reflect essentially subjective motivations.

In treating power and administration in his model societies, Riggs notes that in agraria, with authority sacral, the bureaucrat's legitimation is "royal," which disposes the official to expect deference from the public. In industria, however, authority comes from the people, its bureaucrats are public servants, and their behavior toward their clients is deferential. Riggs eases this idealization somewhat by mentioning strategies of confusion and technological suppression that industria's bureaucracy uses to "suppress the critics effectively."

⁸Cf. R. M. Cyert, W. R. Dill and J. C. March, "The Role of Expectations in Business Decision Making," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 307 (December, 1958).

⁹Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (Modern Library, 1934) and John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Houghton Mifflin, 1958).

¹⁰"Toward a Theory of Organizational Behavior," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 48 (June, 1958).

Riggs next turns to the public administration systems of each model, using economic and cybernetic terms and assumptions. Public administration becomes "an input-conversion-output system." The relations between the theoretical models and the real world are examined in part through an "equilibrium model" in which public administration is set at the center of a constellation of inter-related sub-systems; "'feedbacks,' 'gyroscopes,' and 'governors' tend to restore the balance whenever internal or external pressures threaten the system." As to the relative equilibrium of the two models, Riggs concludes that agraria is "more surely" an equilibrium model than industria. However, the rapid rate of change in some lesser-developed societies is cited to show that equilibrium mechanisms have definite limits in the real world.

For several reasons this part of the analysis is unimpressive. Perhaps the problem lies in the attempt to use an equilibrium concept which remains undefined and is perhaps undefinable in a social context. While the intent is to bring the analysis closer to reality, neither the concepts nor the vocabulary of equilibrium theory bridge the gap between the models and the real world. To say that "the sub-systems in each model are functionally inter-related" and "contain self regulating devices . . . which tend to restore the balance whenever internal or external pressures threaten the system" is just too neat. This degree of order and reciprocity may characterize the physical world but "equilibrium" remains at best a heuristic device in the social world.

Finally, Riggs considers the "dynamics of transition" from agraria to industria, including the capacity of society to accommodate invention occurring either within the culture or being superimposed from without. A survey of the transitional societies of "monsoon Asia," including Pakistan, India, China and Korea, suggests that though these typically agrarian societies have changed substantially and at different rates, a common pattern may still be seen in their responses. Subsistence farming has declined, and industries have flourished. Debt and tenancy have increased. Vast new service outputs have been demanded from public administration and disequilibria between these demands and the resource inputs have been aggravated. Bureaucrats have been

sacrificed to inflation as governments have tried to extract the resources necessary to fill the gap. "In the process primary social organizations have undergone considerable strain and the hopes of elite groups to incorporate western industrial and organizational skill while resisting the social structure that produced them have been threatened."

This tension "corrodes legitimacy at its foundations," resulting in explosive, cabalistic kinds of rule, yet some stability is achieved by the emergence of counter-elites, formed from the technically-skilled, newly-literate elements who have been brought into decision-making positions by demands for technical skill in both public and private spheres. Bureaucratic power grows and continues to offer the most secure and prestigious careers. The survival of colonial rule aggravates the communication problems by the chasm between the top and the lower bureaucratic levels, each of which uses its own language and behavior forms. In sum, the transitional society remains in uneasy equilibrium between agraria and industria, seeking an adjustment between the conflicting demands of area and function, family and community, loyalty and competence.

What kinds of judgments and criteria are relevant in evaluating Riggs' theoretical scheme? Certainly, it is a titanic attempt to give order to the complex field of comparative administration, defined as it must be in terms of the major social values that press upon it. Perhaps the essential function of a theory is to give order to a mass of data by suggesting repeated relationships among them. A theory should provide us a way of looking at the real world and, superficially, the test of a theory is the degree to which its formulations seem consonant with our perceptions of reality. Certainly Riggs' theory meets this criterion, giving a rare scope and depth to "administration."

An equally important criterion is whether a theory is operational, i.e., does it provide hypotheses that can be tested and seem worth testing? As it now stands, I would predict that this theory will have limited impact upon empirical research because it is too sweeping and too abstract. However, it contains a vast fund of potential hypotheses. It is rich in historical insight and achieves a remarkable synthesis of social science concepts. In attempting to reduce the grand scheme of agraria-industria to

manageable size, it is very probable that the master design will be lost; this is to say that agraria and industria are not operational as empirical research categories. They must be sharply reduced in space and time before they can be put to the empirical test. Nevertheless, Riggs has given us the kind of conceptualization, theory-building, and definition that must be had if comparative administration is to become a discipline. He has given us terms and concepts that ease communication, a theory and definitions that order reality, enough hypotheses for several lifetimes of research, and a way of looking at comparative administration that makes sense because it self-consciously sets bureaucracy in its social context.

Testing of a Middle-Range Theory

A recent study based on a survey of 249 middle grade civil servants, illustrates the synthesis of middle-range theory and field research—Morroe Berger's *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt*.¹¹

Illustrating what I have called "public" research, the assumptions, methods, definitions, and shortcomings of the study are explicitly stated. There are serious technical weaknesses in the survey: (1) the sample is not representative of the entire "higher civil service," (2) there is not a random sample of the officials in the ministries that are included, and the "sensitive" ministries (Foreign Affairs, Interior, and War) are excluded, yet statistics are used to analyze the data and to work out significances. Nevertheless, some of the findings are of great interest.

One of the striking findings is the high educational level of the Egyptian officials, 88 per cent of whom had B.A. and higher degrees. In Bendix' study of U. S. officials (1940) only three-fourths had university degrees while Kel-

¹¹ (Princeton University Press, 1957). The sample, from grades 2, 3, and 4 in the ministries of Agriculture, Education, Finance, and Municipal and Rural Affairs, was 16 per cent of the officials of the four ministries in these grades. The interviews were carried out by a staff of 27 experienced Egyptian interviewers, who spent between one and one-half and two and one-half hours with each official. The interviews were conducted in Arabic and the interviewers wrote the answers in Arabic. Six hundred officials were sent letters signed by their ministers requesting their cooperation in the study, and of these 274 agreed to be interviewed.

sall (1950) found only 69 per cent with this level in his study of British civil servants. (Bendix and Kelsall, however, included only administrative officials, Berger includes both administrative and technical workers, 85 per cent being in technical jobs.) It is surprising too to find that 84 per cent of these Egyptian university men took their degrees in Egyptian universities. One suspects that comparative data on other Middle Eastern bureaucracies would show the proportion of officials educated abroad to be substantially higher.

Some interesting differences in socio-economic origins are found. The Egyptian officials were recruited from the sons of civil servants to a much higher degree (38 per cent) than either American (3 per cent, Bendix) or British (10 per cent, Kelsall) civil servants. Somewhat surprisingly, we learn that the Egyptian higher service draws a significantly higher proportion of its members from lower social orders (25 per cent) than the U. S. service (10 per cent) or British (16 per cent). However, we find also that the Egyptian service draws more heavily from the upper, landlord class.

Berger is no barefoot empiricist. The study begins with a survey of the social setting of the civil service, in which Egypt's goals of modernization and industrialization are reviewed and the main theme of the study is set down: an examination of "the degree to which the Egyptian higher civil service approaches Western norms of professionalization and bureaucratic behavior." This theme is not a reflection of ethnocentrism but is dictated by Egypt's own intentions as "expressed in recent efforts to industrialize, in the long-term trend toward secularism in government, and in reforms in the civil service itself."

The origins of Egyptian bureaucracy are traced. Here are centuries of foreign domination and attending patterns of centralization, popular cynicism and resignation, with authority defined as a form of special privilege—all remaining virtually unchallenged until the French invasion in 1798 when Napoleon declared that "all Egyptians shall be called upon to manage all posts." Following the brief reign, Muhammad Ali sought to galvanize Egypt into a modern, industrial state. The Turkish domination of major offices continued, however, and Ali's educated Egyptians

failed to distinguish themselves, in part, in the words of a British observer, because of "the languor and apathy produced by twenty centuries of oppression".¹³ This condition persisted until the British intervention of 1882, the result of Egyptian financial relations with European powers and a revolt against Turkey. Berger's comments on England's decision to remain in Egypt are laced with irony. Apparently, like Byron's Julia who while vowing that she would never consent, consented, England, having assured the French that she would never act unilaterally and desired only an immediate withdrawal of troops, soon "found good reasons for staying" for another half-century.

After providing a historical context, Berger turns to the heart of the study: the attitudes of higher civil servants on several critical variables affecting official behavior. Berger assumes that the degree to which such societies will achieve their aspirations is in good part a function of their ability to adopt the Western bureaucratic model.

The following indexes of bureaucracy and professionalism are distilled from this model:

Bureaucratic Scale:

Rationality and universalism: emphasis upon efficiency, recruitment based upon competence rather than upon family, religion, and so on.

Hierarchy: emphasis upon the prerogatives of position, upon authority and obedience.

Discretion: emphasis upon personal judgment and initiative, acceptance of responsibility, and full use of discretionary power within the rules.

Professionalism Index:

Skill: emphasis upon technical competence as the chief characteristic of an organized group, and upon self-discipline and self-regulation within the group to maintain its standards of skill.

Self-protection: emphasis upon the self-interest of the professional group through monopoly, exclusion, and secrecy.

Service: emphasis upon service to clientele groups and public as the main feature of professional activity.

These are the criteria used to determine how closely the Egyptian bureaucracy approximates the ideal model. Several scales or in-

¹³ Nassau Senior, *Conversations and Journals In Egypt and Malta* (Sampson, Low, 1882), pp. 251-252, cited in Berger, note 15, p. 25.

dexes are designed to do this, based upon items in a questionnaire. In addition to the bureaucratic scale and the professionalism index, there is a scale of exposure to Western influences such as education, reading, and travel, and a job-satisfaction index.

What are the findings, using these indexes? Exposure, age, grade, social mobility, and job satisfaction are closely related to bureaucratic orientations, but none has much effect upon professionalism. Function is vitally related to professionalism. The author concludes that the bureaucratic and professionalism models are not related. "Among those high on professionalism, 38.5 per cent are high on the bureaucratic scale; among those low on professionalism, 38.6 per cent are high on bureaucratic orientation."

Looked at from the point of socio-economic background, the data show that:

- 1) the proportion of highly bureaucratic respondents is much greater among the *older* than among the younger; yet the proportion of high professionals is slightly greater among the younger;
- 2) the proportion of the highly bureaucratic with low exposure is greater than the proportion with high exposure; same for highly professional;
- 3) the proportion of highly bureaucratic who are rural-born is greater than that of the low bureaucratic, but the proportion of highly professional who are rural-born is about the same as those born in urban areas;
- 4) those educated in the West include a slightly higher proportion of highly bureaucratic than those educated in Egypt, same for highly professional;
- 5) the proportion of highly bureaucratic is greater among those in high grades (number 2) as against those in grades 3 or 4, the lowest grades in the sample; the proportion of highly professional in the highest grades is only slightly greater than that in the two lower grades;
- 6) the proportion of highly bureaucratic is greater among those who have not graduated from college, the proportion of highly professional is greatest among those who have graduated;
- 7) the proportion of highly bureaucratic is somewhat greater among administrative than among technical workers, but the proportion of highly professional is much greater among technical workers;
- 8) the proportion of highly bureaucratic is considerably higher among the upwardly-mobile, but the proportion of high professionals is slightly greater among the stable;

9) the proportion of highly bureaucratic among the more satisfied is somewhat greater than among the less satisfied, with the same result for the highly professional.

In sum, "the things that distinguish high bureaucratic orientation are in most cases different from those that distinguish high professionalism." Age and exposure taken together and job factors such as function are the main factors in determining the differences.

The data also suggest that "new" occupations such as engineering and business now challenge government service in prestige.¹³ The relative status of the civil service is generally higher in Egypt than in the West, yet officials are ambivalent. While 82 per cent of them answered "Yes" to the question, "Does the man in the street respect the civil servant?", their doubts are reflected in replies to questions such as: "What do you think of the civil service as a career for an intelligent young man?" Only 9 per cent were favorable.

We have a related index with comparative data from Turkey. When Berger asked administrators to rank occupations according to four criteria—"chance to serve the state," "good salary and working conditions," "skill," and "chance to serve the public"—the following scale resulted:

- doctor
- bank director
- lawyer
- factory owner
- landowner
- government bureau chief
- government clerk
- small merchant
- factory worker
- peasant

Matthews asked Turkish administrators the same question with the following results:¹⁴

- provincial governor (Vali)
- national legislator

¹³ Berger suggests the following reasons for the declining attractiveness of the civil service in Egypt: loss of the prestige that once came from sharing the prestige of those representing the powerful Western leader, England; decline of the monopoly of higher education long enjoyed by the civil service; failure of government salaries to keep up with private incomes in the face of sharp inflation since 1959.

¹⁴ A. T. J. Matthews, *Emergent Turkish Administrators* (The Institute of Administrative Sciences, University of Ankara, 1955), p. 21.

engineer
general
doctor
judge
diplomat
professor
big businessman
government department chief
lawyer

Yet in defining the most important basis of occupational prestige, both Egyptian and Turkish officials ranked "serving the state" and "holding a political office" first.

Civil servants' loyalties provide an interesting chapter. Essentially, the tension here is between the bureaucrat's loyalty to the public, the state, and his profession and competing demands of self-protection, hierarchy, and clientele groups. Such questionnaire replies as these throw light on Egyptian civil servant attitudes:

82 per cent said civil servants should have their own professional society; 91 per cent gave protection of their economic interests as the reason.

52 per cent said a government economist should refuse to prepare a memorandum asked by his superior which did not conform with professional economists' views, but half of these gave as the reason their unwillingness to publicly contradict their economist colleagues rather than their concern with truth. A greater percentage of younger officials (57) than older (44) would refuse to write the memorandum.

85 per cent said it was proper to let an acquaintance wait his turn for an interview (87 per cent of the more educated, 73 per cent of the less), but 85 per cent, also, said that the average civil servant would take his acquaintance out of turn. (Note the relationship to Riggs' observations on the conflict of family-communal values and bureaucratic loyalty.)

90 per cent said a factory inspector would act properly to close a factory whose floor seemed about to give way, though he could not contact his superior for permission. When told that the floor in fact did not collapse, only 74 per cent thought he acted properly.

The Theory and the Data

Insofar as the entire study is concerned, several unexpected results appear. Berger assumed initially that the relationships between both his bureaucratic scale and professionalism index and selected variables would be uniform, i.e., civil servants with similar characteristics such as age, Western exposure, mobility, would fall together on each part of both the professionalism scale and the bureaucratic scale and that their position on each of the parts of both scales would be about the same. However, the findings are inconsistent. For example, exposure to Western influences affects the position on the three parts of the professionalism index differently. Officials highly exposed to the West (not in length of time exposed but in number of ways) tended to emphasize the skill factor but not the self-interest factor. Insofar as the third component, public service, was concerned, results were inconclusive. Again, while it was assumed that those most exposed to the West would score highest on all elements of professionalism, it was actually those "only moderately exposed" who so scored.

Insofar as bureaucratic orientations go, similar disparities occurred. High exposure to the West did correlate highly with rationality, one of the bureaucratic indexes, but was low vis-a-vis another index, hierarchy. Similarly with age and higher education—neither yields uniformly high or low scores against the three elements in the bureaucratic scale.

From this Berger concludes that his "study of bureaucracy in a non-Western setting points to the limitations of current bureaucratic theory, developed mainly in the West." Similarity in bureaucratic structure does not preclude wide differences in official behavior within this structure.

In some ways this is the most significant part of the study since it raises serious questions about the validity for comparative purposes of a model that has proved most useful for teaching and research in the West. What are some possible explanations for this conclusion?

First, there is a question as to whether the items in the bureaucratic scale are really a scale. It is important to note here that the bureaucratic scale can be validated, but we are given no indication that this was done.

The professional index, by definition, cannot be validated since it consists of items that are not intrinsically related to each other in the way that those in the bureaucratic scale are supposed to be. The item "discretion" raises special problems. Certainly there are different ways of defining it, including the common-sense view that discretion is *contrary* to typical bureaucratic norms since these norms are imposed by external bodies such as legislatures and political executives or are the result of technical standards, and so on. This contrasts with the typical professional role, wherein behavioral norms are more often self-imposed or, at the very least, provision for their enforcement is minimal. It is assumed that the professional will use his freedom responsibly. In terms of reference groups, we may say that discretion is affected by the fact that the professional looks to an outside group for guides to his conduct while the bureaucrat looks to the organization's rules and regulations which tend to circumscribe his behavior more closely. This suggests that the scale is not really composed of "related components of bureaucratic behavior." If such considerations have validity, Berger's scale may account for the inconsistencies among his findings.

Second, no correlation was found between bureaucratic orientations and professionalism which indicates that the two categories are not related, as initially assumed. Indeed, Lewis and Maude have argued that as bureaucratic forms and procedures have spread throughout British society, professionalism has declined.¹⁵ This suggests again that Berger's inconsistent findings were a product of his instruments rather than a reflection of some intrinsic weakness of the Western bureaucratic model.

Finally, in addition to the problem of inadequate sampling raised earlier, questions may also be raised about the questionnaire itself. Pervasive and subtle linguistic communication barriers arise when Western concepts are translated into Arabic. For example, one of Berger's questions asks, "What should the general public do to show a proper interest in the activities of the government?" But when this question is put to respondents in Arabic, it reads as follows: "What must (*Yajeb*) the

mass (*joumhour*) do in order to show enough (*Cafian*) interest in the ways of the government?" "Should" becomes "must"; the "general public" becomes "mass"; and "proper" becomes "enough." There is also no Arabic equivalent for "civil service" which in the translation becomes "serving the government." Whether the Western meaning of such terms and concepts is conveyed to respondents from a different cultural complex remains moot.

I cannot agree, then, that any of this proves that the Western model is not adaptable to comparative analysis in non-Western societies. In the obvious sense that all measurement requires a standard or model, its application seems both necessary and useful. Further, we can always learn much about the unknown by setting it against what we do know. Nor is it necessary to justify, as Berger does repeatedly, the use of the Western model because the Egyptians themselves have declared their intention to Westernize and industrialize. Even if the Egyptian system had never been subject to Western influence, the application of some tested model would be necessary. Only when one assumes the superiority of this model for Egypt or expects that the country will follow it closely does the model become dysfunctional as an analytical instrument. Unless one becomes a prisoner of Western theory or adopts a narrow "action" research posture, he will be unlikely to fall into either trap.

That some gaps appeared between Berger's theory and his findings is inevitable and only illustrates that theory-building is much neater work than field research. But it is always easier to criticize research than to do it, and I want to conclude by saying that Berger's study is most useful, providing new generalizations about the Egyptian higher civil service and suggesting exciting new avenues for research while giving us an object lesson in how such research might be done. The study also provides concepts and data which are helpful in building middle-range theory about non-Western systems. This contribution must not be minimized, for one of the main barriers to comparative theory-building is the absence of raw data about the social variables that shape public administration.

¹⁵ R. Lewis and A. Maude, *Professional People in England* (Harvard University Press, 1953), Chapter 15.

Training in the Federal Service— 170 Years to Accept

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IN THE past decades the "chief clerk" stereotype of personnel administration has largely disappeared in favor of a philosophy and practice of positive personnel administration. One of the elements is in-service training which has very slowly advanced in the federal government until, on July 7, 1958, the President signed into law the Government Employees Training Act.¹ The slowness of its acceptance despite ample argument in its favor is the concern of this paper.

In one sense, training in its broadest definition has always been an integral part of administration. Any incumbent of a position must learn about the functions of that position, its duties, its responsibilities, its techniques, its sources of information. For purposes of this paper, training may be defined as an organized instructional process to improve job effectiveness either directly or indirectly. In this sense, training for civilian employees over many decades of American administrative life was conspicuous only by its almost total absence.

The Period Before World War I

The necessity of training in the art of war, however, was not lost on the infant Republic. The United States Military Academy was established in 1802, originally to train military technicians for all branches of the service. The Navy followed in 1845 with the establishment of its academy at Annapolis. The Army began

► Federal personnel policy over nearly 170 years has assumed that all positions could be filled by persons already competent or (the Jacksonian attitude) that public employment could be made simple enough so anyone could learn it quickly and without special training. The history of federal policy on in-service training narrated here raises many questions: Why did the experience of business, which has for more than a generation enthusiastically supported in-service training, strike so little interest among federal policy-makers for many years? Why was the example of training for the military not paralleled for equally unique civilian duties? Why did the federal government fall behind local and state governments who increasingly used training programs for which many federal employees were ineligible? Was the Comptroller-General's narrow interpretation of agency authority an accurate reading of congressional intent? If not, why did Congress wait so long to correct it? Why was there little Executive Branch leadership over many years when the assumptions behind the no-training policy were clearly false? The answers—some suggested here—go to the heart of the politics of administrative reform of which the policy on training is a useful example.

training enlisted personnel with its post schools system in 1866, and the Navy with its shore-based specialists schools in the 1850's.

However, civilian agencies of the federal government did not follow suit. The early years of the federal government were characterized by "competence, integrity, and responsibility." During the first forty years, appointments were made with the consideration of competence formulated by George Washington, though also with partisan beliefs considered. The idea that appointment of competent personnel precluded the need for in-service training seemed to prevail.

¹ U. S. 85th Congress, S. 385, Public Law 85-507.

Andrew Jackson brought with him from the frontier, where it already held sway, a different view, but one which equally proscribed training:

The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience.²

The extreme consequences of Jacksonian philosophy brought reform movements in the 1870's. Organizations for civil service reform spread rapidly in numbers and influence. The passage of the Pendleton Act of 1883 laid down many elements which helped form the basis for present day personnel practices, but essentially it was a negative response to specific abuses, not concerned directly with the ultimate goals of efficiency and effective performance.

It was during the early years of the agitation for improving civil service that the first formal federal government training program was begun, in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing where great skill was needed to produce currency, bonds, stamps, and other engraving. To develop these skills, an apprentice training program was established in 1879, created to meet a specific need. The early in-service training that followed also was technical. Similar provisions were early established in the Government Printing Office. These programs were established without enabling legislation which did not come until 1895, when twenty-five apprenticeships were established by law.

A few years later, in 1910 the Comptroller-General issued the first of a number of decisions relating to the legality of expenditures for training. Most of them have been concerned not with what the Comptroller has termed "strict in-service" training, but rather with training activities for federal employees outside of the government.

The first of these concerned a group of Forest Service employees on full pay who were sent at government expense to study forestry

problems at four universities. The Forest Service had inferred the authority from its appropriation act of 1910. In a ruling answering the query of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Comptroller said:³

(1) It is a fundamental and statutory fact under the methods of appropriation . . . that all appropriations must be used for the specific purposes for which made and not otherwise. (2) Although a department head has considerable discretion as to the detailed use of appropriations such discretion is a legal discretion and cannot extend to purposes not fairly within the meaning of the language of the appropriation. (3) The selection process requires obtaining all the necessary qualifications, and unless there is something in the law to the contrary, it is presumed that the officers and employees when appointed and employed have the necessary education to perform the duties for which they were appointed.

This statement outlines an administrative philosophy which generally dominated the decisions of Comptrollers until relatively recently. Such a viewpoint seems rooted in two historical streams. It presupposes adequate and effective selection methods, a product of the fundamentals laid down by the reform movement. It also reflects the thinking of the Jacksonian, "the duties of public office are . . . so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves. . . ." The premise that selection means full competence, even under rapidly changing external circumstances, was echoed again and again by members of Congress, by the Comptroller-General, and by administrators themselves.

During the early 1900's, there were sporadic examples of in-service training which did not involve payment of funds to other institutions and which were undertaken within the administrative discretion of the heads of departments to meet the needs of their personnel. For example, in 1910 the Collector of Customs for the Port of New York, acting under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, began a training program for his inspectors.

However, the degree of triumph of negative over positive personnel practices is illustrated by the order issued in 1905 by President Theodore Roosevelt about which Van Riper has written "that no government employee,

²First Annual Message, 1829, in James D. Richardson (ed.), *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Vol. 2, p. 449. (Authority of Congress, 1900.)

³16 *Comptroller General Decisions* 429 (1910).

under penalty of removal, could help anyone else pass a civil service examination. The order was aimed at fraud and collusion, but its long-range effect was to block any attempts at training through employee organizations.⁴

Despite the widespread training done by industry in response to the exigencies of World War I, little effect was felt in the federal service except in scattered instances where new, complex work was instituted and clearly demanded it.

The Pre-New Deal Era

In 1920, however, Congress evidenced interest in training. The Senate adopted a resolution requesting the Bureau of Efficiency to survey the desirability of a school for training federal employees. The Bureau's report attempted to assess the needs for such training.⁵ One measure of need was the educational level of the federal employees. Although government-wide figures for the District of Columbia were not available, the Bureau cited Bureau of War Risk Insurance employees as typical: 8 per cent were college graduates, 58 per cent had finished high school, 32 per cent had finished common school, and 2 per cent had not finished any school. More than one in three had entered college and been forced to leave at the end of one, two, or three years. "It is fair to assume that there are thousands of clerks in the Government service who would be glad to carry their education further," the report stated, adding that perhaps 10,000 persons were taking night courses in public and quasi-public schools in the area, at least two-thirds of whom were government employees.

Earlier, about 12,000 persons in all government departments had replied to a questionnaire that they would enroll in a government-sponsored school. About half declared they desired instruction to secure advancement in their work. Nearly 9,000 were willing to pay tuition of four dollars per month.

The Bureau's report stressed the unique

characteristics of some aspects of government service. "There are many subjects of which a knowledge would be peculiarly valuable to Government employees and in which instruction of a practical kind is not now available. For example, the ordinary courses given in bookkeeping and accounting are designed for the purpose of training students to take places in commercial concerns. Such accounting courses do not emphasize at all the peculiarities of Government accounting procedures. . . . It is impossible at present to secure in Washington, or, indeed, anywhere in the country, instruction which could be of direct assistance to Government employees in the performance of their duties."

American business by this time had turned to training with enthusiasm. The Bureau's report contrasted the government's costly turnover rate of well over 10 per cent per year with the experience of business. In contrast:

200 manufacturers who have established training departments in their factories voluntarily testified that their labor turnover was cut in two. So effectual have training schools proved in reducing labor turnover that scores of corporations have embraced the plan. The National Association of Corporation Schools [which later became the American Management Association] was started in April, 1919. In September, 1919, this association numbered 140 members representing 68 lines of industry and half of the capital of the country invested in industries. In other words practically all of the biggest commercial concerns have established training schools of one sort or another.⁶

By comparison, the report found the efforts of the civil service sadly deficient. It did cite two examples, in the Bureau of War Risk Insurance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where training of agents was being undertaken, but concluded "The government of the United States has not to any considerable extent followed the example of private industry in the matter of service schools."

The report strongly urged the government to take the step of setting up such a school. The Senate, however, failed to give any concrete support to this proposition which was not made the subject of any committee hearings or floor debate.

⁴ Paul P. Van Riper, *History of the U. S. Civil Service* (Row, Peterson & Co., 1958), p. 247.

⁵ Report of the Bureau of Efficiency, *Proposed Service School of the United States*, U. S. Congress, Sen. Doc. 246, 66th Cong., March 3, 1920.

⁶ Op. Cit., p. 8.

During this period further evidence of the need for training was brought forward by a group which made one of the most extensive surveys of government personnel operations. The Congressional Joint Commission on Reclassification of Salaries was created in 1919-1920 to try to organize a classification system which would bring some order into the chaotic compensation system under which the civil service was operating. In the course of their survey, the staff studied in great detail the organization of the federal government and in its final report made some general recommendations on personnel policy and also proposed a classification system. The committee report pointed out that

much of the government's work is of a character not duplicated in the outside world. . . . In many cases, therefore, it is not possible to find appointees who can effectively handle the work without a considerable period of instruction or experience. This is especially true in some of the higher positions, where the duties become more and more specialized. . . . In the business world many corporations have found that training courses increase both the efficiency and the *esprit de corps* of their employees and are of immense practical value. As a result there is now a widespread movement to develop and expand work of this sort. [Yet, the committee found] few government bureaus have paid any attention to the matter of systematic training of either new employees in order that they may become rapidly useful and proficient in their assigned work, or of old employees to increase their efficiency and qualifications for promotion.⁷

In a careful survey the Committee found only five instances where systematic training courses had been installed. They estimated that probably less than 10 per cent of the offices and bureaus made any systematic efforts to train any of their employees.

The year 1921 brought an extremely significant step in federal in-service training, the establishment of the Graduate School of the Department of Agriculture. Leonard White has commented that this was "without question the most elaborate and one of the most successful in-service training institu-

⁷ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Report of the Congressional Joint Commission on Reclassification of Salaries*, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., Doc. 686, March 12, 1920.

tions."⁸ The courses were given after-hours. The status of the school itself was somewhat ambiguous, being semi-official although administered and encouraged by the department. Facilities were provided by the department, but expenses were met from the tuition payments of the students.

On May 24, 1924, the Rogers Act was passed establishing the Foreign Service and the first executive order dealing with employee training followed, issued by President Coolidge, to establish the Foreign Service School.⁹ In addition to being notable as the first executive order dealing with training, it is significant for what did *not* follow. Not until 1938 was there an executive order dealing with other than Foreign Service training.

In sum, until the end of the 1920's very little attention was being given to improving the effectiveness of federal employees. What training existed was largely in specific job-related technical skills. Little attention was given to supervisory or managerial leadership. In 1927, however, one of the most experienced observers of public administration, W. F. Willoughby, wrote:

Until a few years ago, if exception be made of the service schools of the army and navy, practically nothing was done by the services of the national government to make systematic provision for the training of their employees. A great change in this respect has, however, recently taken place. In a number of important services, provision has been made for the organized instruction of their employees on a large scale.¹⁰

Willoughby seems overly optimistic, however, when compared to another study of that time by Professor Herman Feldman of Dartmouth College, engaged by the Personnel Classification Board to survey federal wage policies and administration. Commenting on the growing supervision and management training activities of industry, he wrote:

To the vast improvement in this regard during the past decade we may attribute no small proportion of the increase of efficiency in private industry

⁸ Leonard White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 395.

⁹ Executive Order No. 4022 of June 7, 1924.

¹⁰ W. F. Willoughby, *Principles of Public Administration* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), p. 244.

... the civil service may be included as among those organizations which have given least thought to the training of executives for their specific duties as administrators. . . . Training is not a function recognized by the civil service and adopted as a cardinal policy for developing alert and efficient employees.

His report lists only a half-dozen federal agencies doing training at that time. Feldman called for a central agency to study educational problems, to promote training within the agencies and advise the agencies on programs. Also considered was the establishment of a central school, as recommended a decade earlier.

Looking back at this era, there seem to be a number of factors which combined to reinforce negative attitudes toward training.

Perhaps most important, there was no executive leadership for training. The Civil Service Commission, which might have been expected to lead in organizing training, by virtue of its history and outlook was not engaged in "positive" personnel administration. The function of the commission, as then conceived, was largely a regulatory one, keeping the spoilsman at bay. Concentration on recruiting and examining functions, the commission neither explored the need for broad-gauged personnel programs nor attempted to bring training needs before Congress. As to the line agencies, Feldman observed:

Even at departmental headquarters in Washington there are not a half dozen whose work may be compared with that of personnel managers in large commercial concerns. There are indeed, many more individuals in the government service who are called personnel officers, but they are in most cases clerks who do the mere routine paper work required in the certification and appointment of employees . . . [they] are not, in fact, dealing with the great human problems of the civil service but with a restricted routine. Such officers have been so long a time in the service that they have in most instances lost touch with the developments of modern concerns. . . . They have little or no contact with each other. It is sometimes as much news to them to be told of certain types of work carried on in other units in their own departments as it would be if the units were in outside companies.

Probably contributing to this negative atti-

tude was the beginning of the position classification plan in 1924. Though undoubtedly a real step forward for the public service, the definition of functions and responsibilities of each position and of the qualifications of the individual who is to occupy it, implies complete competence before hiring, an assumption apparently held by the Comptroller and Congress. The classification system was the major personnel question before Congress during the 1920's and the concern with it and a related compensation plan obscured questions of in-service training.

Of course the argument for training was less obvious in the 1920's. The federal government was able to meet the demands put upon it because the demands were not great and, compared to the decades to follow, were simple. Although the evidence was strong that training was needed to improve government service, its absence did not lead to a breakdown. But even in the 1920's, Willoughby saw that the era of simplicity was at an end:

The opinion is common that the work of the government is in large part of a character not calling for highly specialized or technical qualifications; that all that is required of administrative employees is ordinary clerical abilities. This is an inheritance of the past. . . . Now our government has taken upon itself the performance of activities calling for employees of the highest competence and a range of technical qualifications in almost every field of human endeavor. Whatever may have been true of the past there can be no question that now the need is imperative that the personnel systems of our government shall be such as to secure and retain the highest class of technical employees. . . .

The New Deal Era

"The progressive rationalization of management"¹¹ was one of the phenomena of the 1920's and 30's. A facet of this was an increased attention to training.

The New Deal gave birth to a host of organizations designed to meet the exigencies of American life of the depression years. In many of these, in-service training was part of their personnel policy. In addition, some of

¹¹ W. Mosher, J. Kingsley and O. G. Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration* (Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 388.

the older agencies began training programs during this period, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Agriculture, Labor, and Interior. In deference to past Comptroller-General's decisions, these were intramural or dependent upon student fees.

Training was still not widespread in the early thirties. In 1935, John Devine surveyed training activities and found very little being done.¹² For example, he noted that the training policy of the Department of Interior followed very closely the old attitudes of government departments—namely, that a person is supposed to know all about his job when he takes it and any post-entry training is a waste of time and money. Of the training that did exist, he observed:

The employee-trainers are a recently born group of craftsmen. . . . Some of their handiwork has hardly cooled. All this means is that the movement has not had time to take definite form. . . . One discovers that there is no common cause for these evidences of training—that most of them are unrelated to each other. . . . Each had a spontaneous beginning. The local agency had encountered some problem in the performance of its duties and has proceeded to solve it by offering remedial instruction.

On the other hand, many of the new agencies gave high place to training. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority from its inception in 1933 maintained training activities of wide extent under the provisions of its organic act.¹³ Its program was conditioned by "the need of in-service training in order to increase the efficiency of the employees on the job and to train some of them for more responsible positions."¹⁴ Similar training was begun in the Rural Electrification Administration, the Social Security Board, and the Farm Credit Administration. Especially notable was the Department of Agriculture's program

¹² J. E. Devine, *Post-Entry Training in the Federal Service* (University of Chicago, August, 1935).

¹³ 48 U. S. Statutes 60. (The Corporation shall have such power as may be necessary or appropriate for the exercise of the powers herein specifically conferred upon the Corporation.) Sec. 4(g).

¹⁴ M. F. Seay, "The Educational Program of the Tennessee Valley Authority," cited in E. Brooks, *In-Service Training of Federal Employees* (Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada, 1938), p. 53.

under W. W. Stockberger in which many courses were adapted to the specific needs of the various bureaus.

There was a rapid increase in training between 1935 to 1938, gauged by Devine's study, which showed twenty-one agencies carrying out programs, and another summary three years later showing thirty-six.¹⁵

This expansion came at a time of high unemployment which should have made more likely the hiring of persons able to fill positions without in-service training. However, the vast new functions of government and a great influx of new employees, bringing new administrative problems,¹⁶ created distinct training needs.

By 1937, Herbert Emmerich was able to note that "outstanding points of progress have been the advanced welfare and training programs of several agencies."

During this period, also, Congress' complete indifference to training was breached slightly. In addition to broad authority provided for several new agencies, limited statutory authority to use outside facilities for training was voted the Weather Bureau and the National Cancer Institute,¹⁷ for example, but their purpose was to keep technical specialists abreast of scientific developments. Management training was not contemplated. Not part of an over-all policy, these bits of authority were sponsored by the substantive committees of Congress dealing with the particular agency rather than by the Civil Service committees.

In 1937 the President's Committee on Administrative Management asserted that "the urgent need today is for the development of a real career Civil Service, through positive, constructive, modern personnel administration."¹⁸ The next year saw the most significant de-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42 ff.

¹⁶ "Another major problem faced by the creation of so many new organizations was the lack of a sufficiently large trained administrative group who were expert in the special techniques of the Federal establishment." Herbert Emmerich, "Personnel Problems in New Federal Agencies," 189 *Annals* 125 (January, 1937).

¹⁷ 52 U. S. Statutes 1014, 50 U. S. Statutes 561.

¹⁸ Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, *Administrative Management of the Government of the United States* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 7.

velopment, the President's Executive Order on Personnel.¹⁹ Among enumerated responsibilities of the personnel director of each agency was initiating and supervising training programs approved by the department head after consultation with the Civil Service Commission. Also, a separate section declared:

The Civil Service Commission shall, in cooperation with operating establishments and departments, the Office of Education, and public and private institutions of learning establish practical training courses for employees in the departmental and field service of the classified civil service.

Whether the commission was to possess powers of control or was to be merely consultative was left unclear.

The order helped put personnel administration on a level clearly differentiated from that of record keeping, which it had been in many agencies. Moreover, it pinpointed training as a personnel function. As a sign of executive leadership it stood in marked contrast to the many years of silence which had preceded it.

Perhaps the major training development of the New Deal era, with lasting impact, was the inauguration of the administrative internship program sponsored first by the National Institute of Public Affairs, ultimately taken over by the Civil Service Commission and still operating.

The War Years

During the war years, government employment expanded threefold in the midst of a labor shortage. One effect was a decline and breach in qualifications for federal employment. The prewar assumption of full competence by a newly-employed person was clearly inapplicable, yet even then resistance to training clung on. Van Riper tells of an arsenal which was turning away competent machinists during a growing shortage because they could not read blueprints or handle certain kinds of instruments. Only after a visit from a civil service commissioner was a school established so that applicants missing minor elements of the job requirement could be hired.²⁰ Although there was no training au-

¹⁹ Executive Order No. 7916 of June 24, 1938.

²⁰ Op. cit., p. 380.

thorization from Congress, wartime necessity forced its expansion.

The lack of a well-formulated policy can be seen in the history of Civil Service Commission organization during the war. With the 1938 executive order as authority, the Commission in late 1939 requested \$82,000 from Congress to establish a Division of Training. This was denied by the Appropriations Committee which concentrated upon the recruitment responsibility of the agency. It was not until 1942 that the Commission established a Training Division which acted on a purely consultative basis. There seems to be little evidence that many agencies looked to the Commission for guidance; most preferred to go ahead on their own.

The Training Division was abolished and the Federal Work Improvement Program instituted in 1943. This was organized by the Personnel Utilization Division, which was to stimulate training and to bring the War Manpower Commission and its Training Within Industry Service programs to the agencies. In carrying out this function, the Civil Service Commission trained the departmental instructors for the "J" courses which were designed to help alleviate the lack of trained supervisory personnel.²¹ The instructors trained at agency request were then used to spread supervisory training throughout their own agencies.

Some members of Congress were unsympathetic to the Work Improvement Program, especially the "J" institutes. Congressman Wigglesworth spoke for opponents:

Is not the real way to get at the root of the trouble to appoint competent people in the first place? . . . Why should we set up another brand new agency to teach the Civil Service Commission how to teach the teachers at various agencies how to teach the employees. You can carry that idea on almost indefinitely.²²

Fiscal year 1946, which coincided with the war's end, saw the last appropriations for the Federal Work Improvement Program.

²¹ The courses were so-called because of their titles: Job Instruction Training (JIT), Job Methods Training (JMT), and Job Relations Training (JRT).

²² U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Hearing on Independent Offices Appropriation Bill*, 79th Cong., Jan. 17, 1945, pp. 1230-31.

With each agency free to develop its own programs, the rate of growth of training varied according to such factors as need, organization, and appropriations. A survey showed that by July, 1942, some thirty-four agencies were undertaking a variety of technical and supervisory programs.

The greatest expansion naturally occurred in those agencies directly concerned with the armed forces, the War and Navy Departments. The War Department had no top organization for training before 1941. New policies and programs began to take shape under Lawrence A. Appley, who was brought in as a consultant in 1941. (Appley had been educational director of New York City and went on to become a business executive. He is now head of the American Management Association.) At that time he found a lack of facilities, equipment, and money for training.²³ In the middle of 1941, training offices were set up on a staff basis to the line administrators. There were formidable obstacles since the Army had no tradition of civilian training, no experienced personnel or procedures. This was compounded by the fact that in 1942 as many as 15,000 new employees were beginning work each week, most with absolutely no experience in government or in the tasks they were to perform. The War Department progressed to a wide-ranging program encompassing a variety of types of training.

The Navy Department, similarly, underwent a tremendous expansion, but it had a long-established training program—for apprentices in the Navy Yards—to build on. With this precedent, the responsibility for training remained on a local basis through most of the war, with only staff advice from Washington. Emphasis was on training individuals for the mechanical trades needed in shipyard construction, with some broadening of training approach to include instruction in individual skills. Well over a million employees were trained in many highly-exacting mechanical skills.

During this period the "J" programs were

²³ Cited in G. M. Kammerer, *Impact of War on Federal Personnel Administration 1939-1945* (University of Kentucky Press, 1951), p. 141. This is the most complete account of wartime training and other aspects of personnel administration.

extended to most agencies; by 1945, the Civil Service Commission reported approximately 66,650 had Job Instruction Training; 26,050 Job Methods Training, and 20,150 Job Relations Training.

Training programs during the war years fall into seven major groups: (1) pre-service, (2) orientation or induction, (3) apprenticeship, (4) instruction in basic mechanical skills and for upgrading, (5) instruction in office skills, (6) supervisory training, (7) administrative internship. They arose in response to urgent and unprecedented needs put upon the capacities of federal personnel. Although some were ill-conceived and poorly executed they formed a legacy for later more effective techniques.

From a current perspective, looking back at wartime experience in training, there is revealed "an inventiveness in method and in intensity of activities that would have seemed incredible when the war started in 1939,"²⁴ nearly all undertaken by the line agencies which, by and large had no previous experience with training.

Post-War Developments

To some extent the postwar era has seen these promises fulfilled, although especially in the immediate postwar years much of the development was stopped. Civil Service Commission appropriations were cut drastically and funds for the Federal Work Improvement Program eliminated. While the wartime lessons were not lost on many agencies, training did lag in others according to a House Committee report:

It has been observed that while in some instances, funds for the administration of personnel offices have been generously and frequently lavishly provided, the proportion of such funds allocated by the departments and agencies to the training and retaining of employees is generally meager.

While departments and agencies of the Government spend an average of approximately thirty-eight dollars for the hiring and placement of an employee, relatively few agencies spend more than one dollar a year per capita in training an employee after he is on the pay roll. Ten agencies re-

²⁴ Kammerer, op. cit., p. 347.

port no expenditures of personnel office funds for training purposes.²⁵

The Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Federal Personnel²⁶ contained a more thorough critique of "the negative attitude which prevails toward training and employee development in the Federal Service which has impaired the prestige and the development of the career service." The Task Force noted that lack of funds had curtailed the Civil Service Commission's efforts in this area, then limited to the administrative intern program. Pointing out an apparent reluctance on the part of many agencies to introduce comprehensive training programs, the Hoover Commission took note of the effect of the many adverse rulings of the Comptroller-General and recommended legislation providing:

(1) A clear policy statement authorizing agencies to conduct training for the purpose of improving the competence of supervisors and the efficiency and productivity of employees; (2) General authorization of the agencies to use their annual appropriations for such training; (3) Specific delegation of responsibility to the Civil Service Commission to assist the agencies . . .

Partly as a result of the Hoover Commission report, a Director of Executive Development was appointed in the Civil Service Commission to encourage agency planning for in-service transfer and training of top-level employees. The Korean War interrupted and little came of it.²⁷

The extent of in-service training some seven years after the wartime expansion was revealed in a comprehensive survey compiled in 1952.²⁸ Discussing all aspects of federal educational activities, the report lists in-service programs operated for civilians by twenty-nine agencies and departments. Despite a wartime emphasis on the role of the supervisor few of

²⁵ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Organization, Functions, and Relative Costs of Personnel Offices*, House Report 2198, 80th Cong., 1948, p. 58.

²⁶ The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, *Programs for Strengthening Federal Personnel Management, Appendix A* (U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1949).

²⁷ Van Riper, *op. cit.*, p. 452.

²⁸ C. A. Quattlebaum, *Federal Educational Activities and Educational Issues Before Congress*, U. S. Congress, A Report for the House Committee on Education and Labor, House Doc. 425, 82nd Cong., 1952.

the courses were for supervisory training, most being related to technical job skills.

The Comptroller-General's Opinions

During the postwar years, the Comptroller-General continued to render decisions on payment for training. Approval was given in some cases where the Comptroller felt training was in furtherance of the purpose of specific appropriations. In the Commerce Department case in 1957, he offered the opinion that the unfavorable decisions through the years were not an interference with administrative discretion.²⁹ Rather, they were based on a lack of statutory authority—the administrator in such cases was normally "without power to send employees to such training programs . . . appropriations must be used for the specific purpose for which made."

In the mixture of favorable and unfavorable cases, certain criteria were reiterated. Payment to outside agencies for training programs could be approved only if they are "(1) essential to carry out the purpose for which the appropriation is made, (2) for a period of brief duration, and (3) special in nature." The Commerce Department case is important because the Comptroller was at pains to point out that under these criteria the doctrine that "employees have the necessary education to perform the duties for which they were appointed or employed" was no longer a hurdle. This doctrine, "which is unnecessary to the holding is not a rationale for either the law or its application."

While the Comptroller's decisions usually were favorable to training for special skills, expenditures for administrative training often were deemed unnecessary to carry out the functions under a specific appropriation. For example, the Civil Service Commission was forbidden to send an individual to an American Management Association course and a number of high-level administrators were denied the right to attend at government expense a management conference sponsored by The Brookings Institution.³⁰ The attitude of

²⁹ 36 *Comptroller General Decisions* 622 (1957). This case is of interest to the general reader since it traces in some detail the history of the Comptroller's decisions on training.

³⁰ 34 *Comptroller General Decisions* 719 (1955) and B-134318 *Comptroller General Decisions* (1957).

the Comptroller was summed up in the 1957 Commerce Department case: ". . . the term (in the Independent Offices Appropriation Act) 'activities for which appropriations are made' was intended by the Congress to apply only to activities peculiarly associated with the work of an agency in the performance of its statutory functions and not to general problems, such as management, which are common to all organizations." Thus, training for management competence which was not tied to some specialized program, in those agencies which had no general training authority, was restricted to intramural programs without expenditure to outside sources.

The effect of this was to cut off the possibility of gaining the benefits from the many well-conceived programs offered by universities and other organizations and to isolate those government agencies from the growing stream of management-oriented training. The 1958 law specifically allows payment for meetings and training contributing to "improved conduct, supervision or management."

Congressional Consideration and Executive Leadership

Until 1958, Congress either approved the Comptroller's interpretation of its intent or did not feel it sufficiently important to work out details satisfactory to all.

Congress began to consider the question seriously in 1953 when study by the Senate Federal Manpower Policies committee resulted in the introduction of a comprehensive bill covering the entire training field and giving authority for in-service training in permanent legislation, to avoid the need for recurring authority in annual appropriations acts. Agency heads were to be authorized to provide training which would substantially contribute to the more efficient functioning of the department, with the Civil Service Commission to provide standards for the scope of such training and evaluate effectiveness.³¹ This was the precursor of the Act which emerged from Congress some five years later as the Government Employees Training Act.

On the basis of consultations between the Civil Service Commission, the General Ac-

counting Office, the Bureau of the Budget, and the staff of the congressional committees having jurisdiction, plans were made to have the 84th Congress (1955-56) consider general training legislation. At the same time, the Administration moved to strengthen in-service training as far as possible by issuing a directive which reflected a philosophy far removed from earlier restrictive attitudes:

Training and development of employees is an essential aid to efficient operation of the Federal service and to attainment of its programs goals. It is therefore the policy of the executive branch to plan and provide for training and development of employees as an integral part of this responsibility for the effective conduct of its affairs. The head of each agency and department is to formulate and maintain a systematic plan of action for the development of training and effective use of manpower resources, including periodic inventory of training needs.³²

In the few years since this statement was issued, training has burgeoned. Under its stimulus training policies were formulated by nineteen agencies, bringing to thirty-seven the federal organizations which have issued policy statements calling for training.

From 1953-58, Congress continued to consider broad training legislation. During this time a number of significant changes had occurred which were responsible for the shift in attitudes toward public service training. Compared to the era through the 1920's, a tremendous change had taken place in the complexity of government's responsibilities and in the continually changing knowledge necessary to carry out these responsibilities. Especially is this true in the scientific field. The committee reports of the 83rd Congress on training legislation placed great stress on needs in this area. The need for increased management competence was also felt to be important, but it received less emphasis.³³

The need for advanced training was made

³¹ Letter from Phillip Young, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission, January 11, 1955.

³² A cogent statement on the importance of management training was made by Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, in the *Hearings of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives*, "Training of Federal Employees," 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 15, June 13, 16, 1958), pp. 71-72.

³³ Senate Document No. 31, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., *Training and Education in the Federal Government*, March 18, 1953.

especially apparent when government programs were compared with those of industry. Measured in numbers trained and total expenditures, industry is constantly increasing its educational efforts. The cumulative testimony to its effectiveness probably helped to reshape congressional attitudes. The lag of the public service behind private enterprise—with a consequent deleterious effect on the government's ability to attract and retain top notch talent—was acknowledged in all of the committee reports and hearings.

Another important factor, missing in former years, was the positive approach to personnel management of the executive branch and the Civil Service Commission, which worked diligently to persuade committee members of the need for training. The Bureau of the Budget also worked for the passage of such a bill, reflecting the positive attitude exemplified by the White House directive of 1955. Probably both Hoover Commissions' recommendations also influenced the change.

An ever-increasing number of legislative authorizations for specific agencies to engage in outside training for their personnel were passed while an over-all act was being considered. Since the individual authorizations were rapidly creating a disorganized and unequal condition, they added pressure toward passage of a general act. By the beginning of 1958, some nineteen agencies had special legislation in twenty-one separate laws. Five of these were in annual appropriation acts. Some of the laws were very restrictive. For example, the Weather Bureau could only train employees in meteorology, while the Maritime Administration was limited to training only five employees per year. On the other hand, a few agencies, such as the Department of Defense, had extremely broad authority. Moreover, there was no mechanism for control or reporting the many administrative aspects of such training. Indeed, Congress and its Civil Service committees had no certain means of ascertaining what was occurring in regard to training in the executive branch. Nevertheless, in the absence of over-all legislation, a rising tide of bills was introduced authorizing training for individual agencies.

The long standing congressional attitude of wariness at best and hostility at worst was not changed over night. Some members feared

that general legislation might open a Pandora's box of slipshod, wasteful, or unnecessary programs. Considerable disagreement was evident over controls, whether oversight should be vested in the Civil Service Commission or some other group and how much control should remain with Congress. Divergence on such details was perhaps the principal reason legislation failed in several sessions of Congress.

When, in July, 1958, the Government Employees Training Bill reached the floor, the change of attitude did seem complete, for the debate consisted largely of ringing endorsements of the measure.

The act came during a period when discussions sparked by the Soviet scientific advances had caused much soul searching on the values of education. It was this atmosphere which helped to trigger the long-awaited passage of the bill. At last the ghost of the Jacksonian ideal was laid to rest as the House Committee said:

The Government lags far behind private enterprise in the training of its employees. The United States is not developing and utilizing the full potential of personnel who bear the responsibility for the success of Government programs. . . . Opportunity to continue and broaden knowledge and qualifications, not only is in the public interest, but, also constitutes one of the major objectives of scientific and professional personnel. Shortcomings in the Government's training policies have impeded progress by the Government in these endeavors by destroying one of the finest possible incentives for outstanding professional people to devote their careers to the public service.³⁴

To be sure, there are still many gaps in the picture, as the Civil Service Commission has pointed out.³⁵ For example, much training tends to be short-run, leaving large areas of career development and long-range planning unexplored. Evaluation is much talked about but not often accomplished. The Training Act will to some extent aid in solving these problems, but its most important function will be to offer a solid base for future growth.

³⁴ House Report No. 1951, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Training Programs for Civilians*, June 24, 1958.

³⁵ U. S. Civil Service Commission, *The Training of Federal Employees, Personnel Methods Series No. 7* (U. S. Government Printing Office, January, 1958), pp. 124-134. This is the most up-to-date and complete discussion of existing federal programs.

Administrative Anecdotes

By WILLIAM BRODY

Patronage, Well Documented

POLITICAL patronage, it is not always realized, is not necessarily confined to the field of government service.

Several years ago a well-known party leader in one of our major cities had managed to secure for one of his boys a top personnel position in a large industrial concern. It then became his practice to refer to this protege certain of his constituents who were in search of employment.

Although the personnel manager wasn't too happy about this situation, there was little he could do about it. One day, however, he was able to "regretfully" turn down a sponsored applicant because the date of birth entered on his blank showed him to be 57 years old and the company's pension contract forbade the hiring of any one older than 55.

When the disappointed jobseeker reported back to his ward leader, the latter, with the acumen for which he was distinguished, immediately arrived at a solution to the problem. He directed his constituent to present himself before the city's deputy commissioner of health, who incidentally had also secured his civil service-exempt position through the good offices of the leader, with a note reading:

"The bearer is my good friend _____. He is a faithful member of the party and is in need of a job. Will you please have his birth certificate amended to reduce his age below 55."

The Purloined Examinations

Everyone knows how adroitly Poe's M. Dupin demonstrated his theory that the best hiding place for a purloined letter might be

right out in the open where it becomes too obvious to be seen. Yet no one thought of this in connection with the investigation of a series of leaks of civil service test questions in a southern state.

The case developed over a period of years because it took a long time for the authorities to realize that several of the highest ranking candidates in different examinations actually knew very little about the subject matter despite their brilliant answers.

The field of investigation was narrowed when the director of examinations noted that in each of these tests the number of candidates had been sufficiently large to require printed rather than mimeographed question booklets. This observation led to the suspicion that the print shop might be the source of the trouble.

Two of the state's top investigators assumed the role of examiners and checked for several months. The linotype operators set the questions in type without ever stopping long enough even to comprehend the items, much less memorize them. After the type was transferred to galley and the proofs run off the latter were destroyed under proper surveillance. An examiner of unquestioned probity supervised the special printer's man assigned to watch over the galley until the pages were composed. All the succeeding steps in the printing process appeared to be completely leak-proof.

Over and over again each of these processes was scrupulously, though unobtrusively, observed. Then the solution suddenly struck one of the investigators. The galley guard, white trousers and all, inconspicuously sat on the inked type and then casually strolled off with the questions on the seat of his pants.

Reviews of Books and Documents

Book Review Advisers: Charles S. Ascher, Arthur W. Bromage, Robert L. Oshins

The Managerialization of The Campus

By EARL LATHAM, Amherst College

A FRIEND IN POWER, by Carlos H. Baker. Scribner, 1958. Pp. 312. \$3.95.

PURELY ACADEMIC, by Stringfellow Barr. Simon and Schuster, 1958. Pp. 304. \$3.95.

PICTURES FROM AN INSTITUTION, by Randall Jarrell. Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. Pp. 277. \$3.50.

THE GROVES OF ACADEME, by Mary McCarthy. Harcourt, Brace, 1952. Pp. 302. \$3.50.

THE MASTERS, by Charles Percy Snow. Doubleday and Company, 1959. Pp. 352. \$1.25.

PRINCIPLES OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION, by Lloyd S. Woodburne. Stanford University, 1958. Pp. 197. \$5.00.

IN *A Friend in Power* Carlos Baker has one of his characters answer a wifely question about the next president of the college by saying, "We're thinking seriously of a double president. The Walrus and the Carpenter. Walrus in the front office, trying to look like Grover Cleveland. The Carpenter on Buildings and Grounds."

"That would never do," said Alice, her fingers firm and warm on the nape of his neck. "Remember what happened to the oysters."

"Eaten," said Tyler grinning. "Swallowed up. A parable of administration and faculty in the twentieth century. The way of all flesh."

Posdcorb in the Ivy

This fiction of course lacks the imagination and the sweep, the boldness of the creeping reality. The reality is to be found in a California junior college the president of which is re-tooling the curriculum with real tools.

Automated instruction seems to be the inevitable end of a new program already far under way. Live professors are to be replaced whenever possible with lectures on film and closed television circuits. Of the students in freshman algebra and English courses, *Time* reports, "Their education is largely seen to by a woman worker in a central control room, who feeds the proper reels into the correct machines, and a faculty-member monitor, who patrols four TV theaters at a time, sees that sets work right, and that classes do not become disorderly. Students with questions to ask may make appointments with instructors." It is not said what the titles of these programs are but "I Love Lucidity" might be appropriate, or perhaps "Truth without Consequences."

So far as can be learned, no wretched professor, fingering the fringes of the suit he bought in 1947, has dared to suggest that junior college presidents be put on films to be shown to trustees, alumni, and prospective donors, but a good case might be made for this approach to academic administration. And *Public Administration Review* could award small statues to be called "Prexies" for excellence in various categories. Since great savings in the cost of instruction in crowded class rooms are the expected result of filming professors live and showing their shadows, the benefits of this technology might be extended. Athletic departments could be abolished, films of athletic contests made in Hollywood could be substituted, and coaches could be employed to answer student questions. This would relieve the overcrowding in the stadiums. But administrative reform, while cutting the intellectual flesh, should not injure the academic bone. As Stringfellow Barr's President Pomton told Professor Schneider in

Purely Academic, "some of our students get more education from football than they do in certain classes I shall not name."

It is not the purpose of this essay to muse about the technocratic future. Let Lassie and Flicka teach animal husbandry in the great state agricultural schools to come, from silver screens yet to be raised. It is the present that presses the professor, and although he is going to glory on the late late show in California, other regions of the country are not yet so advanced. The California experience is still a somewhat isolated phenomenon. It does, however, represent a progressive mechanical phase of what may be thought of as the growing managerialization of the campus. There is posdcorb in the ivy, and thoughtful faculty have watched its serpentine growth for a decade or more now, helpless to combat it.

Science and Letters View Administration

So great has this growth been in such a short time that explanations of it have lagged. It is only recently that a book has appeared—the first, perhaps—to expound the science of university and college administration. This is *The Principles of College and University Administration* by Lloyd S. Woodburne, in the first paragraph of which it is said, that "a careful study of the internal operations of institutions of higher education has almost never been made." It is not clear from this statement whether some author almost never wrote a book on university administration; or whether he did write a book that almost did not become a careful study; or whether he did indeed write a careful study that did not get into the internal operations—the laparotomies, so to speak—of university administration. But the intent is clear. Universities have been around a long time and no one has written a book on how to run them.

But if no one has written a book on how to run them, there are many on how they are run, and the last few years have produced certain remarkable ones. Among these are the books of C. P. Snow, Mary McCarthy, Randall Jarrell, Carlos Baker, and Stringfellow Barr. If Dean Woodburne's book may be thought of as science, administrative science, and the novels as literature, the following remarks

may serve as a summary of statements by science and letters about the academic life and its regulation. They don't exactly say the same things.

At the outset there is some difference of judgment as to what a college or university is. Science says, "Colleges and universities are special agencies of society chartered to carry out teaching and research functions not given to any other social agency." This definition sounds like the classic *laissez-faire* statement about the functions of the state, which reserves to it only those activities that it is inconvenient or unprofitable for private persons to do. But the principal characteristic of the statement is its formalism and abstraction. It would fit mental institutions and prisons as well as colleges and universities.

Literature, as one would expect, is much more vivid. For the most part, the fictional colleges of McCarthy, Jarrell, Baker, and Barr are experimental, progressive institutions established to achieve major transformations in the young entrusted to their care. Jocelyn College in *Groves of Academe*, for example, was intended by its founder to be a continuing experiment in scientific education—"by the use of aptitude tests, psychological questionnaires, even blood sampling and cranial measurements, he hoped to discover a method of gauging student-potential and directing it into the proper channels for maximum self-realization; he saw himself as an engineer and the college as a reclamation project along the lines of the Grand Coulee or the TVA." Letters defines the college by its purpose. Science, however, seems to identify the college with its principal tools, teaching and research, and not by its works. As in the famous story of the two workers on the same job, one says he is sawing a board, the other that he is building a cathedral.

Teaching—The Core; The Taught—Ignored

Although science is not clear on what a university is, there is focus on what it does. It teaches or, as it is said, "the educational-teaching function is the central core of a college or university whose tentacles spread very widely." Stringfellow Barr has one character who was early strangled in this octopean core—Denby.

the foundation man. Science, after saying that teaching is the core of the college, is pretty neutral about it, but not so Denby. "Campus life!" he says, "My God! I couldn't take it. The place awash with perfectly decent boys and girls, sweating through the most ghastly textbooks, copying down in their notebooks the most appalling stupidities and ineptitudes that tired, underpaid, repetitious, frustrated professors droned at them. . . . And over all, an uneducated ex-general or ex-banker blanchishing tax-evading donors into perpetuating their own egos." Carlos Baker, on the other hand, is a little kinder about teaching. His Professor Tyler believes that it is the principal function of a university to combat ignorance—the students', that is. "Ignorance, he thought, the great foe of us all—and the collaborating friend. All year long we will fight it, in all the forms it takes. . . . Just a perpetual war perpetually renewed in all the class rooms and offices and laboratories, with time your ally and time your adversary, too."

Uncertain about the nature of the college and split on the value of teaching, science and literature are nevertheless together in apparently believing that they can ignore the most numerous part of the college community, to wit, the student body. In all but one of the six books, the student body is nothing but a statistic, the exception being *The Groves of Academe*, where student and faculty alike come through in rich pungency. Carlos Baker has two or three students who wander in and out of the plot without moving it in any direction, but apart from this and the exception already noted, the student is the forgotten man in the academic universe. In *The Principles of College and University Administration* there is some discussion of the functions of student counsellors and vocational guidance officers; but none of the thousands of students who have presumably been counselled and guided according to the most rigid principles of administration comes through the print to beseech the reader with pleading eyes. Perhaps this neglect is justifiable. The life of the fisherman is not spent with fish but with other fishermen; the museum curator does not involve himself at all with the lives and cares of the artists whose pictures he hangs, and only slightly less so with the people who come

to view them. Napoleon pinches the personal ear of one of the Guards and thus symbolically pinches the ears of all Guards. Administration is for the managers and teaching is for teachers. It is only when the taught and the managed rattle their fetters that managers and teachers, in a glimpse of Tolstoyan perception, come to realize the fusion of interest between top and bottom, if not indeed the dependence of the top on the bottom.

The Eagles and the Moles

The professional astigmatism that blurs the student body out of focus also affects the view that administrators and teachers have of each other. To change the figure, the academic universe described in *The Principles* is egocentric, that is, it is strictly limited to the overhead management of colleges and universities and is dean-oriented. There are chapters on such topics of slight or no interest to academics as the organization of the university (the inspiration is drawn from the literature of business management), physical plant and budgetary control, the establishment of educational priorities and the conduct of operational research, the administration of research work and the graduate schools, the dean of students office, and the summer session and adult education. The chapters on faculty personnel administration, procedures on tenure and promotion, the curriculum and teaching, and departmental administration—all of which involve the faculty directly and intimately—are dealt with from the view of the eagle, not that of the mole.

But in the moles-eye view of the eagles, the perception is also egocentric. The clearest administrative figures in the novels are the presidents of the academic institutions, who do not really appear to very good advantage. With one exception, they represent, in the main, a combination of charlatany and spurious idealism. President Pomton in *Purely Academic*, for example, buys real estate for his own account in the path of a university development of which he has privy knowledge. The president of Benton in Jarrell's *Pictures from an Institution*, a former Olympic diver, wears undergraduate clothing, affects a boyish mop of hair that keeps flopping in his face,

and melts susceptible audiences in the warmth of a beguiling voice. He is a man who identifies himself with Jay Gatsby, one who, like Gatsby, began poor and was sometimes unexpectedly lower class in phrase or inflection. The liberal president in *Groves of Academe* is a time-server and a trimmer, a "photogenic curly-haired evangelist of the right to teach," a cultist of progressive orthodoxy, inhibited by his professional posture from dealing decisively with a psychopathic liar who exploits his weakness. Such is the man Mary McCarthy calls President Hoar. The exception in this generous distribution of dis-esteem is Homer Virgil Vaughan, the retiring president in *A Friend in Power*, a father figure as the others are not, the Jupiter of Enfield University.

All this is quite savage. The collective portrait of the college president that emerges is certainly an unfriendly one. The animus seems not to be rooted, however, in a literary distaste for managerial types as such, since the presidents only receive their share of a fusillade that cuts down professors, secretaries, students, and the other denizens of the academic jungle. This is not a hunt in a thicket but the extermination of a forest.

Although the clearest figures are indeed the presidents, there are brief glimpses of other functionaries, including deans, most of whom are treated in sketchy fashion or summarily dismissed. Budgeting is for the treasurer, the comptroller may worry about the accounts, the alumni office simply does not exist, the public relations people could be in Hollywood for all that is said about them in the novels. No one goes into the college kitchens, or walks the buildings and grounds, looks under beds in the dormitories, buys faculty housing, or administers a research enterprise.

For the author of *The Principles* the real people in the college or university are the swarms of functionaries whose services must be organized, staffed, directed, coordinated, reported, and budgeted in the familiar sequence. In only one of the novels do some of these functionaries become real people. In *The Masters* by C. P. Snow there is a Bursar who is thoroughly disliked, an odious man, and there is a Dean who has an important part to play in the plot. A measure of the

difference in respect given to functionaries by science and by literature is their respective treatment of the office of dean of students. In *The Principles*, the dean of students rates a whole chapter which, characteristically, is about the office he commands and not the clientele over which he presides. In *A Friend in Power*, one of the characters says, "The dorms and the dining halls are hotel business, and the Dean of Students is the head bellhop." The novelists are only dimly aware then of what they regard as the administrative supernumeraries in the university or college, with the exception of Mr. Big, the president.

The Hot Center of the Academic Galaxy

As to the faculty, although it does not seem very real in the science of college and university administration, for the novelists it is the hot center of the academic galaxy, a social inferno, a flaming pit of writhing souls. And like the college presidents, most of the faculty folk appear to be pretty disreputable in the works of Mary McCarthy, Randall Jarrell, and Stringfellow Barr. In *The Masters*, the faculty are important men with high professional prestige and social position (it is well to remember that this is England, another culture), and the faculty people are rather warm and friendly recognizable types in *A Friend in Power*. But even in this last work, there is a certain amount of sport with colleagues who are given names drawn from a private bestiary: Drake, Baer, Ochs, and so on.

If the managers of the campus were to receive training in the characteristics of the society they appoint each other to govern, as the Colonial Office tells new Residents about the aborigines, much could be learned in the novels. In *Purely Academic* an economist named Nast is an empire builder of a familiar type, who does not scruple to lie in getting a foundation grant to promote what he calls "People's Capitalism." Henry Mulcahy in *Groves of Academe* uses lies and blackmail in his effort to make a temporary appointment permanent, misusing friends for this end in paranoid self-justification. *Pictures from an Institution* portrays a number of shrewish, vicious, mendacious, and stupid types. The History Department in *Purely Academic* has one professor who uses devastating

book reviews as a means of destroying the careers of budding critics; another whose research for a book concentrated on "odds and ends that might discredit his predecessors in the field"; and one who hated his students because they had been born since the thirteenth century. Weed, the chairman of the Political Science Department, is a sympathetic drunk, driven to the bottle because he does not know why French schools educate and American schools do not. Early in *The Principles* the author says that the colleges and universities have "an instructional process which cannot properly be mechanized," and that they employ a higher number of professionals than almost any other type of institution. But simply to say this is grossly to fail to prepare the shiny new dean or publicity-conscious provost with full understanding of the hazards of control.

The Hazards of Control

The hazards of control are greatest at that point in the institutional structure where faculty and administration do most of their business with each other—at the departmental level. This is the crucial point in both the formal and informal relations that make up academic life. The novels bring this out clearly. The leading figure in *Purely Academic* is chairman of the History Department; in *A Friend in Power*, he is chairman of the Department of Modern Languages. In *Groves of Academe*, most of the plot unfolds within and among the members of the language department; and in *Pictures from an Institution*, the language department is the matrix within which most of the comment occurs and from which the characters are set in movement with others in the institution from which the pictures are taken. Departmental rivalry is strongly in action in *Purely Academic*, and least apparent in *Pictures*, but it hangs through all the novels like an atmosphere charged with the faint smell of electricity or sulphur. The bias of the writers for the literary and language departments is perhaps a preoccupation with occupation.

Science agrees with literature on the importance of departmental organization, but the difference in conception is antipodal. For the novelists, the department is a delicate so-

cial organization, full of the tension of idiosyncrasy, a weft of subtle feeling, rich in chromatic variety, a complex of warm and cool colors in shifting shades of meaning. For science, the department is a unit of business administration, the characteristics of which can be adequately comprehended by references to Chester Barnard and how it was in old New Jersey Tel and Tel. Thus we learn that it is seldom satisfactory to "issue detailed operating instructions to people at the departmental level" if they are to be applied in the same sense in which they were "drawn and proposed at the top administrative level." And consultations are important between top level and operating level because top level people can learn from operating level people how operating people operate. This presumably helps top level people to stay on top.

To the sensitive, the establishment of shelves of people is abhorrent. From this it is only a step, which the California junior college has already taken, to keep the shelves and throw away the people. More invidious, perhaps, is the inchoate assumption that college departments are just like business units. As a first step towards this managerial goal, university administrations might begin paying professors on the scale of industry and thus give them something to be businesslike about.

The distance between the scientific and the literary conceptions of the department may be comprehended in the statement from *The Principles* that departments "are, in one sense, primarily convenient budgetary units to provide for ease of operation and assignment of funds. These units also happen to be convenient groupings of instructional faculty into fairly unified blocks of subject matter." Twice the word "convenient" is used. Whose convenience? Not that of plastic professors pressed into fairly unified blocks of subject matter but that of the molding hands of the managers, of course. Nowhere is it suggested that the department is a fellowship of scholars, a brotherhood of truth, committed by a grateful society to preserve the culture and provide for the intellectual nurture of the young. To the contrary. What the managers see is a fellowship of budgetary units, a brotherhood of fairly unified blocks of subject matter, committed by the culture to the easy op-

eration and assignment of funds. It is small wonder that managers like to teach small courses on the side; they not only borrow the prestige of the faculty by doing so. They clutch, if they do not grasp, some small connection with social sense and human reality.

Machinery at the Operating Level

In the science of administration the department head becomes an "executive head" "at the operating level," charged with grave responsibilities. He is the link between the overhead and the underfoot, between the peak and the pit, a vortex created at the juncture of opposing streams that trickle down and bubble up, a colonel in the academic regiments, in command of field troops but under the authority of dean-generals who command divisions. The novelists, however, do not think as highly of the chairman as science does. Professor Tyler in *A Friend in Power* says of the chairman's duties, "Chairmanship is nothing . . . but a glorified secretary's job. Not too glorified either." In *Groves of Academe*, Mulcahy contrives to obtain a contract from the president while the chairman of his department stands rather on the sidelines—indeed there are times when he is not clearly sure what is going on in his own department.

But for professors defeated as scholars, the chairmanship may come to mean substitute fulfillment, through which they create lives of busy triviality. Jarrell mentions the professor of English who had been one of the two foremost authorities on Cowper but whose self-esteem became eroded and whose spirit became frustrated by a universal lack of interest in his specialty. He gradually turned from scholarship, became interested in administrative chores, and was made chairman of the English Department. He was transfigured. "He made . . . speeches to associations, clubs, alumni; he wrote on the problems of American education, the administrative ones especially; he went to baseball games with the Dean of the School of Education, and talked to the coaches and Educators who sat around him." Although scholarship had been ended, and creative works abandoned, and his professional life was now filled with sawdust and

not substance, the professor did not regret the exchange but thought that he had traded equal goods. When he overheard the Dean of the Graduate School say an approving word about his department, "he felt a pleasure that he hadn't felt even when he had first held in his hands, fresh from the Cambridge Press, his own edition of *The Task*."

In the works of both science and letters, the principal administrative device for achieving the common business is the committee. Indeed in a list of the qualifications for appointment and promotion that *The Principles* sets out, committee and administrative work is listed as one of the areas (albeit minor) in which candidates are expected not to be deficient. There are ad hoc committees, departmental committees, divisional committees, senate committees, interdisciplinary committees, and so on. In the novels, committeeism is the conciliar movement of the academic church and, although never making good the claim to paramount authority, nevertheless co-opts portions of the administrative power and collectivizes responsibility for its exercise.

Just as the papacy opposed the democratization of ecclesiastical power, so does administrative science deplore committeeism. Says the author of *The Principles*, "There has been, in a number of instances, a cult of democracy in departmental operations. . . . Some years ago there were in American universities many heads of departments with autocratic powers. In some instances this led to greatness." Now, to be sure, this also sometimes led to consequences less than great, and the introduction of the committee structure rectified the autocracy somewhat. But there is a present danger, it is felt, that committeeism will impose mediocrity on operations and reduce the effectiveness and quality of basic departmental decisions.

Literature is also skeptical about committeeism but on quite different grounds. In *Purely Academic*, Professor Schneider is asked by one of the faculty wives whether, in order to advance himself, one of the professors shouldn't do committee work. Says Schneider, "That I cannot permit—although I have no authority here. That, my dear lady, would require him to dictate letters, issue memo-

randas, and go into conference, the way little businessmen do. In fact, committee work is the professor's way of proving that he is just as important to society as businessmen are."

Personnel Administration— Who Gets Where

In the science of administration, faculty personnel procedures on tenure and promotion are aspects of management. For the novelists, appointments and promotions are the presiding concern. *The Masters* is the story of a losing campaign to elect a candidate to head a college. Both *Purely Academic* and *A Friend in Power* deal with the politics of the selection of the president of a university. The plot of *Groves of Academe* is the struggle of a man of some professional competence but of offensive personality to hold on to an appointment that was meant to be temporary. Although *Pictures from an Institution* is a collection of vignettes loosely held together by common malice, the last chapter does witness the departure from Benton of the protagonist, who goes to another institution and so improves his situation. It would not be difficult to conclude from the evidence of the five novels that the full drama of college life is to be found almost exclusively in the recruitment, promotion, and tenure of professors and presidents. Here, the human condition is one of anxiety about status, prestige, and money; and the stratagems to which the characters stoop to acquire and hold these psychic and material goods are many and devious. In none of the novels does the drama consist in the effort to advance scholarship, science, or discovery. In none is there a profound moral dilemma, choices between good and evil, the compulsions of guilt and conscience, the tragedy of crime and punishment. Except for C. P. Snow and Carlos Baker, none of the authors appears to be much involved with his characters. They seem, rather, to put them on display; and then they invite the reader to disparage the exhibition because it lacks taste.

And in the selection of personnel, whether by recruitment or promotion, what are the standards? Administrative science states the familiar standards: scholarship, teaching, con-

tributions to the profession, and committee and administrative work, as was said earlier. Admittedly, these are difficult to apply, and judgments, especially about teaching ability, are notoriously subjective, often so for lack of clear standards and tests. The chairman of Mulcahy's department in *Groves of Academe* listens to a defense of Mulcahy's teaching ability by a member, who has no basis for judgment, and agrees with him, with certain practical reservations. "He was quite well aware that he knew nothing about the quality of Hen's teaching; but neither, he was certain, did the others, and he would have liked to get this admission on the table. 'Fitness to teach' was an imponderable which he had no intention of pretending to weigh. . . ." Ultimately the decision to give Mulcahy a contract, after he had been notified that he was let go, depended upon the plea made to the president by two of Mulcahy's friends. The president was in no doubt about the correctness of his original decision, but Mulcahy got the contract because the intervention of his friends assured the president that his new decision had some support.

The point about the inadequacy of the standards that Mulcahy's experience shows is made sharper by Stringfellow Barr in *Purely Academic* where he says of the president: "Pomton felt that the surest way to discover who were the best men in your faculty was to see which ones other university presidents wanted." And acting on this principle—which is not stated in *The Principles*—Professor Schneider gets a friend in another college to make an appearance of interest in him so that he can use the supposed interest to pry an increase in salary out of Pomton. But the best that the friend could do was to manufacture a tentative offer, and President Pomton beat Professor Schneider in the attempted bluff.

The selection of presidents is as irrational in the novels as is the selection of professors. The bare majority that two friends organize for one of the candidates in *The Masters* dissipates over time as attitudes change, largely for non-objective reasons. Nast becomes the president of the University in *Purely Academic* when the secretary of the outgoing president blackmails Nast's leading opponent in the board of trustees and forces him to resign.

In *A Friend in Power*, the head of the faculty advisory committee appointed to work with the trustees in rating the faculty possibilities among the potential candidates is himself offered the presidency and accepts. He was chosen, they told him, because of "your books, your brains, your hard work, your administrative experience here and elsewhere. Your army record. . . . You have the respect and admiration of your colleagues on the faculty. You're a father. You've got a fine wife and family. You're a scholar and a teacher." But in addition to all this he was also head of the faculty advisory committee appointed to work with the trustees, and this did not hurt.

To the novelists, there is a fallacy in assuming that these seemingly objective standards for selection are reasons for choosing people. In fact, they are more important as official reasons for not choosing people who have been rejected on unofficial grounds. Faculty selection, at least in this country, is not an objective merit system in which candidates receive appointments in an academic civil service after having qualified in a public competition. *The Principles* discusses the use of *ad hoc* committees in filling permanent positions and finds them seriously deficient, certainly when consultants from the outside are invited to sit. At the least, the outsiders will be chary about letting their best people go and will not cooperate in the selection of "the best man in the country" if he is to come from the universities they represent.

But this is only part of the story. Randall Jarrell puts in the mouths of some of his characters pertinent observations about the mores of a campus that bear on selection. Among the faculty of Benton, local prestige was not based upon class, money, or outside reputation. "Jerrold Whittaker was about as famous as American sociologists get, but there were a dozen professors who were more honored at Benton—who seemed to Benton, far more famous." The faculty was a tightly compressed social community, it generated its own standards, and it regarded them with utmost complacency as universals. "It was like, in many ways, some little community in the Middle Ages; there was a most homogeneous public opinion, a most homogeneous private opinion—almost all the people there were agreed

about almost everything and glad to be agreed, and *right* to be agreed." It was a surprisingly contented place despite its social conformity. "The people who were discontented got jobs elsewhere—as did, usually, any very exceptional people—and the others stayed. They didn't need to be exceptional: they were at Benton."

The selection of people for such a community clearly requires something more than scholarship, teaching ability, contributions to the profession, and committee and administrative work. In most areas of recruitment, personal characteristics are of course relevant to choices when all of the so-called objective criteria have been met, and the test is usually provided in the phrase, "ability to get along with others," or "ability to work cooperatively." But the Benton social fitness test, never explicated (no one can study for it), goes beyond mere ability to get along with others. It is really a social pattern test, and its measure is local prejudice. Thus if the candidate fails the SPT it may be said of him that his scholarship does not quite measure up to the requirements needed, or that he is not as good a teacher as we would like to get, or that his fifty articles in learned journals have not really made a contribution to the profession. The objective criteria are therefore reasons for *not* giving people jobs.

Benton was a small college, but what was true of Benton may be true in some degree in the departments of big universities, and indeed throughout the universe of private bureaucracies. Barnard says that it is important so to choose executives that "a general condition of compatibility of personnel is maintained" and one of the standards is whether the candidate "fits." This brings under scrutiny then the candidate's total personality and outlook, the characteristics of his wife and family, the kind of car he drives, his outlook on sex, life, politics, money, and modern art. The operation of the invisible test weeds out those who do not fit and tends to favor the candidacies of close friends and relations. Real independence of mind and spirit may be one of the least qualifications for an academic career, as Thorstein Veblen learned the hard way.

Parkinson's Law and Parkinson's Disease

The contrasting viewpoints of science and literature about the campus have long been familiar to those who make careers on the campus, whether in teaching or administration. And the increasing bureaucratization of the campus could widen the distance between them. No one of course denies that there are certain aspects of the operation of any custodial operation—prisons, barracks, colleges, universities, nunneries, boys camps, and mental institutions—to which a necessary amount of orderly housekeeping is not only relevant but indispensable. Food must be purchased, and desks and chairs, and dormitory beds; payrolls must be met; buildings and grounds must be kept up; parietal regulations must be established and enforced, and so on. There are useful and inefficient ways of dealing with this housekeeping, and the first are better than the second because they cost less and cause less fuss. But the post of honor in the college or university is the class room. In the jargon, this is the line to which all else is staff. It is here that the function of the institution is fulfilled and everything that gets in its way, or which does not contribute to it, is dispensable.

The standard faculty view is that the intellect, its care and feeding, should fix the center and purpose of the university. The true life of the academy, in this view, is not in the stadium, or the alumni office, or the public relations department, or the dean's office, or the trustees' meeting, or the registrar's office, or the office of the student counsellor or the chaplain's hideaway, or the office of the occupational adviser, or of the fraternity business manager. Ardent faculty critics tell each other that the true life is lived in the meetings of teachers and students, not in the meetings of associations of college budget officers, associations of college housing officers, associations of college purchasing officers, associations of college public relations officers, associations of college alumni officers, associations of papa deans, associations of mamma deans, or associations of little baby deans. The adventure of the spirit, it will be said, takes place in the class room and seminar, not in Druid's circles of minor administrators who clasp each

other's wrists and count the pulses. Since the war, however, it is these auxiliary staff services that have proliferated on almost every campus, and many faculty feel that the stultification of the true purpose of the institution by administration is taking place not only by the operation of Parkinson's law but by the etiology of Parkinson's disease.

Adjustments to Idiosyncrasy

But mild paranoia is an occupational characteristic of many faculty, and the faculty complaint against administration magnifies the shortcomings of the managers and minimizes its own. The candid must recognize that few among the faculty are equipped to govern, and that most need management—up to a certain point, at least. Faculty folk are often—like the French people are occasionally—utterly incapable of self-government. What a confusion there is sometimes in a faculty meeting called to consider, for example, new regulations for the conduct of examinations. The proceedings may even have touches of low comedy, as in an old Mack Sennett movie. Professors spring up and down like Keystone cops in the chase of fugitive sense, rushing up and down the stairs and through swinging doors of parliamentary procedure. The innocent burst through false exits and slam into blank walls. Some try to arrest each other. Finally the president blows a whistle, all crowd aboard the Model T, clinging to the doors and hood as best they can, and go weaving down the road from side to side, towards the objective they were called to reach.

A faculty, moreover, is a collection of highly individualized personalities. Jealousies abound, feuds are not unknown, slights are almost never unintended, envy rankles, and bitterness cankers. Some administrators doubtless share the attitude of Bill, the Treasurer in *Purely Academic*, a tall man, well built, good looking, healthy, alert, and deeply respectful of money. "Conscious as Bill was," says Barr, "of the scorn that the true scholar feels for the administrative officials of the academy, he secretly returned their scorn fourfold: he looked on professors as a special class of kept women, eager for their monthly allowances

but unwilling to contemplate the sordid operations of the butter-and-eggs man who supports them."

Perhaps the task of making mutual understanding falls more heavily on the managers than the teachers since the managers are presumably equipped to deal with idiosyncrasy without contributing to it, and the teachers usually function within a fairly narrow specialty and therefore may not be expected to comprehend the alien dialectic of administrative justification. Indeed, it may be that teach-

ers should be cherished by the functionaries with special tenderness because grateful alumni are more likely to remember a stimulating teacher than the executive officer in charge of buildings and grounds. Carlos Baker puts the case for the teacher even more simply. He makes Alice say, "Professors are lucky. . . . They can write their own monuments and people will always read them."

"Not all the people."

"The best people, then," said Alice. "The teachers. The students."

Known and Needed in Public Personnel Research

By EVERETT W. REIMER, Committee on Human Resources, Puerto Rico

PERSONNEL RESEARCH FRONTIERS, by Cecil E. Goode, Public Personnel Association, 1958. Pp. 176. \$3.50.

CECIL GOODE has written a handbook of information, spiced it with dry comment, introduced a moral, skirted a philosophical dilemma and has managed to keep the whole package as tight and at times as compelling as a good detective story. This sounds like an improbable feat and it is.

Essentially, *Personnel Research Frontiers* is a handbook, defined as "a review of personnel research activities and facilities, with special reference to their implications for government." But the production of a handbook in this field was no routine task.

It turns out that personnel practitioners don't do enough research to write a book about. This will not surprise them; they know how limited is their time and how small their research budgets. But research relevant for personnel management is being done by social scientists in universities and specialized research organizations and is being supported financially by the military services, a few other federal entities like the Mental Health Institute, some of the foundations, and a few of our larger corporations. Most of this research is not considered personnel research even by the people who do it.

Goode had to separate what is from what is not relevant to personnel management and he

had no traditional nor conceptual guides to lean on. All he had was the uncommon common sense of an experienced personnel man able to see, if only dimly, tomorrow's frontiers of personnel management. His book is above all a credit to his foresight and judgment.

Having decided what research to include, the task of selecting categories, aspects, and examples which would make this research meaningful was scarcely less formidable. Goode's condensation is so ruthless as to guarantee a shock to the researchers, but it will fascinate them also to see—in the case of their associates if not themselves—what a practical, determined effort can distill out of volumes of carefully qualified analyses and conclusions. There is no virtue here, of course, except that of necessity; Goode's review of personnel research is no substitute for the research reports themselves, but it probably will lead many personnel people to these reports who would otherwise never know that they exist.

Social scientists will find *Personnel Research Frontiers* worth reading because of the happy if unorthodox manner in which Goode combines information on sources of funds, dollar amounts of grants, names of individual researchers and research organizations, the nature of research projects and, sometimes, the results or conclusions of the research. It is fascinating to learn that a project which cost \$175,000 resulted in five stated conclusions

and to be able to speculate on which of them, if any, are worth what they cost.

Goode's moral is that more research is needed bearing directly on civilian personnel management in government. His supporting argument is not as sure-footed, however, as his preceding exposition.

In general Goode goes to the root problems of government personnel management and does not minimize their difficulties. His response to these difficulties is a rather sharply contrasting expression of faith in research, and he doesn't help his case by leaning on faith in evaluating the research which is in *Personnel Research Frontiers*. Early in the book he cites Peter Drucker's complaint, made in 1957: "The social sciences are bankrupt—they have run dry and are not providing the insights they should. Nothing new has been uncovered in the last thirty years even with the effort and money that have been expended by psychologists. All they come up with is the same old truism, People are Humans." Goode feels that Drucker is overstating the case but his own evaluative summary is also largely critical, and scarcely prepares the reader for his final statement: "Even tho organizational and human research has been relatively fragmentary we are on the verge of a major breakthrough in management and organizational theory." Possessing no more evidence than the

very little that Goode has cited, I nevertheless feel somehow that he is right.

But I do wonder whether this break-through would leave standing what seems to be his implicit major premise: that efficiency—a maximum output-input ratio—is the basic criterion of organizational functioning. My doubt is not the same as Simon's—that men do not have the wits to maximize—it is rather that men do not want to maximize the output of organizations of which their own efforts are the inputs.

If we look at all types of human organizations over the span of history, it begins to appear that the modern, competitive, production organization is an exception to the rule and a temporary exception at that. Goode implies as much when he writes about major research problems for the future, "We will need to do some basic research on the meaning of work and leisure in a society of continually increasing productivity, decreasing work hours, and radically new emerging technology. What do we do with the fruits of increased productivity, and how do we convert them into optimum social dividends?"

Perhaps the research will show that people don't want to work with maximum efficiency so that they can go home and enjoy themselves in the same fashion. Perhaps they would prefer to enjoy themselves in their work.

Administrative Values: Looking Inward and Outward

By S. MCKEE ROSEN, Public Administration Division,
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A PHILOSOPHY OF ADMINISTRATION; TOWARD CREATIVE GROWTH, by Marshall E. Dimock. Harper and Brothers, 1958. Pp. xiv, 176. \$3.50.

IDEAL AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, by Emmette S. Redford. University of Alabama Press, 1958. Pp. xii, 155. \$2.50.

A Philosophy of Administration is a thought-ful little book by an outstanding teacher of and writer on administration. Readers among practitioners and students of administration will find in Marshall Dimock's volume some

fine grains of wisdom which should stir them to further thought concerning the nature and purpose of their work.

The book is a sharp polemic rather than a pedantic treatise. What the author has to say he believes in fervently. Essentially he presents a challenge to the executive to regard his role and function in philosophical and ethical terms. He appeals against the mechanistic and quantitative approach to administration. He pleads for a philosophy of management which stresses objectives, personal growth, and the initiative of individuals.

The stultifying dangers of bureaucracies, private and public, are becoming better known as social scientists direct their studies to the fundamental conditions of large-scale administration in the United States. The popular volume, *The Organization Man*, is perhaps indicative of recent probing. Dimock's book is a search for identity—for value and purpose which render managerial activity meaningful and significant.

The quality of life in any society, Dimock maintains, is in the main determined by its institutions whose vitality in turn is largely dependent upon administrators as a class. He is deeply disturbed by the fragmentation which he finds in business and government administration. Administration should concentrate upon integrative effort and should be concerned more than anything else with the fusion of many elements into a blend—a blend dependent upon knowledge of growth and decay of institutions. Thus as cornerstones of his philosophy Dimock emphasizes creative growth and the organic nature of human endeavor, the development of widely shared leadership and the motivation and not the manipulation of individuals.

A major concern of management, in Dimock's view, is the self-development of individuals involved in the management process. It is such a purpose which should permeate the life of an organization, and executives have a special responsibility for articulating those challenges and encouraging those responses upon which growth and positive survival depend.

Dimock has drawn little distinction between public and business administration. That they possess a great many similar characteristics is undoubtedly true. But there are rather important differences in purpose and objective. The administrative process of government lends itself to motivational patterns which are not within the ambit of private enterprise. The dean of an outstanding school of commerce somewhat inadvertently put his finger on this distinction when he recently remarked that the public administrator was a business executive with a sense of mission. That difference is significant and merits exploration.

Professor Emmett S. Redford's volume,

Ideal and Practice in Public Administration, somewhat supplements Dimock, and in addition attempts to answer the questions: Does public administration have a philosophy? Do public servants have ideals which are operative and effective in the governmental process?

Redford identifies six major ideals in public administration which are deeply rooted in our political and governmental development: efficiency, the rule of law, competence, responsibility, democracy, and the public interest. The excitement engendered by this book comes from the calm, judicious handling of the subject matter.

Redford's approach is epitomized in his last two chapters. In the first of these, titled "The Never-Ending Search for the Public Interest," Redford maintains that as a goal of administration and government generally the public interest is too rich in variety and depth and too deeply involved in our complex life to be easily defined. The outgrowth of a continuous formation of consensus, the public interest emerges through interrelated social, political, and governmental processes and at the same time is firmly imbedded in the more permanent institutional fabric of the nation.

Redford does not see the public interest as a simple sum of pressure group forces. At their best, special interest groups can be and are a constructive and essential part of the democratic process. At their worst, they may seriously impair the independence and strength of public organization. Protections against the excesses of groupism exist in administrative machinery, but protection of the conception of the public interest from distortion by special interests depends upon government as a whole and the standards of society itself.

In his view, the older notion of checks and balances in our social and political federalism is no longer sufficient. The pervasiveness of governmental activity has forced us to recognize the emergence of the positive state and the interdependence of all parts of the nation. A new and constructive approach is thus indicated. Multiple centers of power in the society provide built-in group balances paralleled in the original check and balance system of the federal government. But "the deficiencies of pluralistic government point up the need for

more positive approaches to supplement those of traditional theory."

Redford suggests several ways in which a comprehensive consideration of interests and relationships—general as well as specific—can be woven into the practice of government more effectively. First, he stresses the importance of comprehensive jurisdiction of governmental units, that is of jurisdiction which is broad enough to insure that all the interests involved will have a chance for fair consideration. Second, he emphasizes the significance of comprehensive representation—the chief organ of which is the Presidency. He stresses, finally, the role which creative intelligence must play. "It is a hopeful sign," he writes, "that governments are awakening to the need for 'braineries' at all important policy-determining centers."

In his final chapter, "Institutionalization of Ideal," Redford charts the administrative arrangements worked out in the past two generations which, combined with political structure, have succeeded to a considerable extent in building community ideals into our institutions. These formal administrative channels provide avenues for expression of varying in-

terests and objectives—the federal budget process is an example. He also stresses the development of administrative due process with its three components of fact gathering, consideration of interests, and expert judgment. He concludes that the ideal of the public interest is continually being embodied in many ways in an institutional framework which gives it reality in the governmental process as a whole and in public administration in particular.

These books address themselves in different ways to frontiers of thought on administration. Few problems are as crucial as those involving a philosophy of administration adequate to our times. Dimock addresses himself largely to the management process as such. He does not probe the institutional matrix and values of business enterprise in the way in which Redford analyzes the political and governmental setting of public administration. Public and business administration share many instrumental values which are derived from advancing technique, research, and the analytical approach generally. They also share some institutional values; but there are fundamental roots and values of an institutional nature which are not common to both.

Control or Supervision of the Military?

By ROBERT H. CONNERY, Duke University

FORGING A NEW SWORD: A STUDY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, by William R. Kintner in association with Joseph I. Coffey and Raymond J. Albright. Harper and Brothers, 1958. Pp. xiv, 238. \$4.50.

TO DAY, national security is everybody's business and the grim picture presented of the inner operations of the Pentagon today in *Forging A New Sword* ought to make it required reading for all serious citizens. Public administration practitioners will have an added incentive to examine this volume because the problems presented and the solutions proposed deal with administrative organization, personnel, fiscal controls, and policy-making. To be

sure, these problems in the Department of Defense are made immeasurably more difficult than in most executive departments by the factor of interservice rivalries and civilian-military relations. But in a sense the very size of the defense operations makes it easier to observe, isolate, and measure administrative procedures than in a smaller agency.

Forging A New Sword is a product of the American Project, a venture of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology which "is concerned with the interaction between the United States as a domestic society and its problems and performance on the world scene." Kintner and Coffey are Army officers. To a consider-

able extent, the authors reflect the Army's traditional views about the defense organization. All three have had periods of duty at the Pentagon in the upper echelon. Kintner and Coffey have participated in a number of special studies of defense organization. Kintner also has lectured at the National War College and taken part in various round tables and discussion groups.

The authors find that since the Unification Act of 1947, the major efforts to assure effective civilian control "have been made in the field of administration." Personnel policy, procurement, supply and maintenance, and similar "business activities" of the Defense Department have been placed under the close control and supervision of civilian officials. Consequently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense today consists of several thousand people, organized under nine assistant secretaries and several special assistants to the Secretary. The result is more civilian supervision than control. "The areas in which policy control is of paramount importance is not administration or logistics but strategic concepts, war plans, and force requirements; fields which the military regard as peculiarly their own; and there is still ineffective civilian control over these areas." Budget decisions rather than policy decisions have been the order of the day.

Moreover, few of the 100 civilians who have filled positions at the secretary level since the 1947 Act have had wide experience that would fit them for their position, and few remained long enough to get it. The average tenure has been 18 months. While this "revolving door principle" may work satisfactorily in settling political debts, it can not provide strong civilian leadership. Indeed this situation seems so bad one may wonder whether any organizational changes can solve the difficulties of the Defense Department until some way is found to select more carefully and to retain in office longer individuals at the secretary level who are capable of providing leadership for the whole national security effort. Certainly the vigorous leadership that a Forrestal or a Patterson pro-

vided came quite as much from long tenure in office as from intellectual ability and training.

The authors recommend that the civilians concentrate on long-range planning policy-making, leaving direct administrative responsibility to the military. One may have no quarrel with this general theory, but unless the civilians participate in day-to-day administration they will not be sufficiently informed to make intelligent policy decisions. Forrestal's policy was rather to force the examination of various problems by two or more, in a sense competing, military groups as well as by a civilian staff. Thus well-considered alternatives were presented to him, and he had some choice in making a decision. To some extent this may happen as a result of the latest reorganization which makes overseas commands and special task forces directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense. Thus reports from the military "users" of manpower and material in the field as well as the military producers of manpower and material in the Pentagon will meet on the Secretary's desk. Perhaps they will provide him a better standard of measurement and an aid in reaching sounder decisions.

The time "is not yet ripe," the authors maintain, for a single command and a single chief of staff. But steps should be taken to mitigate service rivalries. One may question whether absence of rivalry in itself is a wise goal and that agreement and conformity always are to be sought. The history of the last war would seem to indicate that a single high command as in Germany means the dominance of a single strategic concept. Some would credit Germany's defeat to the single command concept which they argue resulted in little understanding of the role of sea power in modern war.

The most dramatic recommendation of the study is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be relieved of active command of their respective services and devote themselves solely to planning. This also would enable them to devote more time to advising the Secretary of Defense on military needs.

History of Civil-Military Relations

By JOHN W. MASLAND, Dartmouth College

SOLDIERS AND GOVERNMENTS, NINE STUDIES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, edited by Michael Howard. Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957. Pp. 192. 21/-net.

To the growing body of literature on the relationship of military force and organization to political authority, Michael Howard, Lecturer in War Studies at University of London King's College, has added this small volume. It is based on lectures delivered at King's College on civil-military relations in seven selected countries and in Latin America by eight British scholars, with an introduction by Howard.

The editor's introductory lecture is a masterly statement of the issues involved in the civil-military relationship. "As yet no community of any degree of complexity has succeeded in existing without force," he writes, "and the manner in which that force is organized and controlled will largely determine the political structure of the State." This poses problems of subordination of military force to the political government and organization of the internal political structure and the armed services to achieve this end—more broadly, the eternal conflict between liberty and authority. Commenting on the absence of a profound rift between civil and military interests in Great Britain and the United States, Howard observes that "It is no real paradox that it should be the nations where a separate military tradition has been weakest which have been best able to organize themselves for the total war of the twentieth century."

The contributors, Robert Blake on Great Britain, Guy Chapman on France, F. L. Carsten on Germany, G. H. N. Seton-Watson on

Russia, F. C. Jones on Japan, A. R. M. Carr on Spain, R. A. Humphreys on Latin America, and D. W. Brogan on the United States, are recognized students of the countries of which they write. All but Brogan write as historians, and they have not concerned themselves with the recent past. Only Brogan considers developments since the second world war. Except for a two-page postscript on Sir Winston Churchill's leadership in 1939-1945, Blake's piece on Great Britain, for example, covers the period from the Crimean War to 1918 only. Carsten brings the German story only to 1933.

Thus the volume consists of a series of somewhat unrelated historical essays rather than an analysis of the situation in each country within the context of a schematic design. While nothing as abstract as the concepts of objective and subjective control devised by Samuel Huntington in his provocative *The Soldier and The State* was called for, it is to be regretted that Howard did not at least add a final essay analyzing the observations of his colleagues against the questions raised in his introduction, presenting also his own conclusions.

Brogan, in his essay, points out that "In handling the problem of civilian control of the armed forces, the United States . . . has clung to archaic methods easily explicable in terms of American history, less easily defended in terms of efficiency or safety in our dangerous world, so unlike that contemplated by the 'Founding Fathers' in 1787." He concludes, with Huntington, that civilian control would have been more readily achieved today if the framers had been less eager to achieve it in their time.

Developments in Public Administration

Compiled by WILLIAM B. SHORE

Staff Officer

American Society for Public Administration

Dinosaur Organizations: To Swallow-up or Break-down?

Organizations—business, social, and governmental—are becoming so large that fewer persons make more and more crucial decisions affecting all persons. True or false?

False, says Harlan Cleveland, Dean of Syracuse University's Maxwell School. Large-scale organization seems to mean loose organization, and the growing number of vital decisions they make means more participants are necessary in the process. Also the giantism of today's organizations means that policies even of private organizations are infected with public interest; so there must be outside participants in decision-making.

... the nearer you get to the top of the hierarchy the fewer unreviewed decisions you make. The man who buys writing pads and pencils for a government agency is virtually his own boss, but the President of the United States has to operate in a world peopled with countervailing organizations in and out of government which believe his every move is of concern to them, and must therefore be cleared with them. The more countervailing organizations have to be consulted, the more members of the internal staff must be assigned to deal with them—and must therefore "participate in major decisions."

Furthermore, "a governmental agency wields such power that the lowliest field representative may legitimately feel that he is involved in major decisions. . . . In spite of his

unimpressive position on the totem pole of our agricultural bureaucracy, the county agricultural extension agent is a big man in his circle, disposing of substantial resources and representing, in the individual farmer's eyes, the power and weight of the U. S. Government."

Our increasingly interrelated living means that we each have greater responsibility to our fellow men rather than less. "All this makes life more dangerous, both for the decision-maker and for the rest of us who depend on his being right the first time. But do not these accretions of personal responsibility tend to increase the individual's sense of personal freedom? A dramatic example is our dependence on the young men manning the Distant Early Warning line—a sleepy or an overzealous one could cause irrevocable damage.

This increase in the extent to which each individual is personally responsible to others is most noticeable in a large bureaucracy. No one person "decides" anything; each "decision" of any importance is the product of an intricate process of brokerage involving individuals inside and outside the organization. . . . A large organization is a deliberately created system of tensions into which each individual is expected to bring workways, viewpoints, and outside relationships markedly different from those of his colleagues. It is the administrator's task to draw from these disparate forces the elements of wise action from day to day, consistent with the purposes of the organization as a whole.

Rather than seeking freedom in escape from large organizations, as many suggest, greater freedom than ever is available to those who learn to live within them. The skill needed is "consent-building," and all participants must learn this. "The expert is no longer just responsible for 'presenting all the alternatives' in a careful, scientific, and scholarly manner. He must also figure out who to present them to, and how, and what he wants to see happen after one of his 'alternatives' is accepted. The expert is also responsible, in short, not for being only right but effective; for getting his thinking understood by non-specialists, and for carrying his recommendations to the point of action." ("Dinosaurs and Personal Freedom," *Saturday Review*, February 28, 1959, p. 12.)

Countervailing Small Organizations

Less optimistic, Peter F. Drucker, professor of management at New York University, sees the dinosaur of big government not only trampling on individual freedom but on the verge of collapse from its own weight. One of his complaints, somewhat the opposite of Cleveland's: "Today the Office of the President sprawls all over, but the so-called Chief Executive cannot possibly complete his work. And, more serious, he cannot control policy decisions, no matter how brilliant he is or how scientifically organized his staff." Similarly, the British Prime Minister. Also the other side of Cleveland's coin: when government agencies "are scrupulous, they are fussy and slow. When they are 'efficient' they are likely to be responding to pressures—sometimes corrupt."

Big as it is, government is not able to cope with the other organized bodies of power—business, labor, farm organizations, professional societies, even churches. People are "ruled by countless and competing private baronies." Government in the public interest becomes difficult and "all government usually can do is to mediate between competing self-interests." Even in totalitarian states, where it controls information along with its other powers, government "is becoming too weak to be effective."

Though accomplishing little, government demands more, for example security clearances of persons employed by universities do-

ing government work and greater censorship of government information. Current military technology is the reason. More serious, this technology has taken foreign policy out of political control; war is not "an instrument of policy"; rather "policy has to be shaped to the military needs of survival."

"I can see one possible—but only partial—solution . . . , a return to political pluralism." Our party system, educational institutions, and wide use of public authorities for government tasks are examples of pluralism in this country, where it has remained alive though abandoned for 300 years elsewhere. Pluralism probably will not come to grips with the most critical problem, collapse of international rationality, however, and it runs the risk of leaving uncontrolled "the conflict, selfishness, short-sightedness, and sheer technical efficiency of pluralist institutions and power centers." The many small centers of political power under a pluralist system should—the theory holds—balance each other in competition so that the public good emerges from strivings for private good. This is not happening today and may be impossible, Drucker says.

" . . . today it takes supermen in government to do even a poor job. . . . We need a political theory that will give us effective, strong government . . ." ("The Breakdown of Governments," 218 *Harper's Magazine* 35 (January, 1959).)

Pluralism in Practice

A recent study bears out Drucker's pessimism that the public good can emerge from separate centers of private-interest power, as illustrated by the use of special-interest spokesmen as official advisers to the federal government. While the NRA epitomized government-sponsored self-regulation of industry, participation of the regulated in their own regulation occurred often between the World Wars. There now are more than a thousand federal government advisory groups, mostly initiated by the executive rather than by Congress.

Participation in government policy-making by those affected has been seen as "the preferred method of democratizing administration and combatting bureaucratic rigidity,"

"a check against administrative power," and "a solution to the problem of the political alienation of the masses."

The study points to some difficulties, however, in assuring democratic and responsible decision-making:

1. Representation generally follows the status quo in the industry. If the industry is dominated by a small number of large producers, so is the relevant advisory group. This might help the industry leaders keep down potential competitors. The across-the-board Business Advisory Council of the Commerce Department is heavily "big business" dominated.

2. To prevent industrywide cooperation in official committees from turning into cartel practices, the Justice Department has formulated committee rules (e.g., that meeting agendas be set by the government, that the group be chaired by a government representative and full minutes be published), but "the list of violations is long and varied . . . [including] serious infractions such as the submission of committee minutes to trade associations and other groups for deletions and changes." In some groups, even the pretense of government initiative has been abandoned, and the committee functions with the autonomy of a shadow government, choosing the topics it will introduce for discussion and independently defining its own functions. Another example: an order to staff a petroleum committee with government employees resulted in placing industry-paid staff in government in without compensation status. Also, rules set up from time to time by Congress often are violated, the study asserts.

3. Administrators often identify with the group they regulate rather than with the wider public, resulting in one-sided action in favor of the advisers. For example, the Commerce Department's Business and Defense Services Administration was reported by the *Wall Street Journal* to have "gone to bat more than once for United States firms that want tighter trade restraints to shut out foreign competitors," against the President's policy, and tax-deductible funds of the Business Advisory Committee have been used for a registered lobbyist. Following a plan for oil distribution drafted by the oil companies, with

antitrust laws held back, the firms increased profits between 13 and 23 per cent over the previous period. Also, "charges have been made against the members of the MEEC . . . that its failure to divert Venezuelan oil shipments to Europe resulted from such a conflict of interests."

This identity of interests, coupled with the growing independence of bureau chiefs from the higher executive echelons, enhances the potential power of advisory groups and magnifies the possibility that what is forbidden under the antitrust laws may well be achieved under the guise of regulation.

4. Action of private businesses fostered by the government for specific purpose may not easily be repealed when the need ends. For example, cartels, allowed by the government in violation of the antitrust act "once established, are self-perpetuating and can be dislodged, if at all, only by the most drastic means." (Elma M. Saletan, "Administrative Trustification," 11 *Western Political Quarterly* 857 (December, 1958).)

Intergovernmental Relations— Satisfactions and Problems

"With relatively few exceptions, the [House intergovernmental relations] subcommittee has found a favorable acceptance throughout the Nation of the use of grants and of most existing grant purposes" in a series of hearings with local, state, and federal political and administrative leaders, and spokesmen for private organizations. Far from weakening state and local government, the grant is "a useful device for harnessing cooperative governmental effort." (The report: "Federal-State-Local Relations, Federal Grants-in-Aid," *Thirtieth Report by the Committee on Government Operations*, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958. The hearings: "Federal-State-Local Relations," (in seven volumes) 1958 and 1959.)

State and local officials, far from berating the federal government for invading their domain, generally argued not only for continuation of grants-in-aid but also for continued federal standards on service and administration—and this even in states, counties, and cities

which contribute more via federal taxes than they receive in federal grants. While there were some complaints of federal redtape (e.g., detailed personnel requirements in New York state, with its advanced merit system, and overcaution in approval of housing and urban renewal particularly after misuse of funds was headlined), more typical were such statements as these:

I feel if the Federal Government is going to advance funds, it ought to have some control and knowledge of the expenditure. . . . I see no conflict between State and Federal Government in administering grants-in-aid, as both desire the same objectives. . . . DENNIS J. ROBERTS, then Governor of Rhode Island.

Connecticut's administrative grants from the Federal unemployment tax have been 53 percent of its contributions. It might be thought, then, that we would generally take the attitude of a complete States rights program. . . . We do not. We are well aware of the fact that there would be no unemployment compensation program, or employment security program, were it not for Federal initiative. . . . The Connecticut State government, while it is satisfied generally with the present State-Federal partnership, and while it is enthusiastic about Federal cooperation in this partnership, feels that the large discretion and flexibility given to the States in the basic Federal legislation has resulted in underemphasis rather than overemphasis of the Federal interest. . . . JOSEPH J. GIBBONS, Executive Director, Connecticut Employment Security Division.

. . . it seems to me grants-in-aid are the least vulnerable to any charges of overcentralization or domination by the Federal Government, and I honestly think that the central feature of grants-in-aid, that of minimum standards, definitely tends to strengthen State and local governments. . . . While it seems to me somewhat popular to complain or sneer at bureaucracy, especially at the Federal level, I can only report from personal experience, that the Federal people with whom I have dealt have been able, have been efficient, and have been desirous of helping. JOSEPH COURTNEY, Town Manager, Wilmington, Massachusetts.

I would be a little fearful of receiving unearmarked funds. This way the Federal Government at least has supervision. . . . If you just set the funds free, I am not so sure they would get as good results as they are under the present system. DAVID L. LAWRENCE, then Mayor of Pittsburgh.

. . . it is our opinion that the time has come for a set of minimum standards to which all States would have to adjust themselves, still leaving the

individual States to improve standards above those minimums as they saw fit. . . . In my own experience with Federal administrative standards, I am convinced that they are the most effective way of getting good administration within the States. . . . By setting standards, and keeping an eye on everything we do, the Federal Government puts us, as administrators, in a position where we, in turn, can insist that standards be met. ISADOR LUBIN, then New York State Industrial Commissioner.

We generally feel most of the present programs are vital and should be continued, and even recommend an increase in the funds for some. . . . JAMES D. HOPKINS, County Executive, Westchester County, New York.

The committee found these arguments for continued federal grants valid:

Failure of the states to meet needs, partly due to unrepresentativeness of legislatures, short legislative sessions without adequate staff, and poor pay for legislators. We "must exert greater effort toward improving the representativeness and the effectiveness of many of our State governments if we are to preserve a vigorous Federal system."

Concentrated economic and social activity so that "the demands for government activities are better organized and more intensive at the Federal than at the State and local levels."

Continuing need to equalize resources among the states, whose per capita incomes, though growing together, still varied in 1956 from \$964 in Mississippi to \$2,858 in Delaware. Different sources of federal, state, and local funds, federal taxes being more progressive than most state taxes.

The subcommittee also felt that the Joint Federal-State Action Committee efforts to find federal tax sources which could be abandoned to the states along with full responsibility for programs now federally-aided were inappropriate because of the wide disparity in the financial return to the states from these tax sources and because state constitutional restrictions "may prevent adequate performance of the activities involved." Generally, ". . . it appears that many States would be unable or unwilling to carry on these functions alone." However, the federal government "should

avoid preempting tax fields that are not essential for financing its activities and which can be utilized effectively by other levels of government," but "this principle is separate and distinct from the concept of giving up particular tax sources as a practical substitute for Federal grants."

Some policy and administrative features of grants which the subcommittee feels can be improved are:

1. Grant legislation should include (1) clear program goals, (2) whether the grant is to stimulate or support or both, (3) perhaps a termination date, and (4) provision for periodic review.

2. Financial formulas and administrative requirements should be more standardized if possible, and the total impact of grants on state government should be considered as well as the applicability of the formula to each program.

3. In response to numerous requests at the hearings for greater flexibility in grants, Congress should authorize transfer of up to 20 per cent of federal apportionments between the special categories of any program when requested by the governor and approved by the federal agency involved.

4. To "avoid burdening the States with unnecessary or unreasonable administrative requirements," Congress should consider: (1) removing from the Vocational Rehabilitation Act the limitation on state choice of the agency to receive the grant, (2) repealing requirements to earmark specific state taxes for highway purposes, and (3) permitting the states to reduce unemployment tax rates on a flat rate basis.

5. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare should propose a more equitable formula for distributing old age assistance.

On the whole, however, response to subcommittee questions from state and local officials indicated "a fairly high degree of satisfaction with Federal participation in existing grant programs," and that "the notion that Federal administrative costs take an excessive share of grant expenditures" is a misconception. ". . . administrative costs actually represent a very small percentage of total grant ex-

penditures" and other factors "are more weighty considerations."

Federal-State Action Committee Report

At the same time, the Joint Federal-State Action Committee, set up in August, 1957 at the suggestion of the President and consisting of governors and political executives of the federal government, recommended closer federal-state liaison by (1) making the governor's office in each state the contact point for state agencies needing better channels of communication to Washington, (2) using the Council of State Governments' Washington office as the governor's contact point "where existing means . . . have not been adequate," (3) going (via CSG) to the Deputy Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Relations where two or more federal agencies are involved or previous efforts with one agency have not succeeded. This does not preclude direct state agency-federal agency relations or an approach through the state's congressional delegation.

In disagreement with the House subcommittee, the Joint Action Committee developed a proposal to return to the states 40 per cent of the federal telephone tax (somewhat equalized to help the poorer states) and simultaneously eliminate federal grants for vocational education and sewage disposal. After five years of rebating the tax, the federal government would cut its 10 per cent tax to 6, leaving 4 per cent available for state taxation. However, the Joint Action Committee found it hard to apply this arrangement to other taxes and grants. Even when federal tax sources could be discovered which roughly equalled U. S. expenditures on a grant that might be eliminated, "on a State-by-State basis, an approximate equivalence between grants and revenues is the exception." The Joint Action Committee staff also is studying the feasibility of non-earmarked block grants replacing specific program grants to widen state policy-making. (*Second Report of the Joint Federal-State Action Committee*, U. S. Government Printing Office, December, 1958.)

General Federal-State Relationships

Federal relationships to the states apart from grants-in-aid were sharply criticized by

spokesmen for the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation. Several examples were given of the drafting of federal legislation directly affecting the states on which no state representatives were consulted until the final stages—in contrast to regular invitations by the states for U. S. participation in the drafting of interstate compacts. In addition, they alleged federal interference with interstate compacts beyond the necessary protection of national interests, federal reluctance to appoint state representatives on U. S. agencies dealing in state-related matters, and federal pre-emption of fields of action—preventing state action—without adequate federal enforcement, as in safety regulation of interstate carriers. (By contrast, the U. S. Forest Service and Federal Bureau of Prisons were cited as encouraging interstate cooperation without imposing their own notions on the states.) Admitting that the President's new intergovernmental relations staff has helped, it has so far been mainly an appeal body when states disagree with U. S. decisions. (Testimony and memorandum of Frederick L. Zimmermann and Mitchell Wendell.)

A contrasting example of recent federal-state cooperation:

Complementary federal and state safe boating laws were developed by state officials acting as a subcommittee of the Council of State Governments' Committee on Suggested State Legislation, House of Representatives staff members, and spokesmen for the Coast Guard and the boating industry. A 1958 federal law, substantially as developed by this group, was dovetailed with a model state bill included in CSG's *Suggested State Legislation—Program for 1959*. The CSG subcommittee's suggestions on regulations under the federal law also were substantially accepted, and a continuing advisory panel of state officials will review future regulations and Coast Guard enforcement procedures.

Representative Herbert C. Bonner, chairman of the House Committee involved, commented that this "unusual, if not unique, exercise in federal-state relations" should point the way to "an increased use of such intimate . . . cooperation at the very inception of legislation . . ." (Herbert C. Bonner, "An Exer-

cise in Federal-State Relations," 32 *State Government* 50 (Winter, 1959).)

Channels of Cooperation

The House subcommittee, calling for closer federal-state cooperation, urged a permanent advisory commission with membership from all levels of government and both executive and legislative branches. Its committees would study special problems, aided by a permanent staff and the statistical and research facilities of the federal government. Further, the new federal staff for intergovernmental relations should be strengthened and should pay particular attention to urban problems. The subcommittee also praised the Pacific Coast Board of Intergovernmental Relations which, "under the leadership of J. W. Rupley, then chief field representative of the Bureau of the Budget in the San Francisco Office, and the late Prof. Samuel C. May of the University of California . . . developed into a striking example of the successful coordination of all three levels of government." It was discontinued in 1953 when regional Budget Bureau offices were closed.

As another channel of state-federal communication, the Joint Action Committee report implies that it will continue. This stands somewhat opposed to the House subcommittee proposal of an intergovernmental advisory commission which would not only include local government but also the legislative branches at all levels, both excluded from the Joint Action Committee. (In fact, subcommittee Chairman L. H. Fountain complained that the President did not even inform Congress of his proposal to establish the Joint Action Committee although the subcommittee had already begun its own study of intergovernmental relations.)

Zimmermann and Wendell warned the House subcommittee that our case-by-case approach to federal-state division of responsibilities, without a serious effort to think through principles of responsibility and develop new devices to achieve them, will result in growing federal dominance. The federal position, they said, "is well defended" by the federal bureaucracy which "far outweighs the various smaller State administrative machines both in strength and drive" and the Supreme Court

generally has abandoned its role of arbiter between federal and state interests to the legislative and executive branches.

The idea that the Supreme Court has abandoned its role as arbiter of the federal system, also stated by the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, is disputed by a new book, *The Supreme Court as Final Arbiter in Federal-State Relations*, which points out that "the tendency of the Court to uphold legislative enactments expansive of national power probably reflected judicial acquiescence in these policies rather than retirement from the umpire's role." (By John R. Schmidhauser, University of North Carolina Press, 1958, p. 213.) Also, recent Supreme Court decisions allowing the states to tax what previously had been considered interstate commerce and imports into the state and a 1958 decision allowing state taxation of privately-owned but federally-used property point to the fact that "in economic matters the modern Court has vastly enhanced the power of the states." (Anthony Lewis, "A Gain for States' Rights," *New York Times*, March 1, 1959.)

Canadian Practices

Canadian federal-provincial relationships might be compared to ours:

In Canada, an irregular series of federal-provincial conferences have tended to work out pragmatically the distribution of powers as changing conditions and new types of public programs forced rethinking of the allocation of responsibility. "Records of [conference] proceedings indicate the growing vitality of the institution as an adjunct to the defined legislative and executive functions of Canadian government." Despite "constitutional, political and procedural snarls of a substantial order . . . it does seem that through a history of usage rather than of definition the outlines of a new and continuing 'arm' of government in Canada are becoming increasingly clear . . ." (Thomas H. McLeod, "Federal-Provincial Relations, 1958," in *Canadian Public Administration* 1 (September, 1958).)

In addition, there are 64 federal-provincial committees of long or indefinite terms of reference ranging from broad (e.g., agriculture, fiscal and economic policy) to narrow and

technical (e.g., diseases of the beaver) and ranging in hierarchical level from ministers (5) to technicians (28). Some do not include all the provinces; 24 include nongovernmental spokesmen in addition to federal and provincial officials. They are, according to one participant, "useful, indeed indispensable," though "intergovernmental coordination in administration is a difficult task." (K. W. Taylor, "Co-ordination in Administration," *Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference, 1957*, The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, University of Toronto Press, pp. 253 ff.)

State-Local Relations

"The [House] subcommittee was surprised and somewhat alarmed in its regional hearings by the extent of the animosity shown toward State Government by city officials. The mayors who testified were almost uniformly critical of State restrictions on and interference with the efforts of municipalities to deal with local problems." Some examples:

I personally do not have any great confidence in a State government. . . . I think the State legislatures tend to be pretty irresponsible. RICHARDSON DILWORTH, Mayor of Philadelphia.

. . . State governments . . . are obsolete, archaic, and are . . . living monuments to man's refusal to recognize the close level of the questions and problems in the communities where they are. JAMES H. KINSELLA, Councilman, Hartford, Connecticut.

Harriman on How to Get Better Career Men in Government

"In the forty-five years I have been working in and out of government, I have seen the quality of individual civil servants consistently rise. . . . But, as one of the nation's few genuine experts on government personnel put it to me recently, 'We are getting more and more of the good men, fewer and fewer of the best.' Averell Harriman asks why and suggests some answers.

The traditional mistrust of government has grown with its increasing activities. The false notion that civil servants are "plotting the triumph of Big Government" is prevalent; civil servants "can't fight back, and no one is willing to fight for them."

The political leader must take more responsibility for the civil service, encouraging positive personnel programs that will provide opportunity for interchange among agencies, incentive pay plans, and salaries and fringe benefits that can attract people of the capacity needed.

Also, the line between career and political executives should not be too sharp. Often, a career administrator is the best candidate for a political-executive position and promoting him to it "enables the public to draw favorable conclusions concerning the quality of their anonymous colleagues further down the ladder." This step into political-executive ranks probably means that the civil servant will have to leave the governmental unit with a change of administration because "there is seldom any acceptable way back into the career service." This is difficult for the official and a loss to the government, but "it is a loss which I believe we can well afford in the interests of giving incentive and prestige to the career service." ("How to Get Better Public Servants," 217 *Harper's Magazine* 55 (September, 1958).)

Washington Thinking the Opposite

The federal government is relying more and more on experienced career people for key positions, James Reston, political analyst of the *New York Times*, notes. ("The Pros in Government," March 4, 1959.) The President's continuing difficulty in finding and keeping key men, with "the dangers of a lack of continuity in government . . . increasing all the time," have given rise to

some talk here about the need for strengthening and evaluating the professional corps, and of introducing a system of permanent under secretaries of all the departments who, as in Britain and the other parliamentary democracies, can give continuity from one Administration to another, and help carry the burdens in time of personal illness to the top political leaders.

It is generally agreed that these permanent officials should not be asked to take top political jobs. In the popular phrase, they should be "on tap and not on top," but recent events suggest that there should be more of them and that their critical place in a changing government should be more widely recognized and valued.

Prestige of the Public Service

Public service prestige appears to be rising, but more of both the middle class (social and income) and the college-educated still rate public employment low on prestige than rate it high, a survey in the Detroit metropolitan area reveals.

When asked: "If the pay were the same, would you prefer to work for the United States government or for a private firm?" Fifty-six per cent chose government, only 30 per cent private industry; the rest were indifferent or undecided. This compares to quite similar polls taken nationally by the American Institute of Public Opinion in 1947 showing 41 per cent favored government employment, 40 per cent private; and by *Fortune* magazine in 1940 in which 40 per cent preferred government, 50 per cent private. However, the current preference for public employment may not be a measure of prestige since the reasons for preferring government were: job security or retirement benefits—73 per cent, fairer personnel policies—6 per cent. (Those who preferred private employment mentioned less red tape—26 per cent—and more opportunity for advancement—21 per cent.)

Even if growing preference for public employment does mean growing prestige, it may not extend to the professional levels. Half of those interviewed felt that a stenographer in government had more prestige than one in private industry compared to one-fourth who thought the opposite, but this was more than reversed for doctors, and prestige was considered about the same in public or private employment for accountants—assuming in all cases the same pay and kind of work.

The public's view of public employees (as well as of public employment) apparently improved: 27 per cent said city employees were more courteous than private; 29 said equally courteous; 29 said private were more courteous. In Leonard White's Chicago study in 1929, only 18 per cent felt city employees were more courteous, and 60 per cent felt private employees were. (In using this change in attitude as an indication of a general trend toward increased government prestige, one should consider that two factors were changed—the time and the place.)

Other attitudes of Detroit area people toward government: Only 9 per cent felt that all of the five "highly visible" local and state agencies selected for inquiry were doing a poor job and another 7 per cent thought four of the five were poorly operated, compared with 16 per cent who thought all were well operated and another 21 per cent who said all but one were. Three out of five felt that government gives full measure or more for the tax dollar; only half that number felt government cost more than it was worth. Similarly, 40 per cent felt government should do more compared to 7 per cent who said it should do less. This varied by social class, but not very much. It also varied by age, with a little greater percentage of those 50 and over than of those under 50 feeling there was too much government and a somewhat smaller percentage of over 50's than under feeling there should be more. Oddly enough, the higher the social class, the larger the percentage that felt government services were worth at least as much as they cost.

About honesty in government: 13 per cent said many higher government officials were dishonest, 71 per cent "just a few," and 7 per cent none. At the same time, 41 per cent said "political pull substantially affects government decisions to help private citizens with individual problems; another 28 per cent said it played some part." But they did not seem to condemn pull. "It was viewed as a human and understandable way of coping with and adapting to complexity and impersonality," and did not seem incompatible with the feelings of 65 per cent of those interviewed that their personal dealings with public employees were good or very good. Only 6 per cent said they had poor personal dealings. Nevertheless, nearly three in five felt they needed outside help in bringing a problem before a government agency—lawyers and accountants generally (26 per cent), organizations (16 per cent), or government officials (13 per cent). Apparently, "the political party has lost many of its functions as an intermediary between the public and administrative agencies; professional and special interest groups have assumed this function." (At least in the Detroit area.) (Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright, and William Delany, *Public Administration and*

the Public—Perspectives toward Government in a Metropolitan Community, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1958.)

Meanwhile, in Canada . . .

There is danger that the Canadian government will corral too great a percentage of the country's experts and intellectuals, leaving too little outside knowledge and research capable of presenting alternatives to government policy, John Porter, Carleton College, suggests. (And this despite a 1948 poll indicating that 45 per cent of Canadians preferred working for industry compared to 36 per cent preferring federal government employment, job conditions being equal. About the same time, U. S. citizens indicated a 41 per cent to 40 per cent preference for U. S. government over private employment. Reported in the Detroit study, above.)

Of Canada's top civil servants (243 from the highest three ranks earning \$8,000 a year and over) nearly one-fifth have been teachers, mainly in universities, and "a fair number . . . had distinguished themselves as academics before becoming public servants." A survey of 202 of the 243 "elite" public servants also shows:

More than three-fourths have university degrees; in the highest rank, seven of eight.

Only half have spent half their working lives in the Canadian service and less than one-fourth have spent their whole careers in it. One in four was appointed to his present position from the outside. Of the top ranking public servants, two out of five were appointed to that position or to their immediately previous government position from the outside. Outsiders mainly have come from business and politics, somewhat fewer from universities and the military.

Socially, 18 per cent of the Canadian-born come from the upper class, 9 per cent from the handful of social elite in the country. Only one in eight come from families below the middle class. The higher the rank, the higher the percentage of middle, upper, and elite class origins. ("Higher Public Servants and the Bureaucratic Elite in Canada," 24 *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 483 (November, 1958).)

Louisville's City Consultant— Different Things to Different Men

Louisville hired a City Consultant in 1948 as a top administrator-adviser to the mayor. Roy Owsley has been the only incumbent, but the job has changed several times to fit the ability and interests of the three mayors with whom Owsley has worked. (Gladys M. Kammerer and Ruth McQuown, "The City Consultant: Plan or Expedient?" Bureau of Government Research, University of Kentucky, 1958.)

Mayor Farnsley, who conceived of the job originally and devised the title and legal characteristics to escape the rigid salary and appointment powers allowed by the charter, relied almost entirely on Owsley for day-to-day administration and policy-making, not even appearing regularly at City Hall. He, meanwhile, developed broad city goals and long-range plans—for example, inaugurating city contributions to the Louisville symphony, expanding library services including adult education, increasing the University of Louisville's appropriation and expanding its adult education, initiating urban redevelopment and adding recreational facilities, planning for downtown traffic, and maintaining close relations to citizens (including one innovation—weekly "beef" sessions where citizens raised problems and department heads were called on to reply or investigate).

Mayor Broadbuss, his successor, was a small-businessman, not accustomed to delegating as extensively as Farnsley. For a time, according to these observers, Owsley's full talents were not used. The city council—to whom Owsley also served as consultant—changed with the mayor and showed less confidence in the consultant than before, Kammerer and McQuown said. After a discussion with the mayor, Owsley was given more responsibility; still, the authors seem to feel, he was not satisfied with his role. After an overseas assignment on leave, Owsley returned to even greater delegated responsibility. The third mayor, however, announced that he would

need Owsley for only two years of his four-year term, feeling he could handle administration after that—clearly another conception of the consultant's role.

Evaluating the system, Kammerer and McQuown feel it cannot provide both expert and continuing administration because there is a tendency for the consultant to become identified with major policy questions and because he holds a position that is both line—as director of administration—and staff—as adviser to the mayor on administration, thus eliminating the inspection and review functions usually expected of a staff person.

Who Enters Public Health?

Why do physicians enter or not enter public health? A committee of the American Public Health Association, as a first step toward finding out, questioned 2,669 medical students from eight schools (a stratified random sample). "Very few medical students show any inclination to enter full-time public health work," but a "substantial minority" is interested in part-time public health work.

Compared to all the students, those favorable to part-time public health work are less clear in their thinking about the future, less likely to have been pre-medical students, less secure about their standing in school, less financially secure, less likely to have businessman fathers. They have stronger religious convictions, have a less clear concept of the ideal job, and are less interested in independence of action, a variety of activities, or certainty of effect. They are less concerned with prestige within the profession, with a manageable workload, with challenge, serious consequences of error, jobs requiring exacting analysis or counselling, or high income. They are more likely, however, to feel that a job should contribute to knowledge. (Robert E. Coker, Jr., et al., "Public Health as Viewed by the Medical Student," paper presented to the American Public Health Association conference, October 27, 1958.)

Comment and Critique

Brief letters on *Review* articles and other public administration matters, selected for general interest, stimulating ideas, and thoughtful content. Letters are welcomed by the Editors.

Cancellation of Foreign Service Entrance Examination Criticized

The announcement of the cancellation of this year's Foreign Service Entrance Examination should not be allowed to pass without some indication of the heavy responsibility which the State Department itself bears for this highly regrettable development. Secretary Dulles himself called attention to the risks involved when he told the Senate Appropriations Committee on April 30, 1957, that if sharply increased appropriations were not forthcoming "we shall be unable to advance our program of recruiting into the Department and the Foreign Service the best products of the colleges and universities. . . . It is immensely important that qualified young men and women pick the Foreign Service as a career. But this enthusiasm cannot be sustained if we have to close down on accepting and training new recruits." Many of us in university positions who cooperated with the intensive recruitment drive of the past two years can testify from the angry reaction of this year's would-be candidates how right was Dulles's prediction about the consequences of a cut-off. But it would be grossly unfair to put the whole blame on Congress.

For the fiscal year 1957, with the approval of Congress, very large increases (about 1300) were made in the number of positions available to be filled by Americans in the Foreign Service and domestically in the State Department. Yet in that same period, for reasons that are probably justifiable but by tactics that are not, the Department took advantage of some flexibility in its employment turnover to create and fill an extra 446 positions (109 of them with Americans) "in the hope that

Congress would approve our actions and make funds available for us to continue them [plus the regularly programmed new positions] during the fiscal year 1958." As Deputy Under Secretary Loy Henderson went on to admit later to the Senate Appropriations Committee (May 1, 1957), "I do think we should have informed the committees that we were doing it, and therefore we were derelict. I feel very strongly we were derelict in not informing the committees as to what we were doing." In the economizing mood of 1957, congressmen were not likely to be satisfied with this show of contrition. The House only slightly increased the fiscal 1958 "Salaries and Expenses" appropriation over the figure granted the previous year, and the act as finally passed gave the State Department only about half the increase it was requesting.

The obvious consequence was that the rate of growth of the Department, including the Foreign Service, would have to be slowed severely. Yet already, as Henderson had also told the Committee, "a large number of young Foreign Service officers, FSO-8's, who [had] passed the examination" were waiting for positions.

In spite of the long waiting line, the Department decided not to put into effect any very severe slowdown during 1957-58 in the recruitment campaign in American colleges. Apparently the chance was taken once again that Congress would come to the rescue. A few hundred additional FSO-8 positions were genuinely felt to be needed, partly for undermanned posts, partly because "Wristonization" had produced a Foreign Service relatively overloaded in the middle ranks. (Promotions are difficult to arrange in the absence of "sym-

metry" in the personnel structure.) Henderson was frank with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 27, 1958: "We realize how difficult it is for these men not to know when they may be called in [as FSO-8's after having passed all examinations]. We have been adding steadily at the bottom of the Service. I think sometimes that we may have taken more officers into class 8 recently than our budget can stand. We are so anxious, however, to keep a steady flow from the bottom to the top."

Again, however, Congress was unobliging. Even the Budget Bureau, anticipating congressional attitudes, held down the Department's "Salaries and Expenses" request for fiscal '59 to a level which would have severely restricted the personnel plans. And then Congress split the difference between the actual fiscal '58 appropriation and the final fiscal '59 request—with the result that the "Salaries and Expenses" appropriation for the current fiscal year is only slightly more than for last year. The slowdown in the rate of growth of the Department must therefore continue.

At last, during the summer of 1958, the Department accepted the conclusion that the

rate of recruitment would also have to be cut—and chose to accomplish the cut by simply omitting an entire year of examinations.

Clearly, personnel administration in the State Department had gone way out on the limb. Hundreds of men were accepted for the Foreign Service before there was any certainty that money would be available to employ them. And presumably a few dozen of them, while "qualified" under the somewhat relaxed standards that have recently prevailed, are inferior to men who will now be lost entirely from competition because, lacking a chance to compete this year, they will become committed to other careers. In addition, even from future classes of college students recruitment will be hampered by the impairment of that sense of continuity and reliability which is important in attracting able young men to a career service in government.

Congress is largely to blame. But so also is the Department—for the way it has handled its relations with Congress on these matters and for conducting nationwide recruitment campaigns for positions which were likely not even to come into existence until years later.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD,
Yale University

Editorial Comment

ASPHALT VS. CONCRETE, AND OTHER COMPARISONS

COMPARISON is at the heart of both administration and scholarship. For the administrator, comparison underlies choice and choice is decision-making. For the social scientist, comparison underlies progression from a jumble of individuals, institutions, and events to their grouping into categories. The categories permit generalizations describing the real but otherwise hidden world of relationships.

To recognize the role of comparison, however, is to endorse a procedure whose specifics we eagerly reach for but rarely grasp. We can distinguish comparisons calling for the peculiarly personal taste of an artist from situations requiring an objective and concrete choice, say among paving materials. Between these extremes of subjective taste and testable performance we talk of "informed judgment" and "objective appraisal of the evidence." Administrators and social scientists, aware that the results of their comparisons must blend with those of colleagues dealing with like situations and must be justified to a critical audience, strive to reduce the subjective element in comparison.

But how to do it? We need to decide clearly what features to compare—to cut to the bone of essential likenesses and contrasts. And we need to find a scale on which each unit to be compared can be rated on each of the features deemed relevant. These needs—for criteria and for measurability—are more easily stated than satisfied.

The choice of features to be compared itself rests on comparison. In both administration and scholarship, limited time, money, and staff require that the criteria chosen be few, even though many others may bear on the problem. So choosing the few rests on a judgment of both relevance and importance. But this judgment is often subjective, either because personal values enter in or because the existing state of research on the subject permits no firm guidance. The criteria by which we identify leadership, plan executive training, reorganize a government's executive branch, or choose a research project are all elusive.

Ideally, we need to measure the degree to which specified criteria are met. But in the present state of knowledge many relevant and important criteria do not yield to measurement. By a sort of unintended reverse English, our thrust toward objectivity sometimes tricks us into magnifying the importance of those criteria that we can measure. Statistics of recorded arrests or convictions, though a measurement, are at best only suggestive as to crime rates or police efficiency in different cities. Scrutiny of budget requests, winnowing out of applicants for the civil service, designing of research projects may all focus on the most visible similarities and contrasts because more genuinely discriminating comparisons seem costlier in time, money, and effort.

Measurement is intended to be a tool for increasing the objectivity of judgment. But apparent exactness enables subjective judgment to masquerade as objectivity. Budget requests can be exact statements of inexact ideas, and hopes pose as needs. The graduated scales of efficiency rating forms can give an illusory precision to a peculiarly personal judgment.

Refinement of methods of identifying and measuring important similarities and differences underlies the increasing competence of administrators and social scientists in understanding and influencing the environment. Yet skill is inadequate for many comparisons that must be made. Most essays in this and the preceding issue of the *Review* can be read as commentaries on the primitive state of our knowledge of how to compare, among others, presidents, governors, city managers, public expenditures, executive training programs, advisory committees, and, of course, foreign administrative systems. Our skill in comparison will develop as more administrators and scholars habituate themselves to getting criteria for judgment into the open and imaginatively seek more reliable ways to tell how far the criteria are satisfied by the alternatives under consideration.

JAMES W. FESLER
Editor-in-Chief

Society Perspectives

IN TRANSITION TO MATURITY

FOR THE LAST three years ASPA has been developing rapidly under the impetus of a Ford Foundation grant. Now, with only a small amount yet to accrue from this grant, the Society is beginning to stand unsupported in that traditional year of maturity—the twenty-first.

The returns from recent development buttress the thesis that, given time, ASPA will attract enough support from individuals and agencies to maintain a well-rounded generalist program. Both membership and chapters have increased over the three years by almost two-thirds and revenue from dues, fees, sponsorships, and other earnings has more than tripled. But the course is yet to be proven, for costs are about \$175,000 a year—some \$50 thousand more than current income without grants. The willingness of members to work for the organization, the potentially large audience for its gospel of better governmental management, and the opening of new channels of agency support will help to bridge that gap.

Several guide posts, based on both the founding principles and developmental experience of the Society, seem appropriate for the years ahead:

1. The primary role of ASPA is as a forum in which persons from all specialties, programs, roles and observation points in public affairs share ideas, experiences, and aspirations concerning their common interests in administration.

2. The Society is also an information center about public administration—its trends, personalities, developments, coming events, and broader political and social setting.

3. ASPA has a more positive function—drawing on its wide resources to help individual administrators and public agencies become more effective through executive development, placement assistance, and management materials.

4. The Society has special responsibility for bringing a proper image of the career public administrator before the nation.

5. ASPA needs a sizable and diverse membership—not primarily just line or staff, federal or local, or practical or theoretical. All groups should be represented in order to concentrate effectively on what is of interest to all.

6. ASPA's open membership policy makes good sense—keeping the organization generally available for expressing professional interest in the administrative aspects of the public service.

7. The Society should be the "good neighbor" of other public administration groups, complementing their more specialized concerns and serving as a friendly open house.

8. ASPA benefits also from close and cordial links with social science, civic, and private management groups, which have with the Society a mutual interest in organization and government.

9. Professionalism in public administration will grow out of common knowledge, experience, and objectives as communication among public administrators increases. A profession cannot be organizationally imposed but must develop from the logic of ideas and events.

10. Standards of "good" or "bad" public administration need to be much clearer if ASPA is to consider taking stands. Determining positions without standards, still difficult to define, would be analogous to guiding a boat without chart or compass.

11. The Society provides a continuing framework through which members can carry out programs of personal and professional value. The central staff generally will be more effective as a motivational, coordinative, and communication mechanism than as an operating group.

12. Locally, the chapters are the vehicle through which the ASPA program should be executed. They can be strengthened for this task by increasing recognition, more information, and continuing visitations from national officers and staff.

13. The cost of belonging to the Society must remain reasonable, particularly since many members also belong to complementary specialized groups. A generalist organization cannot have a high-fee policy.

14. The reasons for joining ASPA go beyond merely paying for services. The Society is also the expression of a cause—the belief that the administration of public affairs is worth study and, through study, can be made more effective.

ASPA is entering maturity under challenging auspices. The immediate problem of financing is difficult but susceptible of solution. Once beyond this, ASPA can make almost infinite contributions over the years to a stronger public service and thus to the better realization of American democracy.

ROBERT J. M. MATTESON
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